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ABSTRACT
On April 28, 1965 the US military intervened in the Dominican Republic’s civil
war. This dissertation argues that the military did not deploy to fight a war but to create a
favorable environment for the establishment of a pro-US government. The US military
relied on humanitarian aid through civic action programs and civil affairs operations to
diminish the Dominican populations’ interest in leftist political organizations and
platforms. The civil affairs and civic action programs served to both alleviate the
hardships of the Dominican people, turn them away from leftist policies, and build
support for a US friendly government. The US military’s humanitarian aid through civic
action and civil affairs included programs from entertainment to providing health care
and demonstrates that the military during the Cold War functioned more as an occupation
force rather than a fighting force. The 1965 Dominican intervention demonstrated that
occupation and humanitarian policies continued throughout the Cold War and succeeded
in developing stable pro-US governments. During the intervention the military functioned
alongside humanitarian organizations, other US government entities, and the first and
only western hemisphere military coalition created by the OAS. The use of military
humanitarianism illustrates the neo-imperialist tactics of the US government during the
Cold War.
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
On April 28, 1965 the United States intervened militarily in the Dominican
Republic’s civil war under the auspices of humanitarianism. During the year and a half
occupation the US military relied on civil affairs and civil action programs, rather than
combat actions, to ensure a stable environment in the Dominican Republic for the
development of political negotiations leading to a permanent government. This
dissertation will argue that the US Army and Marine Corps deployed to the Dominican
Republic not to fight a war but to create favorable conditions to establish a pro-US
government. The military used civil affairs and civic action programs to create the
necessary conditions as humanitarian aid, from entertainment to medical care, made the
Dominican population less likely to turn to leftist or radical political activism. When
successful, civil affairs and civic action programs alleviated the Dominican peoples’
hardships, turned them away from the promises of the radical left, and furthered the
mission of establishing a stable pro-US government. The US military experienced minor,
but intense fighting, during the initial months of the intervention, however most military
action dealt with humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. The 1965 Dominican
intervention serves as an example to demonstrate that during the Cold War the US
military operated more as an occupation force rather than a fighting force. The US
military’s use of humanitarian aid in the Dominican Republic exemplified the United
States’ Cold War neo-imperialist strategy of using occupations and humanitarianism to
build and support US friendly governments around the world.
The United States has a long history of military intervention in the Caribbean
region, especially the Dominican Republic. Beginning in 1906, President Theodore
1

Roosevelt, having issued the Roosevelt Corollary two years earlier, took control of the
Dominican Republic’s customs house. Ten years later Woodrow Wilson ordered the
occupation of the Dominican Republic due to civil unrest and increasing foreign
controlled debt. This action, part of a larger overall policy to reinforce the Monroe
Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary, was included among a series of interventions across
the Caribbean including Haiti, Nicaragua, Mexico, and Cuba. Under the guise of
reforming the Dominican government’s institutions a US military government controlled
Dominican affairs from 1916 to 1924 and contributed to the future rise of Dominican
dictator Rafael Trujillo. The election of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt led to the
enactment of the Good Neighbor Policy, which restrained US government interventions
in Caribbean and Latin American nations’ affairs; however, the policy did not stop U.S
corporations from controlling and influencing the politics or economies of those nations.
The Good Neighbor Policy ended in 1954 when President Dwight Eisenhower ordered
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to launch a covert coup to overthrow the elected
government of Guatemala. The first overt military intervention in Latin America since
the Good Neighbor Policy occurred with the 1965 Dominican intervention, and further
reinforced the containment policy against left leaning and possibly soviet allied
governments in the western hemisphere.
The assassination of Rafael Trujillo on May 30, 1961 pushed the Dominican
Republic into civil unrest. Numerous factions attempted to take control of the
government with the leading faction controlled by Trujillo’s son Ramfis and Joaquin
Balaguer. Considering the continuation of the Trujillo dynasty unacceptable the US
government forced the younger Trujillo and Balaguer into exile. The decision stemmed
2

from the brutality inflicted over thirty years on the Dominican population by the Trujillo
regime, but also due to the Kennedy administration viewing the Dominican Republic as a
sample case for the Alliance for Progress projects to promote democracy. In 1963, the
Dominican Republic created a new constitution, and held open elections resulting in the
surprise victory of Juan Bosch, the leader of the left leaning Dominican Revolutionary
Party (PRD). Months after the elections Bosch wanted to institute reforms altering the
power structure within the Dominican military. High ranking Dominican commanders
believed those reforms endangered their privileged position in Dominican society and in
response launched a coup that overthrew Bosch, and established a triumvirate led by
Donald Reid Cabral.1
In early 1965, the Dominican populations’ anger at Cabral’s leadership due to
corruption and a failing economy reached a boiling point. On April 24, 1965 conspirators
within the Dominican military, primarily junior or mid-level officers, arrested the Chief
of Staff of the Dominican army, General Marcos A. Rivera. By the afternoon of April 24,
those conspirators along with their civilian counterparts armed the civilian population.
This faction, labeled the Constitutionalists, called for the return to the 1963 constitution,
and for Juan Bosch to finish his presidential term.2 After political negotiations, Cabral
stepped down, and Jose Molina Urena, a member of the PRD and an official from the
Bosch administration, stepped in as the provisional president of the Constitutionalist
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Piero Gleijeses, The Dominican Crisis: the 1965 Constitutionalist revolt and
American intervention (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).
2
The term constitutionalist is used to refer to the rebels acting against the
Dominican Republic government. However, not all constitutionalists supported the same
goal, which represents the complexity of the conflict.
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government. While younger officers in the Dominican military tended to side with the
Constitutionalists many of the enlisted held loyalty to the senior level commanders and
opposed the Constitutionalist government immediately. Those who fought against the
Constitutionalists, labeled the Loyalists, included the commander of the Dominican
Military Training Center (CEFA) General Elias Wessin y Wessin, Juan De Los Santos,
commander of the Air Force, and former Dominican general and Trujillo assassin
Antonio Imbert.3 In the afternoon of April 26, Loyalist planes attacked the presidential
palace, the location of the Constitutionalist government, igniting a civil war which led to
heavy urban fighting throughout Santo Domingo.
Reflecting the policy of containment and maintaining a reputation as an advocate
against the spread of communism illustrated the importance of the Dominican Republic
to US interests and led to the deployment of US combat troops to the Caribbean nation
for the first time since 1924. The continuation of the Bosch administration and the
Dominican Republic’s civil war raised the possibility of a communist takeover of the
Dominican Republic and increased the fear of a second Cuba in the Caribbean. The
Johnson administration viewed Bosch and his reforms as weak on communism and
believed communists already existed within the Constitutionalist leadership and
controlled the policies of the faction. A communist Dominican Republic also brought the
possibility of opening “Latin America to further Soviet-Cuban penetration, and diminish
US credibility throughout the world as a faithful ally and a bulwark against Communist

3

The term loyalist is used to distinguish government officials from the
constitutionalists but does not mean that these officials supported the government;
instead, they supported their own interests and goals.
4

expansion.”4 This credibility saw increased importance due to the US stance against
communism around the world and the Johnson administration feared a possible decline of
the US reputation without a strong show of force to protect the nation’s own sphere of
influence.
Using humanitarian civic action programs and civil affairs operations the US
military sought to turn the Dominican population away from the leftist political
organizations instigating the rebellion. The military used humanitarianism compared to
armed aggression to keep large amounts of the Dominican population from joining the
Constitutionalist faction against a foreign invader. The distraction and control tactics
attempted to depoliticize the environment and to divert peoples’ attention from the
political maneuvering of both the Constitutionalist and Loyalist factions seeking support
and control of the Dominican government. The US wanted to keep the United Nations
(UN) from condemning the military action. While the US had the ability to veto any
resolution to the security council the use of a veto presented a bad perception for the US
and the Dominican intervention. Portrayal of the intervention in humanitarian terms gave
the US traction when confronting accusations of violating a nation’s sovereignty.
On April 28, US Marines deployed to the capital city of Santo Domingo under the
premise of protecting US citizens and property. The next day, the 3rd Brigade of the 82nd
Airborne Division landed at San Isidro airfield, preceding the rest of the 82nd along with
the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade. Once established, the paratroopers and marines
occupied strategic locations inside and outside the city, including the Duarte Bridge, the

4

Lawrence Yates, Power Pack: US Intervention in the Dominican Republic,
1965-1966 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988), 34.
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main connection between the city and San Isidro. The Marines established an
International Security Zone (ISZ) around the US embassy, the Marine landing area, and
the Hotel Embajador, which held a number of US and foreign citizens. A communication
gap through the center of the city between the paratroopers and Marines concerned US
military commanders. To close the gap the two forces established a Line of
Communication (LOC) extending from San Isidro airfield to the ISZ, and also trapped a
majority of the Constitutionalist forces in the southern section of the city called Ciudad
Nueva, eliminating any chance of Constitutionalist victory, or the possibility to escape
the city and start an armed insurgency in the countryside. Much like the Soviet Union
erected the Berlin Wall in 1961 splitting the city, the US military split Santo Domingo.
Completion of the LOC brought the first prolonged violent engagements between
US forces and the Constitutionalists. However, those engagements ended after the
Constitutionalist offensive on June 14th and 15th. After the offensive, seen as the last gasp
of the Constitutionalist cause, the US expanded civil affairs operations and civil action
programs around the Dominican Republic. US military personnel conducted all civil
affairs in the Dominican Republic as the Latin American contingents of the InterAmerican Peacekeeping Force (IAPF) provided only combat troops to operate in a police
capacity throughout sections of Santo Domingo. The use of Latin American troops in a
police capacity allowed the US to withdraw troops and allowed Latin American troops to
engage with Dominican civilians to demonstrate multinational aspects of the coalition.
The civil action programs remained aimed at manipulating Dominican civilians in and
outside of the capital city through the duration of the occupation. While the US
conducted those operations, the Latin American units remained in the capital city due to
6

the US military’s desire for strict control of the message and programs conducted for
Dominican civilians.
To aid the intervention’s humanitarian perception the US advocated for the
formation of the Inter-American Peacekeeping Force (IAPF), which formed on May 6,
1965 under control of the Organization of American States (OAS). Created in 1948, the
OAS provides a place where the nations of the western hemisphere meet to discuss
relations and policies. The OAS originally formed to promote the unity of the American
nations and to defend their sovereignty and independence. The US military interventions
of the early 20th Century heavily impacted the creation of the OAS and the language used
in the founding charter sought to protect American nations from US intervention. Some
Latin American nations, such as Mexico and Uruguay, still grew concerned that the US
wanted to use the OAS as a western hemisphere North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) that was created in 1947. That apprehension led member nations to use the OAS
to speak out against US neo-imperialist interventionist policies. At present there are
thirty-five nations within the OAS including the US and the Dominican Republic. After
the initial intervention by the US military the OAS worked with the US in an attempt to
take control of the situation. Member nations created humanitarian aid packages
consisting of food and medical supplies, however, some member crafter resolutions that
denounced the US intervention and called for an immediate withdrawal. In a second bid
to control the situation the OAS worked with the US to deploy negotiators and to create
the IAPF.
The idea for a joint American force originated with the creation of the OAS and
received support from the US to deter “intrahemispheric conflicts, discourage pro7

Communist tendencies, promote security within Latin American countries, and, in the
event of a hemispheric crisis, obviate unilateral US intervention.”5 Essentially, the US
wanted the creation of the coalition to avoid a situation like the Dominican intervention.
However, the apprehension toward the creation of the OAS carried over to the joint
American force as member nations grew concerned the US would use the force to
promote US interventionist policies. The establishment of an inter-American force in
1965 did not originate without controversy. The initial unilateral US military intervention
in the Dominican civil war angered many nations within the OAS with long histories of
US political, economic, and military intervention such as Mexico, Uruguay, and
Guatemala. The US campaigned hard for a joint American coalition to deploy to the
Dominican Republic and pushed the humanitarian aspect of the mission. The OAS
eventually approved the creation of the force but the initial unilateral intervention, along
with other nation specific domestic reasons, led to Brazil, Honduras, Paraguay,
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and El Salvador as the only OAS member nations to join the US
in creating the IAPF. While technically falling under the authority of the OAS, the United
States remained the primary nation through providing the majority of troops and supplies
for the duration of the intervention, allowing the US to maintain control over the
perception of the military’s actions.
The establishment of the IAPF and turning over operational command to the OAS
allowed the US, on the surface, to distance itself from having direct influence on the
intervention. United States troops that served under Brazilian General Hugo Panasco

5

Yates, Power Pack, 146.
8

Alvim remained a controversial topic among US military commanders. General Bruce
Palmer Jr., commander of US forces in the Dominican Republic and deputy commander
of the IAPF, advocated that a US general should have maintained command over the
unified force, and that “in the Dominican Republic, the United States for the ‘first time in
its history,’ Palmer contended, had turned over field command of its combat forces to a
foreign officer. That ‘serious error’ should never be repeated.”6 Palmer’s concern
stemmed from the possibility that the US units lost operational capability to act quickly
under a foreign commander and joint hierarchy. US Government and military leaders
assured Palmer that the US military commanders still had the ability to act when required
to carry out the mission. On May 29, 1965 General Alvim assumed command of the
international force and answered directly to the OAS Secretary General. While other
international organizations, such as the United Nations, had advisors in the Dominican
Republic, General Alvim and the OAS Secretary General “served notice that the OAS,
not the UN, was going to call the shots in the Dominican crisis.”7 While the IAPF
provided the intervention with an international banner, the US remained in control of the
intervention through the political negotiations, and by providing the international force
with over half its personnel, and all logistical support. The US negotiators also
circumvented General Alvim to seek advice from General Palmer, and to maintain US
control of the operation.

6

Yates, Power Pack, 156; this was not the first time US combat troops turned
over field command to a foreign officer. During World War I, US combat troops served
under British and French officers, and during World War II some units served under
British officers in Europe.
7
Yates, Power Pack, 159.
9

The development of the LOC and the arrival of Latin American forces saw
combat operations decline and the situation transitioned into a military occupation of
Santo Domingo. Similar to the transition of Berlin at the end of World War II. The
Marines withdrew fully by June 7, 1965 leaving the 82nd Airborne as the only US force in
the city. As the situation transitioned to an occupation, relations between Dominican
citizens and US troops resembled a roller coaster of emotions that depended on the
reception of aid and the conduct of soldiers. Peacekeeping duty included strict rules of
engagement for US forces and created situations where “combat operations would be
defensive in nature and that soldiers would engage in a variety of activities normally
performed by civilian agencies and officials.”8 The Latin American troops under the
IAPF had more lenient rules of engagement, compared to US soldiers, that led to more
conflicts between those troops and Dominican civilians. Those conflicts caused problems
for US troops attempting to forge relations with the Dominican population.
Like the Latin American troops, the US military experienced a variety of conflicts
between soldiers and Dominican civilians. Many of the confrontations between
Dominican citizens and US troops occurred at military check points, and depended on the
neighborhood; middle and upper class neighborhoods tended to be friendlier to US
forces, while poorer neighborhoods resented the US presence and manipulation of
Dominican affairs as lower class neighborhoods tended to side with the Constitutionalists

8

Yates, Power Pack, 119.
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and the left leaning political parties in the Dominican Republic.9 The Constitutionalists
resented the IAPF controlling movement, especially of weapons, throughout the city.
They developed a number of tactics for moving weapons including the use of women,
sniper diversions, funerals, and the city’s sewer system. Many of these tactics generated
contempt between the civilian population and US troops as US troops opened and
searched coffins, and searched women. To prevent the use of sewers, US personnel
rigged booby traps, and at times engaged in gunfights, or hand to hand combat beneath
the city.10
The tactics employed by US military personnel required the development of more
civil action programs throughout Santo Domingo to offset the impression of an
aggressive foreign occupation. The development and use of civil action programs allowed
US military personnel to minimize the impact of strong-arm tactics and make the case
that the US military helped average Dominicans, many of whom had experienced
extreme hardship during the civil war. While civic action programs helped the Dominican
population directly through humanitarian aid programs, civil affairs worked with
Dominican political structures and leaders to restart Dominican institutions which shut
down due to the violence. The operation of government institutions gave Dominicans
places to receive medical aid outside of US facilities and provided a foundation for
Dominicans to find jobs or reopen places of business. The US military and government
wanted life to return to normal as soon as possible for the Dominican people as US

9

Major Jack Ringler and Henry Shaw Jr, US Marine Corps Operations in the
Dominican Republic April-June 1965 (Washington D.C.: Historical Division
Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1970), 38.
10
Yates, Power Pack, 128.
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personnel believed the return to normalcy ensured added stability while political
negotiations took place. However, the return to normalcy allowed the US military to
remove the population from the political environment through providing humanitarian aid
and taking away peoples’ interest in the leftist political promises through taking care of
their needs.
The withdrawal of US troops from the Dominican Republic began with the
withdrawal of the Marines in June and continued until total withdrawal in September
1966. The first stage of US troop withdrawals occurred when the Latin American units
concluded US supervised training and deployed to occupy parts of the Line of
Communication. After Joaquin Balaguer, the same individual who served alongside
Ramfis Trujillo, won the presidency over the previously ousted president Juan Bosch on
June 1, 1966, general stability continued throughout the city and the withdrawal of
foreign troops increased. However, occasional violence still occurred, usually in the form
of riots against the occupation, or isolated bombings and shootings. Overall, US forces
suffered twenty-seven soldiers killed in action, and one-hundred seventy-two wounded,
while the Dominican population suffered over three thousand casualties. While not as
prolonged or violent as Vietnam the Dominican intervention represented the successful
use of non-traditional military tactics. The use of civil affairs and civil action programs
steeped in humanitarianism stabilized the Dominican political environment culminating
in political elections that resulted in the establishment of a pro-US government. While the
election of Joaquin Balaguer led to a US friendly government it also led to the return of
authoritarianism to the Dominican Republic. Balaguer ruled the government for ten years
with his own level of brutality. However, after the 1965 intervention the Dominican
12

Republic never faced another crisis like the civil war, or the possible creation of a
communist government.
US Army historians have provided the most in-depth analysis of military actions
during the Dominican intervention. Lawrence Yates’ Power Pack: US Intervention in the
Dominican Republic, 1965-1966, is the first of these publications, and provides in depth
detail of the military actions and maneuvers conducted over the course of the
intervention.11 Yates’ book gives a blow by blow account of the combat and occupation
activities undertaken by the army units deployed to the Dominican Republic. The second
official history publication is Major Lawrence M. Greenberg’s United States Army
Unilateral and Coalition Operations in the 1965 Dominican Intervention, which supplies
an analysis of the US Army operations within the IAPF during the course of the
intervention.12 Maj. Greenberg details the political and military contributions by the US
and other Latin American nations as well as the main problems and benefits found within
the IAPF. Major Jack Ringler and Henry Shaw Jr.’s US Marine Corps Operations in the
Dominican Republic, April-June 1965 provides a narrative of the US Marine Corps’
actions in the Dominican Republic, and further discusses lessons learned from the
operation.13 These three publications are essential to understand the military’s actions and
perceptions during the intervention. However, they offer a primarily narrative based
account with only analysis of upper level commanders and highlighting everyday
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Yates, Power Pack, 1988.
Major Lawrence M. Greenberg, United States Army Unilateral and Coalition
Operations in the 1965 Dominican Republic Intervention (Washington D.C.: US Army
Center of Military History, 1987).
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Ringler and Shaw, US Marine Corps, 1970.
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routines, while not illustrating the variety of situations and circumstances. What this
dissertation seeks to discuss is the conflict that occurred among the different levels of
command within the military on how to handle humanitarian situations, and to add to the
foundation by further analyzing the depth and complexity of those issues.
Furthering the discussion of the military’s role, and seeking to determine whether
the US military remained neutral, Herbert Schoonmaker argues that “one must study the
entire 18 months of American participation in the Dominican intervention to answer such
controversial questions as whether United States policy was truly neutral.”14 Classified
military records limit Schoonmaker’s analysis, which uses military periodicals, and
accounts of military actions created by journalists, or non-military observers. Even with
the limited sources Schoonmaker provides a detailed account of the overall military
actions during the intervention, and a useful beginning to understanding the military’s
role within the political events. Bruce Palmer Jr.’s Intervention in the Caribbean,
discusses the commanding general’s experiences from a military and diplomatic point of
view, and elaborates on the relationships and strategies incorporated by US forces and the
IAPF.15 These two works provide further in depth information on the military activities
during the Dominican intervention outside of official government publications. However,
the declassification of records allows for a further study and provides a clearer picture of
military civil affairs policies and civil action programs, highlighting how the US military

Herbert Schoonmaker, “United States Military Forces in the Dominican Crisis
of 1965” (PhD Dissertation, University of Georgia, 1977), 184.
15
General Bruce Palmer Jr, Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis
of 1965 (Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 1987).
14
14

attempted turned the Dominican population away from leftist political groups during the
political negotiations.
Foreign policy perspectives dominate the analysis of the 1965 Dominican
intervention, with specific focus on the reason for intervening, and how President
Johnson’s policy fits within the 1960s and the Cold War. Abraham Lowenthal’s The
Dominican Intervention searches “for other explanations of the US government’s
response to the 1965 crisis in the Dominican Republic…to help account for one particular
set of occurrences, comprising the massive US armed intervention in Santo Domingo.”16
Lowenthal agreed that containment and the prevention of a second Cuba acted as the
catalysts for intervention, however he believes those reasons do not account for the
massive US response of over 20,000 soldiers and Marines. Piero Gleijeses provides some
informative clues in The Dominican Crisis, which provides a fully covered background
of events in the Dominican Republic leading up to the intervention. Gleijeses paints a
picture of the Dominican Republic searching for a political identity after Trujillo’s
assassination while carefully navigating the elements of US influence and control but
stops short of providing a full account and analysis of the intervention. The US
government never ceased attempting to control the political activities within the
Dominican Republic. A thorough analysis of the US military and government actions in
the Dominican intervention illustrates the neo-imperialist policies of humanitarianism
and occupation demonstrated in the political negotiations overseen by US diplomats and
the tactics of the civil affairs and civil action programs. While differences exist regarding

16

Abraham Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1972), 5.
15

the cause, political scientists and historians agree on the complex nature of the
intervention. Yale Ferguson describes this “bewildering complexity” of the intervention
and how “the Johnson Administration’s lack of candor in explaining US actions…that
many aspects of the crisis still remain highly controversial.”17 Much of the literature
during the 1960s and early 1970s provided an analysis on how the intervention impacted
foreign policy, domestic policy, and the carrying out of military interventions.
Ferguson elaborates on the complexity by comparing the Dominican intervention
to the Soviet Union’s intervention in Czechoslovakia. Viewing the US influence in the
Caribbean reflecting the Soviet influence in Eastern Europe political scientists see the US
remaining more democratic in its actions rather than relying on military violence. These
political scientists, such as Jerome Slater, further emphasized that both nations had
options to settle the crisis peacefully through negotiation, but the Soviets chose to use
military force. However, Ferguson explains that “Washington did ultimately opt for a
negotiated settlement, but the United States also initially gave serious thought to a
military ‘solution,’ and went so far in this regard as to allow the Imbert junta to massacre
the constitutionalists’ northern sector.”18 Ferguson goes further in his comparison by
explaining that “if one believes that the totalitarian potential in the constitutionalist
movement was minimal, or even virtually nonexistent, it hardly matters whether the state

Yale Ferguson, “The Dominican Intervention of 1965: Recent Interpretations,”
International Organization 27, no. 4 (Autumn 1973): 518.
18
Ferguson, “The Dominican Intervention,” 539; Jerome Slater, Intervention and
Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican Revolution, (New York: Harper Row,
1970).
17
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crushing a democratic revolution was itself democratic or dictatorial.”19 The comparative
aspects in the literature of the 1960s and 1970s leads to further research in the 1980s on
military interventions and foreign policy implications. Analyzing the US military’s use of
civil affairs and civil action programs allows for further building on Ferguson’s
comments on democratic and dictatorial actions. During the Cold War both the Soviet
Union and the United States demonstrated control of their respective spheres of
influence. Whereas the Soviet Union opted for military tactics heavy on violence and
suppression. The Dominican intervention illustrates how the US opted for occupation and
humanitarian aid in situations of instability or crisis and relied on those strategies to forge
pro-US governments. The US government may have sought for the Dominican people to
control their government democratically, but the US military’s actions attempted to
control the Dominican peoples’ options.
Historians and political scientists studying interventions have found it useful to
compare the 1965 Dominican intervention to US interventions before and during the Cold
War rather than to make comparisons to Vietnam. Walter Soderlund analyzed the 1916
and 1965 US occupations of the Dominican Republic to “highlight linkages between
international and domestic politics in the Caribbean area” and to “point out the manner in
which this relationship has changed over time as well.”20 Each intervention, as well as
other interventions in the Caribbean region developed from security, humanitarian, and
economic interests, and all played a role in the 1965 Dominican intervention.21 H.W.

Ferguson, “The Dominican Intervention,” 539.
Walter Soderlund. “United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic 1916
and 1965: A Comparative Case Study.” NS, Northsouth 2, no. 3/4 (1977): 87.
21
Soderlund, “A Comparative Case Study,” 88.
17
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Brands demonstrates that “in each of the three interventions [Lebanon, Dominican
Republic, and Grenada], the decision to send in troops was made against a background of
instability. This instability was both regional and local; in each case local turmoil was a
reflection, and in some ways a distillation, of regional troubles.”22 The Dominican
Republic illustrates this case, especially as a reflection of US policy and reputation not
only in the region but around the world. The multiple factors included anti-American
riots in Latin America and the Caribbean that began in the late 1950s, the instability
caused by the assassination of Trujillo, and the Cuban Revolution. International aspects
such as the situation in Vietnam and the occupation of Berlin influenced the reaction to
the Dominican civil war. For the Johnson administration the crisis in the Dominican
Republic represented the US government’s struggle to intervene without obvious pursuit
of foreign policy goals.23 The US saw the IAPF coalition as an effective tool to solve this
problem, as well as reducing US military presence in the Dominican Republic.
Comparisons between the 1965 Dominican intervention and other interventions of the
Cold War illustrate how the US sought the continuation of stability around the world and
how the fear of instability motivated the US to act militarily. In 1965, instability and a
humanitarian crisis prompted US neo-imperialist action in the Dominican Republic using
historically tested justifications such as defending US citizens, US property and
humanitarianism.
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The Dominican intervention also carries similarities to the US occupation of
Berlin after World War II. Ernest May describes how after the war the US developed
itself as the city’s protector meaning the US “committed to economic recovery and
political rehabilitation of both Berlin and Germany.”24 This same situation played out in
the Dominican Republic where the US saw itself as the protector of not only Santo
Domingo but the entire nation and provided humanitarian aid while rebuilding the
political institutions of the nation. The comparison between the Dominican Republic and
Berlin continue when in 1966 President Johnson advocated that peace and stability
remained the primary goals in Berlin, but that those goals “did not imply abandonment of
the ideals of national self-determination and individual freedom of choice.”25 Again this
is similar to the situation that occurred in the Dominican Republic as the Johnson
administration wanted stability but believed that the Dominican Republic had the ability
to choose its own political future. In this way Santo Domingo and the Dominican
Republic act as a parallel situation playing out in the occupation of Germany. The
situation where the capital city of both nations experienced the US facing communist
adversaries through a wall or barricade that divided the opposing factions.
Researching the diplomatic practices and implications of the Dominican
intervention evolved throughout the 1980s and 1990s as declassified political documents
allowed historians to provide an in-depth analysis of the strategies and issues regarding
the negotiating process. The first of these contributions is from Quinten Kelso, who
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analyzed declassified material with “the purpose of evaluating these materials in order
that a more comprehensive judgement could be offered which would better document the
ramifications of the United States’ involvement in the Dominican crisis.”26 The recently
declassified material allows for a more complete discussion of US policy and perceptions
during the Dominican intervention. However, the materials brings Kelso to the
unsurprising conclusion that the US diplomatic representatives did not act in a fully
neutral manner, and fell far short of the expectations of the US government, and
Dominican people.27 Peter Felten argues “the dynamics of US-Dominican relations thus
should not be viewed simplistically or statically as a superpower exercising authority
over its helpless neighbor. Rather, Washington generally held the preponderance of
power, but Dominicans used their leverage to direct the course of events…Washington
sketched the outlines; Dominicans filled in the details.”28 Felten’s contribution of
including the Dominicans into the story is crucial to understanding the political nature of
the intervention, and that it took a number of attempts before the US understood the role
the Dominican population played in the politics of their own country. The works of Kelso
and Felten complement each other as they further the discussion of US intervention
diplomacy by offering new methods and perceptions. Looking at how the US military
used humanitarianism to diminish the Dominican populations’ interest in a leftist
government provides insight into the military’s political role in the intervention. Both
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Kelso and Felten primarily analyze the diplomatic elements of the intervention by
focusing on the OAS negotiations while only adding limited supplemental information
regarding the US military. While Felten points out that Dominicans participated
politically, this dissertation seeks to discuss how the civil affairs and civil action
programs conducted by the US military turned the Dominican population from
supporting leftist policies to supporting a pro-US government.
Kelso’s work also points out that information regarding the intervention is still
going through the declassification process. This causes an issue within the historiography
illustrated by Felten’s critique of Jerome Slater, explaining how Slater’s “privileged
access to classified US records means that he does not cite specific evidence to support
many of his conclusions. Readers…are left to trust Slater’s interpretations on blind
faith.”29 In 2003, the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library declassified
presidential telephone conversations regarding the Dominican intervention. These tapes
“reveal that Johnson was more responsible than previously thought for the intelligence
failures and hasty decision-making that marked the intervention,” where previously much
of the blame fell on the ambassador and intelligence agencies.30 The continuing
declassification of diplomatic and military sources facilitates new observations, and
declassified military documents provide further insight into the military operations in the
Dominican Republic. Further showcasing how civil affairs and civil action programsbuilt relationships with the Dominican people, and how the military operated alongside
Felten, “United States Intervention,” vi.
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the ongoing political negotiations. Continuing to use declassified information in 2006,
Stephen Rabe’s article argues that while “Johnson emphasized the multilateral nature of
the concern about communism in the Dominican Republic, the invasion was a unilateral
action…The military intervention violated Article 15 of the charter of the OAS,” which
prohibits states from intervening in the affairs of other states illustrating US thinking
towards preserving its reputation of supporting allies, acting unilaterally, and dedication
to containment.31 The continuing release of documents, and the growing information on
the Dominican intervention gained from the declassified material may not change the
argument related to the cause or reasoning behind the intervention. However, the
materials allow for a further understanding of military policies during humanitarian
endeavors, and how the development of civil affairs and civil action programs impacted
perceptions among the international world of the Cold War.
The Dominican intervention has a role in expanding the international perspective
of US history and US military history. Mary Dudziak’s Cold War Civil Rights illustrates
how “American history plays out in a transnational frame. The international context
structures relationships between ‘domestic’ actors…This suggests that an international
perspective does not simply ‘fill in’ the story of American history, but changes its
terms.”32 The Vietnam War provides an example of how international history can impact
events within domestic US history illustrated in the anti-war movement. However, while

Stephen Rabe, “The Johnson Doctrine,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, no.
1, Presidential Doctrines (Mar., 2006): 57.
31

32

Mary Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: race and the image of American
democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 17.
22

the Vietnam War carried the most influential impact on domestic affairs, highlighting the
Dominican intervention details how other events outside of Vietnam impacted affairs
within the United States. The military’s mission in the Dominican Republic appeared in
national headlines over Vietnam in the early phase of the intervention, Phil Ochs sang
about the intervention, and the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
formed as a direct response to the Dominican intervention.33 Elements of the 82nd
Airborne also demonstrated the international impacts on domestic affairs, as the unit
served in a peace keeping capacity in the Dominican Republic, and later deployed to
Detroit during the 1968 race riot. The peace keeping mission in the Dominican Republic
provided the paratroopers that deployed to Detroit with experience in peace keeping and
operating under strict rules of engagement. The Dominican intervention serves as an
example of how US military functioned as an occupation force that carried out the
humanitarian policies to support the goals of the US government.
Smaller military actions, such as the Dominican intervention, also provide
perspectives and opinions overlooked when analyzing a larger military operation, such as
Vietnam. Mary Renda’s Taking Haiti discusses how World War One concerned the US
much more than the 1915 to 1932 occupation of Haiti. Renda further describes events
occurring in the US as “over 4 million US workers went on strike, race riots racked the
nation, and the US Senate finally approved woman suffrage,” and asks the question
“How, then, should the first occupation of Haiti by the United States figure in the larger
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picture of US history?”34 Large scale protracted conflicts carried enormous influence on
the military and society, but small conflicts provided just as much influence, especially
when the US military operates in a humanitarian, or non-war like, capacity. Mentioned
throughout the historiography of US interventions
the rhetoric of paternalism had its roots in the changing social organization of
gender and race in the United States. It appealed to deeply ingrained sets of
beliefs about righteous masculinity, feminine domesticity, and white race
privilege precisely at a time when the racial dimension of the US American
gender ideologies was coming to the surface and when racial and gender
hierarchies were being challenged in multiple ways.35
The situation in 1965 reflected many of these same characteristics; the Civil Rights Act
passed in 1964, the Voting Rights Act in 1965, followed by the Immigration and
Nationality Act, and a few months later the Watts Riot erupted in Los Angeles, followed
by race riots throughout the country.
Paternalism’s relevance during the Cold War took center stage during the
military’s humanitarian intervention in the Dominican Republic. Paternalism in the
Dominican Republic was displayed when Ambassador Tapley Bennett described that his
primary problem “was keeping the little president from coming over and sitting in my lap
everyday” when referring to Donald Reid Cabral’s attempt to maintain power before the
civil war.36 Furthermore Colonel Muller, Deputy Chief of Staff of the IAPF, illustrated
paternalism during a fourth of July speech at IAPF Headquarters that stated “we may be
confident that the concept that has brought us here, the belief that good neighbors have
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the right and the duty to help another in times of great trouble is also a just and enduring
concept that in time will come to be accepted by all in the family of American nations.”37
Analyzing the paternalism prevalent within the US military and within the humanitarian
aid provided during the intervention illustrates the use of this ideology as a justification
of the intervention as well as the relationship between the US military and the Dominican
population.
There has also been an increase in scholarly activity regarding the role of armed
interventions and armed humanitarianism, especially with the increasing humanitarian
roles performed by militaries throughout the world. However, these histories have
primarily analyzed the foreign policy perspective of the humanitarian actions rather than
analyzing how militaries conducted humanitarian operations. Joe Bryan discusses
military humanitarianism by analyzing the 2008 humanitarian mission conducted by the
USS Kearsarge to Nicaragua. Bryan points out that “US military involvement in
humanitarianism is often rationalized in terms of universal moral duty to preserve life and
prevent suffering.”38 Similar sentiments occurred during the military intervention in the
Dominican Republic as the military viewed its mission as protecting the Dominican
population from the violence of the civil war. However, when the military acts within a
humanitarian environment those actions may always be viewed skeptically as Michael
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Pugh points out that even though “military forces might aspire to…principles of
impartiality and neutrality…as agents of government or inter-government policy” their
actions will always be viewed in terms of impacting the political situation.39 Military
involvement in humanitarian endeavors has increased since the end of the Cold War.
Analyzing military humanitarianism during the Cold War demonstrates the military’s
tactics during humanitarian endeavors to support US foreign policy goals.
Interactions between Dominican civilians and US military personnel were vital to
the creation of civil affairs programs. The US military supported a variety of
humanitarian aid missions including medical and infrastructure operations in order to
promote good relations. During the Dominican intervention the US primarily provided
medical equipment, food and water, while taking on the role of medical professionals due
to the high numbers that left the city during fighting. Military personnel also sought to
rebuild Dominican health institutions and provided assistance to the average Dominican
citizen. Describing humanitarian assistance in Vietnam, Heather Stur’s Beyond Combat
discusses how the need to reinforce “paternalistic images of the Vietnamese as victims in
need of the gunslinger’s protection, numerous stories highlighted soldiers’ work with
Vietnamese children and families” in newspapers and other public periodicals.40
Reflecting the situation in Vietnam and the occupation in Berlin, US troops occupied the
Dominican Republic for the humanitarian reason of protecting Dominican civilians from
the violence perpetrated by the Constitutionalists. Fulfilling the mission of containing the
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spread of Communism and providing the conditions necessary to form a stable
government illustrated the influence of paternalism on the intervention. A military
occupation is the ultimate act of paternalism even when the occupation includes
humanitarian aid. This is partially due to US influence but the OAS wanted “to show the
world that the American states can and should find a solution to their difficult
problems.”41 However, this statement refers to the OAS as an organization, not to
individual nations controlling their own affairs.
The relationship between Dominican citizens and the US military changed as the
military intervention transitioned into a military occupation. The occupation operated as
an “encounter and a process” as “two cultures within one geographical space” interacted
with each other in multiple situations with multiple outcomes.42 This is highlighted
during the Dominican intervention as there included not only militaries from a variety of
nations but also humanitarian organizations, and other non-military government agencies.
The development of pieced together US bases, or US controlled zones, aided in the
interaction of these cultures. The operations the US military conducted to benefit its own
personnel did not only impact the military members but also the surrounding community.
Cynthia Enloe describes how “each of the men and women—civilian and military—
deployed to each base has relationships that extend beyond that base…which affect how
that man or woman thinks about what he or she is doing there.” 43 This is fully illustrated
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in the Dominican Republic due to the different number of organizations present all with
different ideas of their roles and responsibilities. The variety of organizations included
the Peace Corps, the OAS, the United Nations, private organizations, and other nongovernmental actors. The Peace Corps, especially, operated a number of clinics and
schools within the poorer neighborhoods and the rural towns of the Dominican Republic.
The Peace Corps volunteers, and US military personnel operated parallel programs with
the same goals of improving the US image and providing humanitarian aid to turn the
population away from leftist political organizations.
The Dominican intervention created a situation where the US military conducted
humanitarian operations to stabilize the Dominican political environment leading to the
creation of a pro-US government. The situation required adaptation to navigate the
humanitarian requirements, but the US military also found itself constricted in the
humanitarian endeavors due to military regulations. Military culture focuses “not on
ideology but on military practices and the basic assumptions behind them. These habitual
practices, default programs, hidden assumptions, and unreflected cognitive frames”
produce reactions when in a military situation.44 An analysis on the practices of civil
affairs and civil action programs rather than the ideology behind them allows researchers
to see the changes and adaptations within the military when confronted with situations
that lay outside the military’s realm, such as humanitarian activities.
In the Dominican Republic, the military required many investigations and debates
relating to the carrying out of civil affairs and civil action programs in a humanitarian
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capacity. While at the same time trying to decide what actions did not endanger the
humanitarian perception of the intervention but also led to the completion of the stability
mission. Wayne Lee describes how a “cultural analysis in military history should connect
that ‘idea template’ to wartime behavior, while recognizing that there may be different
templates at different levels within the military and the political leadership.”45 This aspect
is illuminated through analyzing how the different levels of command and the different
military offices viewed the role of the military in humanitarian activities. Some levels of
the command believed the military should be able to render aid regardless of
responsibility. While other levels and offices believed that rendering aid in certain
circumstances, humanitarian or not, led to legal culpability or a taking on of too many
endeavors. Civil affairs and civil action programs in the Dominican Republic showcased
the complexity of the military’s situation and demonstrated that what commanders
wanted to do remained different from what they actually did or were able to accomplish.
Those actions also provide issues for comparison of how the US military acted during
occupations around the world during the Cold War.
Chapter one examines civil affairs and civil action projects while also
demonstrating the variety of roles civil affairs played in the Dominican Republic during
the intervention. Since traditional military operations, including combat actions, made up
a small part of the intervention civil affairs took on a different and more primary role.
This chapter describes the influence civil affairs units carried on the Johnson
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administration’s attempts to stabilize the Dominican Republic outside of the political
negotiations and how those units demonstrated humanitarian actions. The administration
funneled money into the Dominican Republic and the role of civil affairs remained to
ensure that Dominican institutions operated in a capacity that the money benefitted the
nation. Civil affairs operators also conducted counter terrorism assignments in the capital
city. After the signing of the ceasefire in September 1965, many left and right-wing
political groups conducted terrorism and assassinations of political opponents. US troops
did not escape the attacks, as political groups attacked American soldiers in restaurants,
cafes, and on the streets throughout the city. The civil affairs units attempted to turn the
Dominican population away from radical groups and worked with Dominican institutions
and the IAPF to stop the attacks. Those descriptions illustrate the large tasks under the
umbrella of civil affairs throughout the Dominican intervention, but also illuminates the
military’s success in removing the Dominican population from the unstable political
environment.
Chapter two analyzes the US military’s claims services during the intervention.
The claims services of the US military are placed under the civil affairs in this
dissertation due to the attempted use of claims as part of humanitarian aid. Claims
services existed alongside other civil affairs and civil action programs to provide
financial aid to the Dominican people. The claims services sought to distance US military
responsibility regarding destruction of homes or injuries suffered by Dominican citizens.
However, while the role of claims services was supposed to help Dominicans in their
plight, army regulations made that job difficult as claims resulting from combat injuries
experienced rejection, and the military passed claims over to the OAS and IAPF, or
30

settled for a lesser amount of money. There also existed instances where the claims
services and the US military sought to control how Dominicans used the claims money
by making sure it was spent on the damage leading to the claim rather than on how
Dominicans wanted to spend it, such as improvement of their homes. This chapter seeks
to portray the different sides of the claims process and the difficulty in adjudicating
claims where the military wished to provide aid but remained unable to do so due to the
regulations and possible liability.
Chapter three discusses the medical aid mission undertaken in the Dominican
Republic, which served to alleviate the public health humanitarian crisis. The medical aid
missions were the first priority of the US military when the 82nd Airborne first landed in
the Dominican Republic and saw the military make medical deployments top priority
over combat deployment, angering senior level military officers. After the initial stage of
fighting the US military conducted medical programs throughout the neighborhoods of
Santo Domingo providing free medical care to all Dominican civilians. As the
intervention grew in duration, however, the US military started to scale back the medical
missions and started to use civil affairs units to restart the Dominican medical
institutions. The military’s use of humanitarianism sought to diminish the populations’
interest in a leftist government and to bolster support for the pro-US government. The
military further pushed this by turning down Dominican requests for medical treatment at
US facilities outside of the Dominican Republic. However, the military did treat high
ranking Dominican officers and government officials at US facilities in Puerto Rico
demonstrating a discrepancy in how the military treated people deemed essential and
non-essential to the mission. The medical humanitarian aid provided by the US military
31

provides an analysis into how the military used medical aid and controlled who received
the aid.
Chapter Four examines the use of recreation and entertainment activities such as
baseball and band concerts as part of the civil action programs conducted by the US
military. Baseball has a long history as the most popular sport in the Dominican
Republic, and the US military sought to use that history to their advantage while creating
youth baseball leagues to keep Dominican youth away from radical political groups. US
Army band concerts also served as a vital component of the civil action programs as the
concerts sought to improve the relationship between the Dominican population and the
US military and to decrease interest in leftist political activities. The US military
successfully used baseball and music to connect with the Dominican people and created a
favorable environment for the establishment of a pro-US government.
Chapter five analyzes the relationship between the Peace Corps and the US
military during the intervention. The Peace Corps first sent volunteers to the Dominican
Republic in 1963. Many of the volunteers served in poor neighborhoods in Santo
Domingo that became Constitutionalist strong holds during the civil war. Some
volunteers served in hospitals behind Constitutionalist lines, drove ambulances that came
under fire from Loyalist soldiers, and provided medical treatment to Constitutionalists
wounded fighting against US soldiers. The Peace Corps, as an independent government
organization, conducted parallel programs alongside the military to improve the US
image and to turn the population away from leftist organizations. The Johnson
Administration also pondered the idea of sending hundreds of Peace Corps volunteers to
the Dominican Republic to replace US military personnel to offset the perception of an
32

aggressive military intervention. The Peace Corps for their part fought back against that
type of use and many volunteers wondered whether the Peace Corps managed to maintain
their independence. The Dominican intervention represented the first time the Peace
Corps and the US military operated in the same nation and carried a lasting impact on the
two organizations.
The 1965 Dominican intervention has largely been left out of the debate regarding
military actions during the Cold War or left as a footnote. However, the Dominican
intervention provides an interesting case of a situation where the US military relied on
civil affairs and civil action programs more than combat efficiency. It was also a situation
that saw the military adopt humanitarianism to turn the population away from a leftist
style government, and to establish the environment for a permanent pro-US government.
The Dominican intervention may have only lasted a year and half but the invaluable
insight into how the military operated in a humanitarian capacity during an occupation
offers a number of new perspectives. Especially into military humanitarian endeavors and
occupations during the Cold War.
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CHAPTER II – CIVIL AFFAIRS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
In the afternoon of July 17, 1966, a group of enlisted IAPF soldiers, believed to be
American due to use of the word “Yankee” in the watchman’s report, boarded the
Norwegian cargo ship “Gimlekollem,” an oil tanker docked in Santo Domingo.46 A
Dominican watchman on duty attempted to stop the group, but the soldiers, not permitted
on the ship in the first place, threatened to throw the watchmen overboard. Wanting to
prevent a serious confrontation a crewman of the “Gimlekollem” asked the watchman to
allow the soldiers to board. Once on the ship the soldiers started to drink and smoke,
which the watchman believed dangerous due to the ship transporting fuel. Also seeing
this behavior, the ship’s crewman, who originally allowed the soldiers to board, urged the
soldiers to leave. At this point the soldiers continued their hostility, and again threatened
to throw both men overboard. Finally, a US officer intervened and ordered the men off
the ship. However, the watchman later reported that another group of US soldiers,
attempted to board the ship while hurling threats, but eventually left the area on their
own.
This event illustrates the public relations task of the US civil affairs officer and
the bureaucratic difficulties of conducting civil affairs as the complaint had to work
through the multiple levels of command before reaching the civil affairs officer’s desk.
The complaint moved through various levels of hierarchy from the Watchmens’ Group, a
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local workers union, to the Customs Collector’s Office, to the General Ports Director, to
the Finance Minister, to the IAPF Commander, and finally landing on the desk of the
Civil Affairs officer. The civil affairs office (J-5) of the US Forces Dominican Republic
(USFORDOMREP) received the complaint on August 2, 1966, which then forwarded the
complaint to the Provost Marshall’s Office for further investigation. The investigation
eventually ended on August 31, 1966 “due to the fact that the incident took place some
six weeks ago, further investigation at this time is not recommended, unless more specific
information can be provided by persons directly involved in the incident.”47 The event,
the following complaint and investigation represented various interactions civil affairs
officers had to navigate between US soldiers with Dominican civilians and how those
interactions impacted the image of the US military.
Handling the “Gimlekollem” incident and serving as a liaison between the US
military and elements of the Dominican government represented only one among many
responsibilities the civil affairs office held throughout the intervention. Civil affairs’ main
priority remained restarting the Dominican institutions that provided services, such as
electricity, medical services, and garbage collection. However, during the intervention
civil affairs experienced a broadening of responsibilities. In a message to US forces
regarding the creation of the Inter-American Peacekeeping Force (IAPF) Lieutenant
General Bruce Palmer Jr, outlining the mission of ensuring a stable, pro-American
Dominican government, said “the mission outlined is a difficult, complex and

47

Letter from General Robert Linvill to CG IAPF, date; 201-46 United States
Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, Civil Action Reference Papers,
1966; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/19659/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.
35

sensitive…each of us holds the reputation of our country in his hands” and to “present
your best in appearance, conduct and performance of duty.”48 The responsibilities of the
civil affairs office required every point outlined by General Palmer during the
intervention, from humanitarian aid, to public relations, to community liaison. Those
responsibilities fall into line with historical duties of civil affairs within the military,
which started as its own separate unit during World War II when US commanders needed
to deal with the liberated populations in the formerly occupied towns and cities. With the
onset of the Cold War civil affairs joined the Special Forces branches as the military
along with the US government realized the military had to portray a softer side under
certain circumstances to win the support of the local population. The job of civil affairs in
the Dominican Republic remained throughout the intervention to manipulate the
population through a winning the hearts and minds strategy.
This chapter argues that US Army conducted a wide variety of humanitarian civic
action programs and civil affairs projects across all aspects of the intervention to create
the environment necessary to establish a pro-US government. This relates to the overall
argument illustrating the elaborate programs the US military developed successfully used
to diminish Dominican population interest in a leftist government and that those
programs developed support for a pro-US government. Those diverse programs included
providing food and water to the local population, conducting psychological operations,
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and participating in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency whenever necessary. This
chapter also discusses the Civil Affairs branch of the IAPF. While US army officers
commanded the IAPF Civil Affairs branch and closely cooperated with the
USFORDOMREP Civil Affairs the branch engaged in operations as a separate entity
under a separate chain of command. Operating under a separate chain of command
allowed the IAPF Civil Affairs branch to coordinate civil affairs and civil action
programs across the IAPF with those conducted by US forces. However, IAPF civil
affairs and civic action programs almost always operated with US personnel and with US
supplies allowing the US to maintain control over the branch.
The first month of the intervention, from April 28 until May 31, involved most
combat actions and the pinnacle of the humanitarian crisis regarding the availability of
food, water, and medical aid. The primary task of civil affairs involved the humanitarian
mission of food and water distribution to the population of Santo Domingo. In the
Dominican Republic’s humanitarian crisis the lack of food and water due to the closure
of stores and distribution centers, and the shutting down of water treatment facilities,
illustrated how “hunger remained an irrational element, turning citizens into mobs and
giving demagogues license.”49 The situation in Santo Domingo, and the growing
instability provided a humanitarian excuse for the US to intervene militarily.
The Organization of American States (OAS) meeting of foreign ministers passed
a declaration on May 2, 1965 recognizing the humanitarian crisis and allowing OAS
member nations to send food and other humanitarian aid supplies to the strife ridden
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country. The US government understood the importance of the OAS declaration to
provide a humanitarian perspective in a city wrecked by conflict, and in a region with a
long contentious history of US intervention. With no centralized government existing in
the Dominican Republic the US military started food and water distribution programs to
stabilize the situation and turn down the political passions of the population. The
programs also attempted to isolate the small percentage of political radicals by providing
aid to their potential followers. The emphasis on food and water programs throughout the
intervention and subsequent occupation illustrated that “hunger and poverty were no
longer seen as the universal human condition but as a danger to international stability.”50
Understanding this factor, from April 28, 1965 to June 31, 1966 the US military
conducted an operation with parallels to the Berlin Airlift that delivered “1,451 tons of
food supplies…this includes over 663 tons of rice, 155 tons of powdered milk, 147 tons
of beans, 108 tons of cooking oil, 96 tons of flour, 76 tons of wheat, 195 tons of corn
meal, and 7 tons of baby food.”51 2nd Battalion, 325th Infantry Regiment assigned to the
82nd Airborne Division handled a food distribution program from May 31 to September
25, 1965 and described the process as:
An orderly procedure was developed to distribute this food once a week. The was
broken down into small bags and placed on trucks the night prior to the
distribution. Concertina wire was placed in the distribution area in such a manner
as to force the civilians to form orderly lines. Dominican National Police assisted
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in controlling the crowd which numbered 700-1000. Hand megaphones were also
utilized to give instructions to the crowd. Approximately 20 soldiers and 12
Dominican policemen were needed to effectively control the crowd, check the
food cards, and distribute.52
While the conflict remained largely isolated to the capital city food distribution to rural
areas maintained the humanitarian aid operations and ensured the population in those
areas did not revolt or join the political conflict raging in the capital. Even in the city, the
food distribution programs targeted not only people but also animals, as seen with a food
program aimed towards abandoned animals at the Santo Domingo Zoo, further
illustrating the humanitarian aspects of the military operation. By the end of the
intervention the US military distributed over 30 million pounds of food throughout the
Dominican Republic.53
United States’ use of humanitarianism in the Dominican Republic to prevent a
communist friendly government continued the use of occupation forces and humanitarian
aid during the Cold War that originated with the occupation of Berlin and the Berlin
Airlift. As a part of that policy the Dominican military intervention remained a major
issue among Latin American representatives in the OAS due to concerns the US returned
to the early 20th Century military interventionist policy. In an attempt to gain support, the
US termed the intervention in a humanitarian perspective at the OAS for a higher
probability to create an Inter-American force, or at least to receive Latin American
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contingents to carry out roles “in addition, policing cease fire and handling refugees such
contingents could also be helpful in humanitarian work, distribution of food and medical
supplies in Santo Domingo and throughout the country.”54 The US government also
attempted to differentiate this military action from past interventions, and to “make it
clear that our [US] soldiers do other things besides fire weapons at Dominicans.”55 For
this instance the provision humanitarian aid drew on added importance to show not just
the region, but the world the US intervened to prevent a humanitarian disaster, not just
for political reasons. However, the humanitarian aid provided during the initial months
was always a tactic to control the Dominican population and to stop the formation of a
communist government.
Economic aid to the Dominican government to restart the economy operated as
another control tactic by US government. While distribution of food and water served as
one tactic to bring stability back to Santo Domingo and avert a communist takeover. The
other primary tactic rested in getting the nation’s economy up and running again and to
fund civil affairs and community projects. The situation remained bleak into the first
month of the intervention as the Constitutionalists, under the command of Colonel
Francisco Caamano, a former officer in the Dominican military, held the Ciudad Nueva
district of downtown Santo Domingo, the primary financial district for the city. Both the
Loyalist and Constitutionalist factions refused to negotiate with the other, and residents
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of Santo Domingo lived in a state of occupation by two opposing forces. During this
period the US conducted negotiations to end the conflict and set up a government with
the goal of holding official elections after the situation stabilized. However, both factions
did not agree on the individuals nominated for government positions as each side wanted
their own personnel and feared retaliation without the realization of their conditions.
Due to the state of political negotiations to create a permanent government,
jumpstarting the economy remained an important factor in returning the capital city to a
period of normalcy. In response the US government sent a team of economists led by
Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Anthony Solomon. Solomon pointed
out that “the major offices downtown” controlled by the Constitutionalists “contain the
books and records, and when a business does not have books and records, it is going to
do less business,” such as receiving loans from banks and providing work for the
unemployed.56 One tactic around this problem suggested by the US Embassy was to
provide capital to Dominican businesses in the form of a loan, but this option aided
money leaving the Dominican Republic when the population desperately needed money
to stay in the country.57 The solution called for the US to provide credit to Dominican
banks, which can then be urged to extend credit to Dominican businesses.58 Getting the
economy up and running presented a huge humanitarian issue for the US government.
While the military did not carry a strong hand in the economic revitalization efforts the
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success of those efforts impacted the military civil affairs programs by diminishing
interest in leftist political programs. The economic revitalization helped the military by
stabilizing the political and financial environment and eased the military’s job of
lessening interest in leftists’ political proposals.
On November 17, 1965 President Johnson approved a large aid package for
further economic recovery of the Dominican Republic. The package called for fifty
million dollars covering fiscal year 1965 and 1966 “of assistance to reduce political and
economic pressures” in order to move forward with government elections and the
withdrawal of IAPF forces in 1966.59 The aid package provided the Dominican
government the opportunity to create for itself a level of stability that provided
employment within the Dominican government. The package also contributed to the
financing of civil affairs and community projects operated by the US military alongside
Dominican government personnel. Ten million of the initial fifty million provided went
to community projects in early 1966 such as refurbishing ports, building irrigation, road
maintenance, and other projects that provided employment, which aided “more
importantly to siphon off potential dissidents from political activity.60 The US
government believed that providing employment for Dominican citizens took them away
from political groups through giving them a job funded by the Dominican government
also making them dependent on the government, thereby bringing a level of stability by
removing the incentive to rebel against the government. Providing economic aid on top of
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military civil affairs operations allowed for a two-pronged attack on the primary issues
preventing stability such as politicization of the population and the humanitarian crisis.
Those humanitarian aid initiatives allowed the US to provide a humanitarian face to the
intervention that covered the use of military force and for US and OAS negotiators to end
the conflict between the Loyalist and Constitutionalist factions.
Psychological warfare operations during the intervention assisted humanitarian
aid through providing information to the Dominican population on where to find aid but
also through countering Constitutionalist propaganda against the US military. Throughout
the intervention the civil affairs office monitored radio stations to gather information
related to the propaganda of the Loyalists and Constitutionalists. Working alongside the
US Army’s Intelligence branch (J2) the Civil Affairs branch provided reports to the US
Forces, Dominican Republic (USFORDOMREP) commanding general on the daily
reporting from radio stations and newspapers in the country. Keeping tabs on the media
and running propaganda fell under the 1st Psychological Warfare Battalion, which
operated under the J5 (Civil Affairs) branch and went against normal procedure as the
unit usually operated under J3 (Operations).61 Along with being placed under the J5
command, the psychological operations unit worked closely with the US Information
Agency (USIA) to disseminate information regarding the purpose and mission of the
intervention in the Dominican Republic. The USIA created the information and the
battalion distributed the information to the Dominican population. The primary reason for
this was “during the rapid developments at the height of the [Dominican Republic] crisis,
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it was necessary to achieve instant reactions in consonance with the immediate situation.
The USIA had the current knowledge and understanding of the target audience to fulfill
this essential requirement” of immediately stating the reason for the US intervention and
portrayed the US military in a positive and humanitarian light to stabilize the situation.62
The USIA worked with the J5 to present reports to the USFORDOMREP
commanding general that regarded the variety of radio stations and provided information
about the stations’ primary listeners. In a report dated November 15, 1965 from the
USFORDOMREP J5 to the Chief of Staff, the J5 provided news summaries from Radio
Commercial, Radio Universal, and Radio Military.63 Radio Commercial, one of the left
leaning stations in Santo Domingo, reported that the “Dominican Popular Movement
(MPD) has appealed to all political, labor, professional and student associations to
continue the struggle for the achievement of sovereignty and the withdrawal of the
occupation troops from the country.”64 This was one of the standard Constitutionalist
messages played over the radio and demonstrated the need for expanded humanitarian
operations through civil affairs and civic action programs to diminish the Dominican
peoples’ interest in leftist policies and into supporting the presence of the US military in
the nation.
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From the beginning of the intervention and into the subsequent occupation
psychological operations and propaganda efforts took a position of immense importance
within the USFORDOMREP and later the IAPF. In the first month of the intervention the
US sent out one million six hundred and forty one copies of propaganda sheets that
varied in content from a “List of Communists” (accounting for twenty-five thousand
copies), to “Why Americans are Here” (accounting for a hundred thousand copies), to
“Baseball Scores” (accounting for twenty-thousand copies).65 Those statistics illustrated
that the US understood the importance of the informational campaign against the
Constitutionalist faction in the Dominican Republic. A campaign not only waged for the
pacification and support of the Dominican population but also for the support of the
world.
Not all pro-US propaganda received approval by the US government or support
the US’s mission. In one instance a Department of State telegram stated that “we have
report that Wessin y Wessin [commander of the Loyalist faction] is doing all he can to
promote idea that US Government is supporting him to associate himself with US
operation in Dominican Republic. In your discretion you should do what you can to
convince Wessin y Wessin that it is neither in his interest nor ours for him to become
over-identified with US at this point” the telegram concluded with words of advice
regarding the General that said “it would be particularly helpful if he could be persuaded
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to stop playing the ‘Star Spangled Banner’ over San Isidro Radio Station.”66 Wessin y
Wessin’s propaganda decisions endangered the US image of remaining neutral, at least
publicly, not to mention that a majority of the Dominican population saw Wessin y
Wessin as everything wrong with the Dominican military. He was a leftover from the
Trujillo government and had been one of the 1963 coup’s leaders that ousted Juan Bosch,
the democratically elected president of the Dominican Republic for eight months before
the coup.
The Constitutionalists did not back down from the battle over the image of the
intervention and the US psychological operations unit had to stand ready to counter any
information put out by the Constitutionalists that damaged the US mission. On one
occasion in a Department of State telegram, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the US
forces to “employ all available resources to jam rebel radio broadcasts in the DOMREP
to the maximum extent consistent with maintaining essential SIGINT [Signal
Intelligence] collection capabilities” with the next point directly underneath stating
“queries and/or accusations regarding US radio jamming are to be flatly denied.”67 For
the first month of the occupation two themes dominated the Constitutionalists
propaganda messages: pro-Constitution and Anti-US sentiment. Along the proconstitution line Constitutionalists stated that “The citizens of the Dominican Republic
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are fighting to eliminate dictatorship, drive out the Yankee invaders, and re-establish the
Constitutional Democracy of 1963.”68This statement illustrated Constitutionalist attempts
to push their ideology by giving the Dominican population a reason for the violence, the
ultimate goal of the fighting, and stated that a victory was taken away by the interference
of the United States military. In the anti-US message, the Constitutionalists stated that
“Ambassador Bennett and VOA [Voice of America] have lied to the President and the
American people. In response to these lies, President Johnson sent troops to halt a
democratic revolution. The US troops, in support of the tyranny of San Isidro, have
committed atrocities against the Dominican people, especially the women. These troops
must withdraw.”69The message focused on the actions of the US troops and as
psychological operations personnel commented “a clever distinction is made between the
American who are maintaining the peace and those who will continue to send food,
financial supplies, and medical aid to the Dominican Republic. Ambassador Bennett and
US troops in-country are attacked but the US homeland receives gentler treatment.”70 The
mention of San Isidro, the base of Loyalist forces, further illustrated why US personnel
wanted Wessin y Wessin to stop playing the “Star Spangled Banner” over the radio.
Much of the propaganda created by the psychological operations unit dealt with those
two themes pushed by the Constitutionalists through informing the population of the
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humanitarian operations of the intervention and relayed messages that the
Constitutionalists answered to foreign communist influencers rather than popular
Dominican leaders. By the end of the first month the 1st Psychological Operations
Battalion disseminated over two million copies of printed material, spent almost seven
hundred hours on radio propaganda, and conducted close to two hundred air and ground
loudspeaker missions demonstrating the importance of the media and propaganda to turn
the Dominican population away from support leftist political organizations.71
The signing of the Act of Reconciliation on August 30, 1965 created the
Provisional Government headed by Hector Garcia-Godoy, a Dominican politician
approved by both the Constitutionalist and Loyalist factions and called for national
elections the following year. The IAPF, including US forces, supported the Provisional
Government and considered combat actions over due to the end of Constitutionalist
legitimacy. The declaration ended the civil war, reunified Santo Domingo, and allowed
the re-establishment of the Dominican police force. However, severe schisms still
lingered on both sides, and both Loyalists and Constitutionalists commenced a campaign
of terrorism throughout Santo Domingo in order to continue the conflict and influence the
upcoming elections. In response to the increased terrorist activity the US forces increased
the amount of humanitarian aid projects to further restrict the spread of radical political
ideologies.
To highlight the increased terrorist actions occurring in the Dominican Republic
by both left- and right-wing groups the Intelligence Chief of Staff of US Forces (J2)
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produced a report on November 16, 1965 that detailed the many different forms of
terrorist actions. This report provided the best insight into how the US military viewed
and investigated the actions of terrorism after the signing of the Act of Reconciliation.72
The report illustrated how “predictions about the occurrence of terrorism are risky simply
because terrorism is not a mass movement, but carried out by a very small group of
people…conditions certainly deserve to be investigated, but accident undoubtedly plays a
great role.”73 It is also difficult to name the groups behind a terrorist attack, especially
with the many different factions that existed in the Dominican Republic, but the report
does provide details from witness statements. The report is broken up into three subcategories: the first is “terrorist activities,” followed by “activities of sabotage,” and “law
and order incidents.”74 The multiple categories allowed the report to include incidents
that cannot be confirmed as terrorist actions and some of those incidents may have
occurred due to grudges between individuals for non-political reasons, or due to
frustration with a business. Of the forty-four incidents listed in the report seventeen, or
thirty-five percent, of them are listed as acts of terrorism, and six of those incidents
occurred against US military personnel. One such event occurred on October 3, 1965
when a bomb exploded in a bar used by men from the 504th Infantry Regiment as an
enlisted men’s club wounding ten people, six of them US military personnel. While an
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investigation of the incident did not find an individual responsible leftist and communist
groups received blame for the attack.75
While left-wing terrorist activities took the primary focus, right-wing terrorism
also concerned the US military as a continuing threat to stability throughout the
Dominican Republic. The US military already had a difficult task in controlling the
Loyalist faction of the Dominican armed forces led by General Elias Wessin y Wessin.
This task grew more difficult due to the relationships between fervent anti-Communist
commanders within the US military and the IAPF. An example involved the relationship
between Brazilian General Hugo Panasco Alvim, the commanding general of the IAPF,
and General Robert York, commanding general of the 82nd Airborne Division who
bonded over their disdain for the left particularly communism. According to General
Bruce Palmer, York “was conservative in his views, and to compromise with the left was
not in his nature;” Alvim was also a “rightist and viewed everyone on the rebel side as a
card-carrying Communist,” and had a great admiration of the paratroopers.76 The
relationship between the two generals created friction with the Dominican population and
made it difficult the IAPF and US forces to maintain the perception of neutrality during
the first four months of the intervention.77 With Alvim and York holding close relations
with Loyalist commanders the Constitutionalists did not believe the US or IAPF acted in
good faith during the negotiations making progress difficult. However, the issue was soon
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relieved when General York left the Dominican Republic and the 82nd Airborne to
command the Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia.78 Cutoff from his most
ardent supporter General Alvim became easier for General Palmer and the OAS Ad Hoc
Committee to control.
After combat activities ceased, Loyalist soldiers continued targeting
Constitutionalists thereby ignoring orders from the Provisional Government and allowed
for the continued instability of the nation. An intelligence report dated November 13,
1965 titled “Possible Rightwing CEFA Group at San Isidro” illustrated the concern US
military commanders had about the formation of right-wing terrorist groups.79 The report,
distributed three days before the “Acts of Terrorism” report described a possible
rightwing terrorist group under the leadership of an individual named “El Rubio.”80 The
report defined the goal of this group as to “kill military personnel who were
Constitutionalists,” and that the “group dresses in civilian clothing and are armed with
pistols” in order to carry out their actions in the city.81 While maintaining a deep level of
concern the J2 also stressed that caution needed to be taken while investigating the claim
as “the actual existence of these groups has not been confirmed. It would appear that the
San Isidro element may be organized as the name “El Rubio” has been referred to, in the
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past, as a source employed by the 82nd Abn. Div.,” the same unit commanded by General
York who General Palmer grew concerned about due to the close relationships with the
Loyalist faction and CEFA commanders.82 The existence of this group and other right
wing terrorist groups threatened the image of the US military and the US military’s
control over the population. The continued activities of those groups were
counterproductive to the US military mission of turning people away from leftist
organizations rather people listened to the leftist messages of a violent occupation. The
right-wing terrorists attempts at destabilizing the nation are demonstrated in a kidnapping
and murder that occurred in November 1965.
The case involved the targeting of a former Constitutionalist officer by
individuals suspected by the US military of belonging to the right-wing terrorist group
based at San Isidro and threatened the work toward stability. Details of the case involved
the kidnapping and subsequent murder of Luis Arias Collado who was kidnapped by
armed civilians on November 1, 1965 and found dead from multiple gunshots on
November 3, 1965. A file from the US forces intelligence officer contained a statement
from Collado’s wife who said the kidnappers “forced him into their automobile at
gunpoint and drove eastward from Duarte Bridge.”83 It is important to note that CEFA
headquarters, the force primarily making up the Loyalist faction, is located at San Isidro,
east of Santo Domingo and the Duarte Bridge. Furthermore, the car used in the
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kidnapping was said to have Dominican Air Force license plates, described as being
white numerals with blue background, “which is not only the color scheme of Dominican
Air Force vehicles, but also of all DOMREP official vehicles.”84 The file continued to
offer some hypotheses about the individuals behind the abduction which all point to it
being a political targeting. Collado was named on a list of deserters from the Dominican
army and was also on the list of Constitutionalist soldiers to be placed back into the
Dominican military.
The J2 file concluded that while the kidnapping and murder “appears on the
surface to be the work of extremist rightists, conceivably involving DOMREP military
personnel, the identification of the kidnappers-murderers remains anonymous, and further
speculation that the crime was committed by Caamano forces is dangerous in the absence
of any proof.”85 The “further speculation” regarding Caamano forces is in regard to leftwing radical groups that targeted former Constitutionalists for deserting the cause and
many of those radicals viewed those men as traitors to the country. This case illustrates
the difficulty the US forces and the IAPF faced in attempting to stabilize the situation in
Santo Domingo. The evidence demonstrates that this case was not carried out by leftwing but right-wing extremists within the Dominican military. The IAPF and US forces
worked closely with the Dominican military and the situation provided increased
difficulty for the Army’s Civil Affairs branch to portray the US and IAPF in a positive
light, pacify the population, and limit the populations’ exposure to violent political
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groups. Due to the terrorist activities humanitarian operations to manipulate the
Dominican people grew in importance throughout the occupation.
To counter terrorist activities and to stem the growth of extremist groups the Civil
Affairs branch reached out to the population through civil affairs projects and community
relations projects. While not holding a large role in an investigating capacity the Civil
Affairs branch had the ability to make the most impact distancing the US military from
the right-wing terrorist actions and continuing to use humanitarian operations to turn the
population away from leftist groups. The primary concern remained a stable environment
to form a temporary government and to hold national elections leading to a pro-US
government. The easiest way to complete this goal was through humanitarian projects
meeting the populations’ needs such as food and water which diminished the peoples’
interest in a leftist government.
The goal of civil affairs in preventing terrorist activities was not through
discouraging people from holding political demonstrations but to keep the population
from joining the violent extremist groups on the left and right. Providing humanitarian
aid or alternative non-political events remained the surest tactic to control the population
and the one reason why US personnel conducted civic action programs and performed
civil affairs operations.86 By the early months of 1966, through humanitarian operations
the US and IAPF succeeded in limiting terrorist activities and managed a level of
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stability. Terrorist actions transitioned to the exception rather than the rule and brought “a
cautious optimism with respect to the chances of holding elections on June 1” leading to
the formation of a permanent government.87
To combat both left- and right-wing terrorism the US military trained elements of
the Dominican military in counterinsurgency with a heavy emphasis on civic action
programs. In July 1966, the US military conducted counterinsurgency training for the 1st
Brigade Dominican Army and two squadrons of the Dominican Air Force emphasizing
civil disturbance and riot control. While the “counterinsurgency program conducted by
United States Forces was limited to environmental improvement…the actions were
highly successful from the point of view of favorable publicity and good will created for
the United States Forces.”88 The civil affairs programs, referred to in the report as
counterinsurgency, fell under six categories: construction activities, professional training,
medical care, athletics, air freight, and other. In every category the care of children,
religious institutions, and road construction accounted for the most projects conducted
from July 1965 through June 1966 with many of the projects ongoing at the time of the
report. However, working on projects “limited to environmental improvement” does not
allow for a deep reconstruction of society or government institutions, instead those
projects focused on fixing existing problems of a much smaller capacity. For example,
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the sub-heading “construction activities” included projects such as repairing a monastery,
repairing park benches, road repairs, and multiple pier leveling projects.89 Those projects
did not mean to drastically change the lifestyle of the population but existed as primarily
cosmetic changes to aid the everyday issues facing the population and to fix lingering
infrastructure problems.90 Those projects kept the spirit of a humanitarian intervention
and US forces relied on civil affairs and community projects to build support among the
population for a pro-US government. The projects improved the image of the United
States through providing Dominican citizens basic necessities and community
improvement. Many of those projects only provided short term stability and satisfaction
leaving other long term, more important, projects and reforms to be addressed in the
future by the newly elected Dominican government.
The Inter-American Peacekeeping Force (IAPF) activated on May 23, 1965 under
a multinational command structure with Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer in temporary
command.91 Six days later Brazilian General Hugo Panasco Alvim took permanent
command of the IAPF from General Palmer and organized the unified command staff so
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each of the participating nations obtained a position.92The US held the Logistics (C4) and
Communications (C6) Chiefs of Staff positions, while Personnel (C1) belonged to
Honduras, Intelligence (C2) to Costa Rica, and Operations (C3) to Nicaragua.93 Nations
primarily held onto their respective staff commands and the only change occurred when
Paraguay received command of the intelligence office due to having more troops in the
Dominican Republic than Costa Rica. A Civil Affairs branch (C5) had not been created at
the time of activation but when created the position belonged to a Latin American officer,
however, the C5 ended up commanded by an officer from the United States. The US
wanted to maintain control of the occupation’s civic action programs and civil affairs
operations to ease the coordination between the IAPF and US forces during projects.
The primary duty of the IAPF Civil Affairs office was to handle personal claims
against the force. IAPF regulations under chapter five, “Rights and Duties of Members of
the Force,” paragraph thirty contains a detailed description of how the civil affairs office
dealt with claims resulting from property damage or personal injury and stated “claims
against the Force and its members shall be settled in accordance with procedures
provided by the laws and regulations of the participating state or states concerned. But if
the claims were as a result of the accomplishment of the mission, such claims should be
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directed to the OAS.”94 Reporting claims to the OAS fell under the accomplishment of
the mission due to the OAS legal protection provided to members of the IAPF as OAS
agents. Each of the participating nations handled claims differently under different laws.
The goal of the regulation, and the IAPF in general, was to offset the cost of settling these
claims. The wording “result in the accomplishment of the mission” meant that all claims
fell under OAS jurisdiction, however, the US did handle claims against the
USFORDOMREP, but many claims filed against the US fell to the IAPF and OAS. How
the US handled claims will be discussed in a later chapter.
For the first three months after the IAPF’s creation civil affairs issues mainly fell
to the Office of the Secretary of the Combined Staff (SCS) and experienced a number of
growing pains in the initial months. Confusion reigned the first few months of the IAPF’s
existence as personnel shuffled from job to job with orders requiring translation between
Spanish, English, and Portuguese.95 Many rivalries also existed between the participating
nations such as Paraguay and Brazil, and especially regarding the contentious history
with the United States. As a response to those issues the IAPF-SCS conducted an internal
civil affairs campaign. The campaign functioned as propaganda and built good relations
between IAPF members to promote the unified mission. One example was the parties or
commemorations centered on holidays, especially patriotic holidays, of the different
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nations. Usually hosted by the respective nation’s commanders those celebrations
allowed each nation to demonstrate respect to the other and to show unified support for
the mission.
Two examples illustrated the IAPF’s internal civil affairs. On July 4, 1965 US
Army officers hosted a party to celebrate US independence attended by General Alvim as
a guest of honor. During the ceremony Colonel Henry J. Muller, the Deputy Chief of
Staff of the IAPF, gave a speech saying “although the purpose of our mission here may
be questioned and criticized in some parts of the world---even within our own
hemisphere---we may be confident that the concept that has brought us here, the belief
that good neighbors have the right and the duty to help another in times of great trouble is
also a just and enduring concept that in time will come to be accepted by all in the family
of American nations.”96 The use of the term “good neighbors” represented a spin on
Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy of the 1930s where the US ceased military
intervention in Latin American affairs. However, Colonel Muller suggested that
humanitarianism provided a valuable tactic in the western hemisphere to fight against the
spread of communism. The phrase “accepted by all in the family of American nations”
further illustrated the humanitarian policy shift and expressed the interests of Latin
American nations to support those actions. This trend of hosting parties continued and on
September 15, 1965 Costa Rican, Honduran, and Nicaraguan commanders hosted a
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celebration of their respective nations’ independence attended by the US and Brazilian
ambassadors as well as General Alvim.97
The recognition did not only manifest itself in ceremonies and celebrations
targeted towards commanding officers but also in ways that reached the frontline troops
serving throughout the IAPF. A popular tactic was to print a speech or letter in the IAPF
weekly bulletin circulated to all units under the unified command. In one of these
bulletins, an open letter to General Alvim from Colonel Gutierrez, the Nicaraguan IAPF
Chief of Staff, congratulated the Brazilian general regarding Brazil’s Army Day and in
the letter stated “the glories of Brazil are also our own because we are the brothers of
America, and we are aware of the important role that your great army has played
throughout time and history, up to the present when we have just waged a decisive battle
against a common enemy who is trying to enslave us and to take away from us the
traditional heritage of the Western Hemisphere and the Faith through which He
preached.”98 Colonel Gutierrez continued regarding the mission of the IAPF and stated
how all of the nations involved are “engaged in a mission of peace and harmony
immolating our blood on the land of Quisqueya so that tranquility and democracy may
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once more reign over the Dominican Republic invigorated with energy and hope.”99 The
humanitarian message of the intervention appears throughout the unifying message. The
IAPF used the US forces message of humanitarianism to manipulate the perception
among Latin American troops within the IAPF.
Promoting the coalition and the responsibility of neighbor nations was the
primary talking point from the various celebrations and speeches along with humanitarian
justification for the intervention and a sense of familial togetherness within the conflict.
The notion of familial membership with the mention of brotherhood and neighborly duty
to battle the spread of communism throughout Latin America and the Caribbean existed
in both Colonel Muller’s speech and Colonel Gutierrez’s letter. When dispersed
throughout the IAPF those messages acted as a form of internal civil affairs between the
nations, essentially functioning as propaganda. The messages also motivated and
educated the troops about their mission so to return to their prospective countries
“satisfied with a job well done and with a bigger heart because we have made new friends
and we have deepened our love and devotion toward our America.”100 The IAPF was the
first strictly American military coalition to exist outside of NATO and the UN and
maintained a sense of unity throughout the occupation. Internal civil affairs ensured that
member nations never felt isolated and that all nations contributed to ending the crisis in
the Dominican Republic. Those acts demonstrated that the humanitarian programs
existed to not turn Dominicans away from leftist organizations, but also to influence how
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other Latin American citizens perceived the intervention and role of the IAPF as allies
standing against communism, similar to the French, British, and US in Berlin.
The IAPF Civil Affairs office aided by the engineers and medical sections
conducted humanitarian civil action programs to generate a positive image of the IAPF
and pacify the Dominican populations’ hostility to the occupation. The engineering
section of the IAPF fell under the Logistics branch (C4) commanded by Colonel Herbert
B. Erb, also a US Army officer. For the first three months of the IAPF’s existence the
engineering section operated as a one-man office alongside the US forces’ engineering
section as an IAPF representative. It was not until August and September that the section
operated fully under the IAPF but remained staffed with US officers and the section
continued to work closely with US forces engineers. Both branches, civil affairs and
logistics, acted as the primary operators during civil affair projects. However, while Latin
American engineers held positions within the Logistics branch US Army personnel made
up most of the IAPF’s engineer section. This allowed the US to maintain heavy US
influence over any IAPF engineering or civil affairs projects.
The engineering section of the IAPF remained active throughout the occupation
of the capital city by settling real estate contracts and working on civil affairs projects. In
handling of real estate contracts the IAPF worked closely with “governmental and private
agencies to obtain property rights in completion of the IAPF Stationing Plan facilities
requirements,” to obtain property for IAPF camps to house IAPF troops primarily the
Latin American contingents.101 Along with those types of transactions the engineering
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section also handled personal property claims from Dominican citizens. The process for
filing claims started with a front line unit trained in real estate appraisal and received
forms to fill out on sight, and transfer back to the real estate officers.102 Following the
forms reception a claims officer launched an investigation into the claim for legitimacy, if
the claim passed investigation it was sent to the OAS attorney working within the C4
office. During the course of the occupation the IAPF engineers fielded ninety-one
property claims totaling about RD$100,820. However, investigations reduced many of
the claims with one example of forty-one claims filed between the beginning of April
1966 and the end of June 1966 for RD$71,047 but claimants only received RD$24,851.103
The mass discrepancy illustrated a common complaint discussed throughout the IAPF,
OAS, and US forces detailing attempts by Dominican citizens to receive money from all
organizations, especially if one or the other rejected the claim. It is difficult to analyze
whether the claimants received fair compensation as it appears the IAPF claim forms are
not available in the archives.
Alongside of claims the engineering section of the IAPF also worked on a number
of civil affairs projects classified as high priority and entered into agreements with
institutions of the Dominican government. In January 1966 a water shortage impacted
Santo Domingo due to the high population, including US and Latin American troops,
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placing increased strain on the system compounded with the stress from the months long
civil war. A member of the engineering section served as a representative for the IAPF on
a water conservation and planning committee that included various high ranking
members of the Santo Domingo and Dominican government.104Working with the
committee and a US forces’ engineer a plan developed to provide free water to the
population hardest hit by the crisis by shipping “a quantity of US Navy cubes with a
1,000-gallon capacity…from the US by surface transportation, and placed to good
advantage in selected areas throughout the city. These water tanks would then be serviced
by huge military water trailers on a regular basis.”105 The US forces provided the trucks
to fill the US provided water tanks.
Throughout the water crisis the IAPF engineer section consistently used US
forces equipment and vehicles to aid and complete other projects throughout the city.
This is further illustrated by the IAPFs use of US forces’ trucks to haul water to local
hospitals to aid in cleaning wounds. The trucks also received use to provide water to the
IAPF’s Latin American units from the Ozama River as a tactic to relieve the city’s water
system.106 The humanitarian operations allowed the US to manipulate the situation to
control the use of equipment and to promote the US forces role in the occupation. The
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water crisis received some relief when heavy rains impacted the Dominican Republic in
April and May. However, the rains also caused a crisis when the runoff washed away a
four-lane bridge connecting Santo Domingo to the port city of Haina. Conducting another
high priority civil affairs project engineers of the IAPF once again turned to the
USFORDOMREP for the supply of a M4T6 Tactical Floating Bridge to be constructed
over the waterway.107 The disaster occurred on May 28, 1966 and a couple of weeks later
on June 6 a dedication ceremony opened the newly constructed bridge.108
Having a US Army officer in charge of the C4 branch commanding the
engineering section was no doubt helpful in acquiring U.S forces support in many of the
civil affairs projects. However, it was not the IAPF or OAS letters on the side of the
trucks but rather US Army or USA. which demonstrated the control the US maintained
over both the occupation and the IAPF. Even when US soldiers arrived in vehicles
marked with the OEA (Spanish acronym for OAS) letters or wearing OEA armbands
many Dominicans still viewed them as US Army soldiers. While no doubt alleviating the
water problems and fixing the bridge aided the population of Santo Domingo both
incidents helped to pacify and control the population through humanitarianism while not
providing a permanent fix for either situation. In the case of the bridge, the Dominican
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government returned the pontoons to the US Army when those units withdrew in
September of 1966.
Within the realm of civil affairs, the logistics command signed multiple
agreements and contracts with the city of Santo Domingo to improve community
relations and to provide security for both the population of the city and IAPF troops. One
of these deals was the Reciprocal Fire Protection Agreement signed by the Chief of Staff
of the IAPF, Chief of Staff of the US forces and Santo Domingo’s Fire Chief.109 As with
other issues within the IAPF’s engineering section the only fire department existed within
the US forces and contained only English speaking personnel. To resolve this issue the
IAPF assigned three Latin American soldiers to the unit to receive training and to act as
liaisons between the US Fire unit and Latin American units as well as the Santo Domingo
Fire Department. Members of the engineering section also entered into negotiations with
the National Water Company and US forces regarding water compensation for the ten
months of the occupation and future compensation for the remaining months.110 The
primary issues of the negotiations revolved around the lack of metering and the
constantly changing troop strength made it difficult to get accurate information on water
usage. USFORDOMREP eventually took over the negotiations and agreed to a deal
consisting of a flat monthly rate for water. The Latin American units’ portion came out to
RD$5,144.37 which comes out to just over RD$514 a month.111 The ability to create
contracts with the Dominican government and the Santo Domingo government illustrated
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the IAPF engineering section’s role in conducting civil affairs assignments. However, as
in previous cases the US forces held a primary role in a very visible capacity making
many of the IAPF projects in name only. Working through the IAPF also exemplified the
pacification on the population of Santo Domingo without obvious control by the United
States and to show the IAPF, controlled by the OAS, as a competent and functioning
coalition. This further demonstrated the use of humanitarianism to not only turn
Dominican citizens away from leftist organizations but also to create a positive image of
the hemispheric coalition.
The IAPF medical section existed alongside the engineers in the C4, logistics
branch and took on a number of roles during the occupation, specifically preventative
medicine. The head of the medical section held the position of Preventative Medicine
Officer with the mission of advising “the Commanding General, IAPF on conditions
affecting the health of IAPF personnel,” including environmental, epidemiological,
sanitary conditions, liaison roles, and preventative medicine.112 A US military officer,
Captain Sunseri, commanded the medical section of the IAPF, which also turned out to
be a predominately US led section. Similar with most of the other sections within the C4
command, in the early days of the IAPF medical command contained a staff of three
people forcing the section to work closely with US medical units already in the
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Dominican Republic.113 In this working situation the IAPF medical section’s two primary
problems consisted of sanitation and disease control representing particular problems that
required distinct and improvised solutions involving a number of cross unit and command
liaison activities.
The issue of sanitation lasted throughout the occupation and required a variety of
plans and operations impacting Dominican civilians as well as US and Latin American
military personnel. One of the largest operations involved the IAPF medical section
working closely with the 714th Preventative Medicine Unit in developing a plan to inspect
civilian owned restaurants, food processing plants, and slaughter houses for unsanitary
conditions that influenced which places IAPF personnel visited within Santo Domingo.114
These inspections occurred monthly and through the first seven months only six
restaurants managed to remain on the approved list: The Carimar, Vesuvio, Embajador
Hotel, Mandarin, Italia, and the San Cristobal Hotel. However, of those six only one, The
Carimar, received continual food cleanliness due to having “its own chlorinator and its
water and locally-made ice are considered potable, having consistently shown an
adequate chlorine residual content.”115 Those inspections carried a heavy impact on
society as any restaurant not on the approval list remained off limits to IAPF personnel.
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Even many of the often-visited bars around the city contained restrictions regarding
edible food and inspectors deemed some of the local beer undrinkable. The national
brewery’s product “El Presidente” made from a private source of water received a
passing grade. While a negative ranking hurt local businesses, it remained the business’
responsibility to meet the IAPF’s sanitary requirements. When considering the economic
and institutional impact of the civil war and the continuing violence many of the
businesses could not afford or remained unable to reach the IAPF code. That inability left
them unable to access the economic possibilities tied to the numerous military personnel
in the nation.
A source of unsanitary conditions throughout the occupation remained the
increasing garbage problem building up in the streets of Santo Domingo and led to an
increasing rodent population throughout the city. Those sanitary issues also existed
within the military camps of the IAPF and led to the development of policies and
inspections regarding food and other waste disposal. At the beginning of the intervention
and subsequent occupation of the city US troops encouraged Dominican citizens to pick
up garbage throughout the city. Soldiers aided the work by supplying bulldozers and
trucks to transport the garbage to landfills. However, in January 1966 the Dominican
Sanitation Department, the department responsible for garbage removal, went on strike
leading to a build-up of garbage and an increase in the rodent population.116 The IAPF
medical section stressed to officials of the World Health Organization, acting as advisors
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to the Dominican Minister of Public Health, that the situation needed to improve. One
way the medical section addressed this issue was through the creation of “IAPF Field
Sanitation Teams…organized and trained under the supervision of the IAPF Surgeon.”117
However successful in reducing waste build-up, garbage issues continued to plague the
IAPF and in June 1966 personnel met with officials of the Dominican Ministry of Public
Health and discovered a lack of heavy equipment prevented the carrying out of plans for
cleanup. Further meetings organized between the IAPF C4 and C5, and US forces J4 and
J5 determined adequate solutions to the problem. The solutions included increased
training of sanitation teams and providing more heavy equipment to the Dominican
Ministry of Public Health.118 Providing that equipment demonstrated that the pro-US
government had the capability to meet the peoples’ needs and undercut the arguments
made by leftist organizations.
Immunizations and dealing with diseases took on the other primary portion of the
IAPF medical section’s role within the occupation falling under preventative medicine.
As a result of the increased rodent problem throughout the city, at the end of June the
IAPF immunized all personnel against the plague even though all the rats tested
contained no presence of fleas. Malaria and hepatitis also concerned the medical section
and both diseases appeared throughout the occupation, malaria the most concerning.
Plaguing armies for centuries the transmission of malaria occurs through the anopheline
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mosquito which has a heavy presence in the Dominican Republic, and due to the tropical
climate, the ability to increase population at a dramatic rate. A breakout of malaria during
the occupation brought the very real possibility of an epidemic. U.S and later IAPF
officials held great concern regarding US military personnel as “all personnel in the
command who have served tours of duty in Vietnam are known to be potential carriers of
malaria and therefore possible sources of infection.”119 This concern took on a new aspect
when IAPF medical personnel discussed the possibility of the Vietnam strain of malaria,
which “is highly unresponsive to treatment by drugs,” appearing in the Dominican
Republic transmitted by US military personnel.120 If US troop presence led to the
outbreak of a Vietnam strain of malaria the situation would not have helped the US image
in the Dominican Republic and may have led to further instability. The solution started in
December of 1965 when chemical units began an aggressive campaign against the
mosquito to diminish the possibility of mosquito borne diseases. This “war” on the
mosquito consisted of the spraying of a five percent DDT-Kerosene mixture, the
elimination of stagnant water, and select personnel from US and Latin American units
received training on the proper techniques of the anti-mosquito program.121 The
successful strategy prevented an epidemic breaking out and infections of malaria
remained at a low level throughout the occupation.
While malaria generated great concern among the IAPF medical section the real
threat appeared in the form of hepatitis, which infected forty-six military personnel
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throughout the first eight months of the intervention and subsequent occupation.122 The
cases of hepatitis appeared especially among soldiers stationed along the Line of
Communication and among primarily US military personnel. It was not until the end of
December 1965 that a Nicaraguan soldier developed a case of hepatitis.123 The IAPF
medical section dealt with the spread of the disease by administering gamma globulin to
those infected and to those most at risk. When the Nicaraguan soldier developed hepatitis
gamma globulin was administered to the entire Nicaraguan contingent. Headquarters,
IAPF and a majority of IAPF personnel received two rounds of gamma globulin
treatment that resulted in greatly reduced cases during the occupation and as “a result of
this experience, gamma globulin has been made an immunization requirement for
military personnel assigned to the Dominican Republic, and the same policy would be
recommended for any area wherein the incidence of infectious hepatitis is significantly
high.”124 However, while not known at the time of immunization gamma globulin is now
known to be a transmitter of Hepatitis C, which was not discovered until the 1980s, but is
believed to have existed as far back as the 1940s. It is unknown whether or not any of the
IAPF military personnel or Dominican citizens developed Hepatitis C from the gamma
globulin immunizations, but as early as the 1980s the US government recommended
people be tested for the disease to receive treatment if necessary.
The headquarters of the IAPF also employed many Dominican citizens during the
occupation and the high concern of hepatitis placed many of those employees under the
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microscope of the IAPF medical section. One of the employment requirements for
Dominican citizens working for the IAPF consisted of a medical examination. In order to
adhere to the policy of medical examinations all Dominican citizens working in the
employ of the IAPF received “extensive chest x-ray” exams. Many of the exams turned
up no existence of hepatitis they did reveal one case of lung disease resulting in the
employee referred to the Dominican Republic’s Social Security hospital for further
treatment.125 The discovery of any type of disease related illness further testified that “a
policy of pre-employment examinations” should be required to gain employment within
the IAPF facilities.126 While these examinations aided the Dominican population seeking
employment opportunities the examinations also discovered other illnesses allowing the
individual to seek treatment. The medical examinations of possible IAPF employees gave
the appearance of a dual reasoned humanitarian project, however, the IAPF medical
section, under US personnel, used the examinations to control who received a job within
the IAPF offices and to protect IAPF personnel.
From its creation the IAPF found itself in a difficult position regarding the
possibilities and limitations of the organization within humanitarian civil affairs programs
and community projects. On the one hand the IAPF operated as the first official military
coalition in the western hemisphere outside of NATO and the UN. The force conducted
many operations to portray competency and unification but remained heavily reliant on
the US forces for personnel and equipment to carry out those operations. It did not help
matters that even in IAPF operations many of the vehicles provided carried USA
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markings, while this was later remedied by adding OEA markings or armbands many
Dominican citizens recognized US influence. The logistics and civil affairs branches
continued working closely with their counterparts within US forces which allowed
operations to run smoothly but also influenced the perception of the civil affairs
operations. The humanitarian projects and operations undertaken did not have long term
implications. Rather the programs sought to turn the population away from leftist
organizations and provide stability long enough to establish a stable pro-US government.
Meaningful and lasting reforms remained unfinished and left to the permanent
Dominican government after the dissolution of the IAPF and withdrawal of military
forces.
Those actions and operations illustrated the diversity of roles civil affairs offices
experienced and the multiple challenges faced at all levels of the command whether
within the US forces or the IAPF. Civil affairs projects required extensive coordination
between the different branches such as Logistics and Civil Affairs and services within the
respective branches such as medical and engineers. The civic action programs and the
civil affairs operations sought to build support for a pro-US government while turning
people away from leftist organization and activities. This chapter offers a brief glance
across a wide spectrum at the general civil affairs involved in the Dominican Republic
and illustrates the importance of those operations to creating stability in the strife ridden
country. The chapter also demonstrates how the US military successfully used
humanitarianism to build support among Dominican population for a permanent pro-US
government, and to influence the perception the OAS and IAPF. That use of
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humanitarianism successfully decreased Dominican interest for a leftist government and
led to stable environment for the development of US friendly Dominican government.
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CHAPTER III - CLAIMS SERVICES
On May 1, 1965 US Marines came under sniper fire while manning a barricade at
the intersection of Concepcion Bona and Pimentel Streets in Santo Domingo, and in
response the marines returned fire.127At the same time, Maria de los Angeles Ogando, a
young women living in a house at the intersection, heard the shooting and ran to close her
door, but as she closed the door a bullet fired from the Marine position struck her face,
destroying part of her jaw.128 Senorita Ogando remained in the hospital for three and a
half months receiving medical treatment, but required plastic surgery for the wound to
fully heal. She filed a claim with the US Army Claims Services for fifty-thousand dollars,
but the US army rejected her claim due to her wound occurring from combat actions. The
army only accepted claims regarding injuries or destruction of property that occurred
outside of combat actions due to the belief that combat occurred during the completion of
the mission not due to an accident. Durward Sandifer, a representative of the Inter
American Commission on Human Rights, located within the OAS, sent a letter to
Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer regarding Ogando’s situation. It is unknown if General
Palmer saw the letter, but the nature of the injury and the circumstances caught the
attention of USFORDOMREP Chief of Staff General Linvill. From that point forward,
Ogando’s case blossomed into a bureaucratic debate illustrating the complexities of how
the US Army dealt with personal and property claims throughout the intervention.
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The primary duties of the US Army Claims Service involved handling issues
arising from Dominican citizens regarding personal injury and property damage resulting
from US military activities. The service was created during World War II to handle
claims resulting from the confiscation or destruction of personal property in the liberated
towns and cities. Located within the US Army Judge Advocate General (JAG) the claims
teams investigated the validity of cases and determined the approval or rejection of
claims. During the US intervention in the Dominican Republic claims officers handled
690 claims between January 1, 1966 and September 19, 1966. Of those, the army paid
323 claims amounting to over two hundred thousand dollars over the course of the seven
months.129 The payment of claims allowed US forces to avoid further liability regarding
damages since the US held a dubious claim to intervene in the Dominican civil war under
the laws and regulations within the OAS charter relating to non-intervention and not
violating a nation’s sovereignty. That issue may have potentially led to Dominican
citizens suing the US government for personal damages. The claims also functioned as a
form of humanitarianism to appease the Dominican population in order to further
pacification efforts and develop positive relationships.
The foundation for the US Army’s handling claims from Dominican citizens
resides in the Foreign Claims Act within Title 10 of the US Code regarding military
affairs and activities outside the continental US and its territories. Passed in 1946 due to
the damage inflicted on civilian populations during World War II, the Foreign Claims Act
states that an employee of the armed forces acting on a claims committee may settle
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claims from foreign citizens of no more than one-hundred thousand dollars. Those claims
resulted from personal property damage or personal injury and death if “the damage, loss,
personal injury, or death occurs outside the United States, or the Commonwealths or
possessions, and is caused by, or is otherwise incident to noncombat activities of, the
armed forces” however, the claim will be rejected if the damage, injury, or death
occurred during combat activities.130
While the Foreign Claims Act allowed US forces to settle claims in order to build
positive relations with the local population and to stabilize and pacify the situation there
existed severe restrictions through the rejection of claims originating from combat
activities. Rejecting claims resulting from combat activities was not a new phenomenon
within military activities and followed a “precedent from a long line of international law
primarily dealing with the doctrine of sovereign immunity,” which is the idea that a state
cannot assume responsibility for the damages caused during military activities without
waiving their immunity from other actions.131 Those precedents in US history occurred
during the Civil War when union forces occupied southern homes, during the Philippine
Insurrection when US troops damaged local property, and the occupations of Haiti in
1914 and the Dominican Republic in 1916. The urban setting during the Dominican
intervention led to the buildup of claims and the US military failed responded slowly to
the massive filings. However, as the occupation progressed the claims service rejected a
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large number of those claims, and by the end of the occupation in September 1966 the
claims service completed all investigations or passed existing claims to the OAS.
This chapter argues that in addition to alleviating Dominicans’ frustration with
US military actions the adjudication of claims payments manipulated the population
away from the Constitutionalist propaganda labeling the US as an aggressive occupier
and controlled the population by keeping them away from leftist political groups. This
fits into the overall argument of this dissertation by detailing how humanitarian aid in the
form of claims payments made the population less likely to turn to leftist political
activism. The successful handling of claims allowed the US military to alleviate
Dominican financial needs thereby keeping them away from the promises of political
radicals and aiding the formation of a US friendly government. The US forces held
conversations throughout the intervention regarding the limits of claim services as part of
the humanitarian mission to achieve success in stabilizing the situation. Military
commanders continuously questioned the role of claims services due to Army
Regulations limiting the military’s capabilities to provide humanitarianism through the
claims services process. The formation of the IAPF, under the OAS, allowed for the
military to turn over claims responsibility to the international organization. The push and
pull of legal forces versus providing humanitarian aid occurred in the bureaucratic
paperwork of the various command offices. The debates and the prevailing arguments are
best illustrated through the filing of claims, which existed at the intersection of
humanitarianism and legal liability and carried enormous influence regarding the actions
of the US military.
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The issues and controversies involving rejection, amount of distribution, and the
use of money that surrounded claims services and the lack of status of forces agreement
is displayed in three case studies that occurred during the intervention and subsequent
occupation. The first elaborates on Maria de los Angeles Ogando’s claim and illustrates
the number of different and conflicting perspectives regarding how the military handled
claims, and which cases received special attention. The second case study examines the
influence of the US Embassy on how the military operated regarding humanitarian issues
and how the intervention of the embassy forced the military to handle issues they might
not have otherwise addressed. This case also offers a good comparison against Ogando’s
claim, which followed a different bureaucratic route that did not include the US
Embassy’s influence. The third case deals with how the US military investigated claim
funds they believed did not get used as intended, such as instead of using the money on
medical bills a claim recipient used the money to upgrade their household.
Maria de los Angeles Ogando’s tragic situation began with her injury on May 1,
but her complicated story continued after she filed a claim against the US military
igniting full debates on the US general staff over the role of the military and the possible
legal ramifications. On October 22, 1965 Ogando received the claim rejection letter
signed by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph H. Rouse which provided the reasoning behind the
rejection as “that any wound you have suffered arose during the tactical position of the
American troops in an hostile environment” and that “the laws applicable to the US
prohibit arrangement or consideration of such claims.”132 The Foreign Claims Act is the
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law referenced and the portion of the law allowing the rejection says “a claim may be
allowed only if it did not arise from action by an enemy or result directly or indirectly
from an act of the armed forces of the United States in combat.”133 Under this law the
claims commission legally rejected Ogando’s claim as her injury occurred during a
combat engagement involving US armed forces. However, on November 25, 1965
Ogando, along with her mother, visited the Inter-American Rights Commission offices in
the Dominican Republic and made a statement to Durward V. Sandifer. On behalf of
Ogando and her mother, Sandifer composed a letter to Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer
Jr., deputy commander of the IAPF and commander of the US Forces in the Dominican
Republic, saying that Ogando and her mother requested support “of her need for a plastic
operation on her jaw. She says that they do not have resources with which to pay for such
an operation.”134 Sandifer further explained that he examined Ogando’s jaw which had
not healed after three months in a Dominican Republic hospital and said “the case
appears to be a deserving one and I express the hope that arrangements can be made for
the performance of the operation,” the letter concluded by asking for General Palmer’s
support.135 It is unclear if General Palmer saw or was made aware of the letter, but the
letter came across the desk of USFORDOMREP Chief of Staff General Robert Linvill
who then asks for a further investigation and re-evaluation of the case.
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The letter from Durward Sandifer produced interest from the upper levels of the
USFORDOMREP command and led to various interpretations of Army Regulations.
Information on the case arrived to General Linvill in a letter from the SJA, Lieutenant
Colonel Wallace S. Murphy, on November 29, 1965; four days after Sandifer’s letter. In
the letter the SJA mentions the Foreign Claims Act and that Ogando’s claim did not
qualify based on Army Regulations 40-3, Medical, Dental and Veterinary Care.136
Furthermore, the SJA’s letter stated “IAPF regulations provide that claims arising out of
the accomplishment of the mission of the IAPF will be referred to the OAS for
settlement,” and since the army disqualified the claim any further investigation and reevaluation is the responsibility of the OAS. However, the letter concludes the opening
paragraph by explaining “that this claim arose prior to the formation of the IAPF.”137 The
former statement is correct as IAPF Regulations state that “claims against the Force and
its members shall be settled in accordance with procedures provided by the laws and
regulations of the participating state or states concerned. But if the claims were as a result
of the accomplishment of the mission, such claims should be directed to the OAS.”138
The main issue was the fact that this incident occurred before the creation of the IAPF
and while it was in the accomplishment of the mission the primary action originated with
US Forces, therefore the claim fell under US law and regulations, i.e. the Foreign Claims
Act. While the SJA believed the case should have been passed onto the OAS as an IAPF
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claim General Linvill had other ideas. He provided those ideas in a handwritten comment
on the letter to J-4 (Logistics) and the US Forces Surgeon saying “I would like to help
this gal. Admittedly we have no actual responsibility. Get J-5 into the act and see what
we can do.”139 The comment overruled the SJA and set the gears in motion for the
forthcoming debate.
After the Chief of Staff asked the J-4, the US Forces Surgeon, and the J-5 to solve
Ogando’s claim; each office responded with their own comments on the information
provided by the SJA. The conversation started on December 8, 1965 with the J-4 taking
the primary lead by asking the US Forces surgeon to have “subject examined to
determine extent of damage,” and asked the J-5 to see “if the US unit is still in
DOMREP, subject could be made a Xmas project or the 1st Bde could take on the
idea.”140 The J-5’s task illustrated the winning of the hearts and minds concept through
providing a Christmas gift of money from a US military unit to provide medical care
thereby improving the image of USFORDOMREP. However, Marine Corps units
departed the Dominican Republic by June 6, 1965 so the responsibility, if initiated, had to
fall to an army unit present in country most likely 1st Brigade mentioned in the message.
This displayed the use of humanitarian operations to distract and control through using a
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Christian holiday in a nation with a large Christian population as a way for the US
military to avoid legal responsibility while demonstrating humanitarianism with
personnel from a US unit “voluntarily” providing money to the victim. The replies from
the surgeon and J-5 represent the best contrasting sides within civil affairs. The surgeon
responded that the evaluation would occur in due time with the report to follow shortly
after. While it appears that the US Forces Surgeon’s report on Ogando is not present in
the archival documents the response from the surgeon can be surmised from a similar
situation. In that situation the surgeon provided a report on November 13, 1965 regarding
treatment of Dominican citizens and notes that “Rodriguez Army Hospital is under the
[jurisdiction] of CINCSOUTH [Commander in Chief-South], and no foreign nationals
should be evacuated to that hospital without his authority.”141 The J-5 responded with a
three page report on December 13, 1965 that outlined why it is in the best interests of the
US to accept responsibility of Ogando’s claim, the exact opposite perspective taken by
the SJA and other officers in the chain of command.142
On December 13, 1965 the J-5, Major Edward J. Neal, sent a report to the Chief
of Staff that detailed why he believed the US should accept responsibility for the claim
and offered arguments in support of that belief. The report started out by saying that “the
attached correspondence concerns a claim made by Maria de los Angeles Ogand[o] who
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requested payment of $50,000 damages for facial wounds received on 1 May 1965,
allegedly from American fire” and described that the claim did not fall within the realm
of the Foreign Claims Act, and that “both the Surgeon and the SJA feel that the claimant
does not qualify for medical treatment at US Army Medical Facilities.”143 The SJA used
Army Regulations 40-3 as a justification for rejecting the claim, but Major Neal
explained that after “a careful examination” of the regulation, he arrived “at an honest
difference of opinion with both the SJA and the Surgeon” primarily regarding the
regulations’ interpretation.144 Paragraph 25c(7) of the Army Regulations 40-3 stated:
The Transfer of foreign personnel from outside the United States to the United
States solely for the purpose of providing medical care in Army medical treatment
facilities is not authorized except under unusual circumstances as determined by
the Secretary of the Army. The US Army attache in the Country concerned is
responsible for effecting through diplomatic channels such coordination as may
be necessary with the local government and interested agencies will request the
attache to render such administrative assistance as may be within his
capabilities.145
The primary point of disagreement is in the interpretation of the meaning of United
States, which the J-5 highlighted in the report and asked whether it meant the land mass
of the content or all fifty states. The J-5 then proceeded to use the regulation’s definition
of United States which stated “this term means the 50 States and the District of
Columbia.”146 The J-5 interpreted this to mean that Ogando can be transferred to medical
facilities in Puerto Rico to avoid travelling to the United States as defined in the Army
Regulation. The report continued by analyzing the interpretation of Paragraph 34,
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particularly the delegation of authority. The report observed that the commanding officer
can delegate authority to a “major subordinate officer” for determining whether medical
care will be administered, and whether or not any fees will be waived for the treatment.147
Another paragraph in the report supporting the J-5’s argument stated “medical care may
be furnished to such persons outside the United States when it is determined that this
action can be expected to contribute to the advancement of the public interests of the
United States.148 There appears to be no information as to why Major Neal did not
highlight this paragraph, as it relates to Ogando’s claim, but he did add it to the report.
The report concluded by saying “I do not propose to establish a Dominican medicare
program, but I do feel that certain cases should receive individual attention. Those
concerning facial plastic surgery, particularly women, might be put into this category.
One only has to recall the ‘Hiroshima maidens’ and the resulting favorable worldwide
publicity the United States received to realize the importance of such situations.”149 The
Hiroshima Maidens consisted of a group of twenty-five women who suffered crippling
and disfiguring injuries from the atomic bomb blasts from Hiroshima, Japan and in 1955
traveled to the US to receive reconstructive surgery under a program established by the
US government.150 Mentioning the Hiroshima maidens illustrated how the J-5 believed
the military can use situations, such as Ogando’s case, to offer humanitarian assistance
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and to promote good will and press around the world, especially in the Dominican
Republic; an opinion based on winning the hearts and minds.
The J-5 clearly believed that offering humanitarian assistance to Ogando was in
the best interest of the US military the only question left was whether the Chief of Staff
agreed, or if he followed the advice of the SJA and the US Forces Surgeon. The Chief of
Staff responded to the comments from the Surgeon and the report created by the J-5 in a
hand written note in the comment section regarding the November 29 report and under
the J-5’s December 13 comment bringing attention to the office’s report. The Chief of
Staff stated “SJA co-ordinate [with] other two [Surgeon and J-5] for answer to the letter.
J-5 [and] Surgeon keep me informed,”151 illustrating that the Chief of Staff followed the
J-5’s advice regarding Army Regulation 40-3, paragraph34(c) dealing with delegation of
authority, but wanted to continue following the developments of the case. The US Army
responded to General Linvill’s delegation of authority to the SJA, Surgeon, and J-5 in a
January 18, 1966 memorandum to the commanding officer of the 42nd Field Hospital.
The memo asked for an evaluation of Maria de los Angeles Ogando, but that “actual
treatment and/or further evacuation will not be undertaken” without the headquarters’
approval.152 However, later on January 18, 1966 the SJA and Surgeon crafted a letter to
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Durward Sandifer, Ogando’s representative at the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, that stated “a careful examination of current United States Army
regulations compels the conclusion that the treatment of Senorita Ogando at United States
Army medical facilities would be in violation of law and regulations.”153 The letter again
mentioned that the claim arose “out of the accomplishment of the mission of the Inter
American Peace Force” and therefore Sandifer’s letter along with attachments was sent to
the Ad Hoc Committee acting under the OAS.154
The US Army continued conversations regarding Ogando’s situation, as displayed
in a communication to the commanding officer of the 16th General Support Group from
Headquarters, 42nd Medical Hospital, which stated that “the IAPF Surgeon advises me
that through the request of OEA [OAS] and C-5 [IAPF Civil Affairs], he has seen and
examined this patient [Ogando]. He further advises me that a Dr. Cuervo of OEA has
contacted Mr. Howard Rusk of the Institute of Rehabilitation and Physical Medicine,
New York City where arrangements are being made for carefree of expense to the
patient. OEA is planning to defray the transportation costs.”155 The letter further
recommended “that USFORDOMREP withdraw its interest” taking away any possibility
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of US military liability.156 Unfortunately, there appears to be no further documentation
regarding Maria de los Angeles Ogando as the US military withdrew interest and left the
situation to the OAS, but it also appears that Marie de los Angeles Ogando received the
required treatment inside the United States outside of the US military’s laws and
regulations.
The case of Rosendo Garcia provides a comparison with Ogando’s claim and
while the case is not a claim handled by the Claims services it represents further issues
surrounding the reasoning SJA and the Surgeon provided for rejecting Ogando’s claim.
On September 17, 1965, a month before Sandifer sent the letter regarding Ogando’s
situation to General Palmer, Dr. Luis Fernandez Martinez, President of the Dominican
Red Cross, sent a letter to US Ambassador to the Dominican Republic William Tappley
Bennet regarding Constitutionalist soldier Rosendo Garcia, who lost the use of one eye,
and was in danger of losing the other.157 Martinez wrote to Bennet hoping that Garcia
may receive treatment from Walter Reed Military Hospital and asked the ambassador “to
do all that is in your power so that this young man, only survivor of his family and his
mother’s only support as his father was killed in this war, is able to conserve the vision of
his only good eye.”158 The situation is similar to Ogando’s request as both are asking for
further treatment within the United States deemed essential to the quality of life of the
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individual. The major differences between the two is Ogando’s injury occurred when
caught in the crossfire as a non-combatant and involved US troops, while Garcia received
wounds fighting, possibly against US forces, as a Constitutionalist soldier. The US
Embassy involved itself in Garcia’s case and proved essential as Garcia eventually
received the necessary treatment outside the Dominican Republic at US military
facilities.
The US Embassy took immediate interest in the case and persuaded the US
military commanders to transport Garcia out of the Dominican Republic for treatment.
On the same day as Martinez wrote his letter to Ambassador Bennet, William Connett,
the Charge de Affaires addressed Colonel Joseph F. Quilty, Chief of MAAG (Military
Assistance and Advisory Group) in the Dominican Republic. In the letter, Connett stated
“it seems that it may be possible to save the remaining eye by an operation which can be
performed in American hospitals but could not be carried out here. In view of the special
humanitarian considerations involved, I believe we should undertake, through military
channels, to provide whatever medical treatment is required.”159 Connett continued by
saying that “the operation should be conducted in the nearest appropriate United States
military hospital and we should arrange for transportation. All costs will have to be borne
by the United States Government” and that it will need to be conducted with
expediency.”160 Receiving an endorsement from the US Embassy personnel enticed the
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cooperation of the military and the Chief of Staff General Linvill, the same Chief of Staff
that asked for a re-evaluation of Ogando’s claim, took an interest in the case and
requested the 15th Field Hospital evaluate Garcia.161 Connett mentioning humanitarianism
illustrated the importance of humanitarianism in controlling the Dominican population,
but also seeks to maintain the illusion of support and aid for both sides of the conflict.
The 15th Field Hospital undertook the evaluation on September 27, 1965 ten days after
the original letter from Dr. Martinez brought the attention to the US Embassy. In
comparison, it took over a month for a reply to be sent to Durward Sandifer regarding
Ogando’s case. In the report, the examining physician, Lieutenant Colonel Donald
McLeod, rated Garcia’s condition as “extremely poor” and recommended that “this
individual be evaluated by an ophthalmologist for an expert opinion. This consultation
can be performed at Rodriquez Army Hospital” in Puerto Rico.162 This is almost the
exact opposite of what the surgeon wrote over a month later regarding not shipping
individuals to Rodriguez Army Hospital due to it falling under CINCSOUTH and outside
the command of USFORDOMREP.163 The day after the medical evaluation reached the
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Chief of Staff’s desk, William Connett requested the transfer of Garcia to Puerto Rico for
the required medical treatment.164
Rosendo Garcia reached Rodriguez Army Hospital on September 29, 1965 and if
the US Embassy hoped for a show of good will from Garcia toward the US military, it
did not occur as planned. Garcia received the required medical care, but the military
believed he did not need to remain hospitalized or sent to the continental US, so
arrangements proceeded to send him back to the Dominican Republic. While boarding
the plane back to the Dominican Republic Garcia lashed out at US personnel and created
a “disturbance within this office constantly cursing at the Americans for intervening in
the Dominican crisis and further refused to sign any documents prior to boarding the
aircraft in San Juan.”165 The attitude Garcia showed toward US military personnel was
related to his service as a Constitutionalist soldier who very possibly received his wound
fighting against US soldiers. His not wanting to return to the Dominican Republic was
due to right-wing terrorist groups that targeted former Constitutionalists. Garcia’s
arguments proved fruitless as on October 6, 1965 he returned to the Dominican Republic
while restrained on a US military aircraft; just over two weeks later the claims
commission rejected Ogando’s initial claim. There does not appear to be any
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documentation of events after Garcia returned to the Dominican Republic, but judging by
his actions, his view of the US and the US military is not likely to have increased due to
the treatment he received.
A comparison of Maria de los Angeles Ogando’s claim and Rosendo Garcia’s
case illustrates US military procedures in a humanitarian situation and that their actions
reflected the use of civil affairs and humanitarianism to turn the population away from
leftist political organizations. First, both cases found their way to the Chief of Staff,
General Linvill, through an international organization; Ogando through the Inter
American Human Rights Commission and Garcia’s through the Dominican Red Cross.
However, the appeal for humanitarian aid went through different bureaucratic channels,
which ultimately determined the different treatment of the two cases. In the case of
Rosendo Garcia, the US Embassy got involved in the situation and delegated instructions
to the military, whereas Durward Sandifer, representing Ogando, sent a letter to the
commanding officer of US forces, this action allowed the military to control the case and
situation. While the military showed a willingness to cooperate under orders from the US
Embassy. Ogando filed a claim against the US military and concerns existed that any
further involvement in her case carried possible political repercussions such as opening
the US military and government to further legal action regarding US military actions, and
possibly the entire intervention. Ogando’s case saw the US military push the burden of
responsibility onto the OAS, but the similar case of Garcia, a Constitutionalist soldier,
received a rapid response from the military without a strong or lengthy debate regarding
the circumstances. The similarity of the two cases and that they received different
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treatment with close to the same result, illustrates the questioning of motives behind the
US military civil affairs and humanitarian actions throughout the intervention.
The US Forces surgeon carried an important role in both cases as they determined
the level of treatment and provided recommendations for where that treatment occurred.
Insight into why the surgeon changed opinions two months after the Garcia case can be
found in the report from November 13, 1965. This report provided an explanation into
how the surgeon treated Ogando’s claim, while providing insight into how that opinion
changed. The report stated that the primary reasons for the treatment of Dominican
individuals is “often to placate the individual patient, full use of available DOMREP
Medical Facilities and personnel has not been made, DOMREP authorities have an
erroneous and exalted opinion of the capabilities of the 15th Field Hospital.”166 Those
reasons provided describe the numerous requests for treatment the army medical units
received and the overall reason for the report is in regards to the inability to treat the
requests due to limited personnel. The surgeon went so far as to call out US Embassy
personnel and the MAAG for encouraging and proliferating those requests and that they
needed to be made aware of the situation.
If a claim occurred against the US military outside of combat circumstances and if
money was distributed the military took exception if use of the money went towards
anything else other than acquiring medical attention related to the claimant’s injury. On
May 2, 1965 Francisco Almonte Rodriguez picked up a live grenade that exploded in his
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hand leading to the filing of a claim.167 In settling the claim the US military distributed
14,000 dollars to the family to handle the medical costs for treatment.168 However, the
issues with the case did not end with the disbursement of money as a Baptist minister,
Reverend Shumaker, drew further attention to the case when he solicited army doctors to
treat Rodriguez. According to Lieutenant Colonel Donald McLeod, Reverend Shumaker
showed concern due to “the claims money is being used for other than this patient’s
care.”169 Reverend Shumaker also approached Captain John Lamb, a US Army surgeon,
to assist with treatment of Rodriguez. Those actions caused an issue when the services
affected Lamb’s ability to keep up with his regular duties at which point Captain Henry
Wise ordered Lamb to cease assisting with the recovery.170 The US Embassy got
involved at Reverend Shumaker’s request when Captain Lamb stopped visiting
Rodriguez. The primary concern of the Embassy regarded the treatment Rodriguez
received from the US military and to discover the circumstances around his situation. The
Embassy’s questioning prompted the investigation from Lieutenant Colonel McLeod. In
the letter to the Chief of Staff, made necessary due to the Embassy’s interest, the head of
J-4 mentioned a discussion with an embassy staffer. After the discussion the decision was
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made for USAID to send a letter to the family “to suggest they apply the money to
necessary medical procedures for the boy. We feel this is a case of the parents having
their cake and eating it too,” and recommended that the US Forces take no further action
in the case.171
The primary commonality in the Rodriguez case and the Garcia case is the
participation of the US Embassy, which pressured the US military to re-evaluate cases
and participate in actions where the military might not otherwise focus, such as flying
individuals to Puerto Rico for medical treatment. Both issues originated from individuals
of humanitarian organizations outside the sphere of the US government and therefore did
not have the same concerns regarding legal issues or precedents. The US Embassy asked
the military to handle Garcia’s case without any discussion regarding alternative actions
and the military performed the actions requested along with the necessary treatment. For
Rodriguez, the military settled a claim with the family but did not believe the money was
used appropriately, and the child needed further medical attention at Dominican medical
facilities. All the cases, especially the Rodriguez and Ogando cases, illustrated the
military’s use of humanitarian operations to control the Dominican population regarding
what individuals do with money rewarded to them and the delegation of cases in which
the military has an overriding legal interest to other organizations such as the IAPF or
OAS. There appears to be no documentation of what happened if the family did not use
the money as the military saw fit. Rather once the claim was settled the military washed
their hands of the situation evidenced in asking Captain Lamb to stop attending to
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Rodriguez. USAID also passed on the Rodriguez case due to the family filing a claim
against the U.S military, which further pushed the military into a humanitarian role. The
Civil Affairs officer spoke at length about each of these situations in their report
regarding Ogando’s claim, but those comments can be broadened to claims in the
Dominican Republic in general. If the military truly wanted to pursue humanitarianism in
the Dominican Republic then their participation in these cases and claims would have
occurred sooner and lasted longer regardless of the US Embassy’s intervention, or the
involvement of individuals and organizations outside of the US government. The military
humanitarianism in the intervention remained about successfully controlling the
Dominican population.
The situation around Maria de los Angeles Ogando and her claim illustrated how
the US military’s perception of claim services as a humanitarian operation led to the
continued viewing of those operations to control the Dominican population. If
humanitarian aid was not about controlling the Dominican people then following the
recommendations of the J-5’s report to sponsor Ogando for reconstructive surgery in
Puerto Rico, and following suit with other incidents on a case by case basis provided a
sensible tactic. The precedent for such a situation already existed in the Hiroshima
maidens’ example, but the US government sponsored those women, so the military did
not see that situation as their responsibility. Instead, the most productive discussions that
occurred out of the re-evaluation of the case was the recommendation by the J-4
(Logistics) that Ogando might be a good candidate for a Christmas project and the
delegation of authority by the Chief of Staff to the SJA, Surgeon, and J-5. This case
represented the military’s interest in using claims services as a part of humanitarian
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programs to control the Dominican population through ignoring the recommendations
made by the Civil Affairs office, and the transfer the issue to the OAS or recommending
treatment at a Dominican medical facility. However, the military had no issues dealing
with cases inquired about by the US Embassy displayed in the military’s handling of the
Garcia and Rodriguez case as those cases held authorization from the US government and
worked within the restrictions of the Army Regulations. Furthermore, if Ogando’s claim
fell under the Foreign Claims Act and was rejected due to occurring during combat
actions, why did the same not occur in the Rosendo Garcia case? Those cases illustrated
that Dominican citizens may have been better off not filing a claim with the US military
and instead operating in accordance with the OAS to influence treatment at US medical
facilities outside the Dominican Republic. In the instances where Dominicans followed
that route, they received the assistance and treatment required.
The settling of claims is an issue still impacting the US military at present
regarding the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) “from fiscal years 2003 to 2006, DOD has reported about
$1.9 million in solatia payments and more than $29 million in condolence payments to
Iraqi and Afghan civilians who are killed, injured, or incur property damage as a result of
US or coalition forces’ actions during combat.”172 The report continues stating that “these
payments are expressions of sympathy or remorse based on local culture and customs, but
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not an admission of legal liability or fault.”173 While the money distributed in Iraq and
Afghanistan is much larger than the distribution in the Dominican Republic. The issues in
all three locations remain largely the same. The Dominican intervention provided the
context of how the military handled claims in a limited conflict, but also provided the
basis for future arguments made by military officers that claims can be treated as a form
of humanitarian aid. The claims presented during the Dominican conflict hold links to the
claims in the present and provide valuable insight into how the military has changed and
adapted to the ever-evolving environment of providing humanitarian aid while engaged
in theaters of conflict.
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CHAPTER IV – MEDICAL AID
On the morning of April 1, 1966 a Special Forces Group operating in Samana,
Dominican Republic, requested a US Army medical helicopter evacuation for Gustabo
Yepez, a Dominican national who suffered a heart attack.174 Two hours later the 42nd
Field Hospital approved the medical evacuation, and forty minutes after the approval the
helicopter took off from Santo Domingo carrying a Dominican physician and an
interpreter. The trip from the 42nd Field Hospital to Samana and back to Santo Domingo
took an hour and twenty minutes; the entire process from the first call to request the
helicopter to the final landing with Yepez took four hours. After Gustabo Yepez arrived
at the field hospital US Army medical personnel examined him, and then loaded him onto
an ambulance for transport to a local Dominican hospital. The report regarding the
incident to the commanding general described that “the patient did suffer a heart attack
and went into cardiac failure” and “an air evacuation was most beneficial” since there
was no certainty of the patients survival via ground transportation.175 While there appears
no available documentation of Yepez’s situation after he left the US Army hospital it
appears he did survive the ordeal.
The transportation of Gustabo Yepez illustrated one of many ways the US Army
medical units serving in the Dominican Republic provided treatment to Dominican
civilians over the course of the intervention. When the medical units arrived in the
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Dominican Republic the primary task was to ensure the medical treatment of US
personnel and to provide humanitarian medical care for Dominican citizens. The
Dominican intervention saw medical personnel treat over 50,000 Dominicans while
providing “realistic training opportunities” for rotating US medical personnel.176 Those
operations involved opening clinics throughout the capital city and making trips to the
towns and cities surrounding Santo Domingo. Outside of caring for the personnel of the
US military units and Dominican citizens, the medical units also provided medical care to
IAPF soldiers, US government employees, and assisted Dominican hospitals when
overrun or in need of supplies. Considered additional advantages, those services aided the
US military’s effort to provide a stabilizing force and further ensured the cooperation of
the Dominican population.
This chapter argues that the medical services provided through humanitarian aid
tended to the Dominican populations needs and kept the population from supporting
leftist policies. As the occupation continued the US military medical units pushed the
population to Dominican medical facilities to support the pro-US government and
eliminate the support for leftist political promises. This fits into the overall argument
through show how the military’s use of medical humanitarian aid through civil affairs
and civic action programs turned the Dominican population away from radical political
activism and toward supporting the pro-US government. This also demonstrated how the
US military struggled to find a balance between providing medical care for Dominican
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nationals and rebuilding the Dominican medical establishment’s capabilities. The military
faced difficulties when Dominicans became dependent on US military medical aid
instead of Dominican medical institutions. While Dominicans flocking to US military
hospitals risked uncovering the military’s use of humanitarianism to control the
population. Those circumstances allowed the commencement of political negotiations to
create a government without the threat of riots or the burden of a continuing humanitarian
crisis consisting of a public health crisis caused by the civil war and included a lack of
access to medical treatment.
US military medical operations in foreign nations gained popularity throughout
the Cold War and were commonly implemented during the Vietnam War. There are
similarities between the medical operations in the Dominican Republic and the Medical
Civil Action Programs (MEDCAPs) used in Vietnam in terms of military assistance of
civilians in areas of operation. However, the conflicts themselves remain vastly different
and the Dominican Republic offered a better environment for medical operations to
flourish. This better environment was due to the Dominican intervention being a limited
conflict that saw fighting diminish after a couple months and transitioned to an
occupation. The Dominican Republic is also a smaller country compared to Vietnam and
allowed the military easier mobility and logistical advantages such as distribution,
mobility, and access. The US military’s interest in MEDCAPs revolved around the
tactic’s counterinsurgency applicability and that interest continued well into the 1990s
and the present.
Robert Wilensky provides an analysis of MEDCAPs during the Vietnam War and
examines “the motivations for these programs as well as their implementations” while
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asking the question “was the major aim the provision of medical care, or…the use of the
programs to advance the war aims of the administration?”177 The Dominican conflict fits
into this analysis as medical civic action program used humanitarianism to prevent a
communist takeover of the nation. Medical civil affairs projects have several upsides
such as: access to areas other aid organizations cannot reach, the ability to offer more
services than other agencies, and the ability to provide security for the medical
operations.178 Medical units also provided Dominican health institutions with medical
supplies and administrative aid although the units preferred to pass the latter to regular
civil affairs units to maintain the units’ ability to offer treatment and handle any possible
situations. Military analysts also observed that MEDCAPs were more effective when
deployed in a low conflict situation, demonstrated in the Dominican Republic, and “that
Vietnam was not a low intensity conflict after 1964.”179 So, while Wilensky offered a
solid analysis of MEDCAPs in Vietnam the Dominican intervention offers the chance to
further explore evidence of MEDCAP operations in an atmosphere conducive to the
operations. The discussion seeks to discuss questions of how MEDCAPs and
humanitarian aid were used by the US government and the US military to reinforce
foreign policy stances.
At the onset of the intervention the medical situation received top level support by
the US government and military much to the chagrin of combat commanders leading the
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first wave of forces. To handle the public health humanitarian crisis the US military sent
the entire 15th Field Hospital, which contained 400 beds within the unit’s supplies and
required thirty-six military aircraft. Displeased at the arrival of hospital units General
Robert York, commanding officer of the 82nd Airborne Division, believed combat troops
held priority rather than medical units during the initial deployment.180 It turned out that
while the humanitarian situation did reach a crisis level initial reports exaggerated the
amount of civilian casualties reported, and medical personnel and supplies during the first
weeks exceeded the requirements for the number of casualties.181 Even though the
medical mission at the beginning of the intervention was exaggerated in terms of the
number of medical units required those units stationed in the Dominican Republic found
themselves in prime position to assist in the humanitarian medical civil affairs and civic
action missions that took shape after initial combat actions.
After the US military separated the two factions through creating the Line of
Communication on May 3 through 5, 1965 military medical units conducted operations to
treat civilians in Santo Domingo and the surrounding areas. Many of the operations
carried a dual mission of serving both US military personnel and Dominican citizens as
“military preventive medicine activities and civil public health activities…which are
carried out benefit everyone in a given area, not just those persons for whom the
measures are taken.”182 The preventive medicine and public health operations took on
added importance as the violence between the two Dominican factions led to a collapse
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of public services in Santo Domingo when people fled the conflict raging throughout the
capital city. This collapse resulted in hospitals closing and the evacuation of private
physicians. The Dominican Red Cross and the Pan American Health Organization also
experienced destruction and violence from both Constitutionalist and Loyalist groups.
The Pan American Health Organization lost 30,000 dollars of medical equipment and the
US military worked closely with both organizations to recoup the losses. Some of this aid
appeared when the military “loaned equipment to the Pan American Health Organization,
the Dominican Red Cross authorities, and the Ministry of Health, and issued thousands of
dollars in medical supplies to help the organizations function effectively” throughout the
course of the intervention.183 While the US army medical units assisted humanitarian
organizations, those units also turned their attention to the Dominican civilian population.
Medical units consistently conducted operations that dealt with the large swaths
of insects that descended on US military personnel and Dominican citizens due to the
lack of sanitation services. Adding to the uncleanliness of pests such as flies and roaches,
those insects also transmitted diseases such as malaria and yellow fever, so the preventive
medicine units operated smoke and fog machines in their attempts to eradicate the
problem. The US military took particular care to broadcast messages about the role of the
fogging operations whenever the units operated. Those broadcasts made sure “Civilians
were warned that food should be covered and children brought in off the streets,” but
many did not heed those warnings and the Constitutionalists used the fogging missions in
their own propaganda to illustrate claims that the US military engaged in chemical
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warfare against the Dominican population.184 The smoke and fogging operations proved
successful, but had to be performed every week in the first half of the intervention. Those
missions illustrated the impact of preventative medicine units and the work to eliminate
the possibility of disease. While many of those missions fell under the purview of
traditional medical units, those units also participated greatly in community outreach as
well.
Preventative medicine units evolved into a primary resource of the US army
medical teams in the Dominican Republic and those units implemented a variety of
programs to ensure the health of both US military personnel and Dominican citizens. The
restaurant inspection program, discussed in a previous chapter, fell under US Forces
medical units and is worth expanding on the details of how and why this program
functioned. The purpose of the “Civilian Restaurant Inspection Program” was to
“establish procedures and standards for the inspection and approval of local civilian food
service facilities for use by US Military Personnel.”185 As noted earlier, most preventative
medicine operations benefitted not only US military personnel but also Dominican
civilians who used the services of the inspected restaurants. The inspections included
procedures such as inspection by members of the 714th Preventative Medicine Unit who
followed a checklist used by the Dominican Ministry of Health and operated on a onehundred-point system. The restaurant then received a grade of A, B, C, D, or fail, as long
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as the businesses received at least a D they continued serving US personnel.186 However,
if the establishment failed to pass the inspection then the business in question was
deemed off limits to US patronage.
The US Forces inspection teams attempted to provide a level playing field
through using the Dominican Ministry of Health’s checklist. Investigations also expanded
by “concurrently conducting inspections and evaluations of various wholesale food
producing and processing activities…to correlate these results with the disposition of
food-stuffs at local restaurants.”187 There are no details of how far those inspections went
outside of Santo Domingo into rural areas or other cities and towns. The inspections and
grades also provided a service to the Dominican civilians through advising them of which
restaurants qualified for a passing grade by Dominican standards, but it appears that the
US Forces did not broadcast those standards to the Dominican population. The
preventative maintenance unit also encouraged US military personnel to avoid “street and
sidewalk, push cart, bicycle, and ‘hand carry’ food” vendors as they were a “continuing
menace to health and must be avoided at all times.”188 The inspections continued for the
duration of the occupation but only in the vicinity of Santo Domingo, which contained
the majority of US military personnel and US government officials. The restaurant
program demonstrated how the military’s humanitarian aid controlled the population
through providing information regarding the sanitation of restaurants. It is unknown how
closely Dominicans followed US postings. Dominican civilians likely followed the
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system as restaurants were increasingly added to the list demonstrating an incentive
existed for the restaurants to at least receive a “D” grade.
Preventative medicine units operated for the duration of the US military presence
in the Dominican Republic and served in various roles that aided US soldiers and
Dominican civilians. Many of the operations conducted by the preventative medicine
units allowed for the normal operation of Santo Domingo’s businesses, restaurants, and
stores which in turn allowed a level of normalcy to return to the city after months of
violence. The preventative medicine units represented the pinnacle of humanitarian
assistance to Santo Domingo due to their taking on many of the sanitation and health
tasks. This was required after the fall of the Dominican government and the closing of
Dominican health and sanitary institutions such as trash collection, rodent and insect
control, and restaurant health inspection. The primary objective for many of those
services was to aid US military personnel the missions also aided the health and wellbeing of Dominican citizens. Those operations calmed the worries and tensions
throughout the city and eased the peacekeeping duty for US combat troops who
controlled the two fighting factions, and Dominican civilians. At the same time the
sanitation operations provided a positive image of the US military intervention and
activities. Calming the worries and tensions of the Dominican population remained at the
heart of humanitarian operations. The military successfully controlled the population
through those operations and allowed political negotiations to continue under a stable
environment.
After most of the fighting subsided after May 5 medical units turned their primary
attention to Dominican civilians to compliment military operations. From the period of
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May to August 1965 “82d Airborne Division medical personnel treated 55 Dominican
civilian inpatients and had 50,792 outpatient visits. In the same period 104 civilian
inpatients and 212 civilian outpatients were treated by 15th Field Hospital personnel.”189
The more patients US army medical units serviced the more popular the US military
found themselves. That popularity, made possible through humanitarianism, allowed the
military to distract and control the local population, thereby aiding the overall mission of
stabilization. To expand their ability to treat Dominican citizens the US military formed
Civil Medical Assistance Teams that contained doctors, airmen, interpreters, ambulance
drivers, and a number of assistants.190 Those teams, similar to the MEDCAPs used in
Vietnam, held the mission of taking humanitarian service directly to the Dominican
population through offering free medical service, prescribing antibiotics, and
administering immunizations. By mid-May those teams serviced 500 to 600 people a day
and started running out of medical supplies requisitioned for civil assistance.191 With the
draining of supplies and lessening of the humanitarian crisis the military leadership
believed that it was time for the medical units to transition back to a more civil affairs
policy of helping the Dominican doctors and hospitals return to operation.
One of the primary roles of the medical personnel in the Dominican Republic was
to ensure that the Dominican population regained confidence in the nation’s medical
institutions which translated to confidence in the Dominican government. Wilensky
described how providing too much medical assistance had the possibility to be
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“counterproductive to the overall goal of creating confidence in the local government. It
might also foster a false impression about the local government’s ability and desire to
meet the population’s needs.”192 So while US medical units stemmed the humanitarian
crisis in the Dominican Republic they did not want to start a US military form of
Dominican health care. Instead the military wanted to encourage support of the new
Dominican government, while supporting the mission of stabilizing the crisis. During the
attempted support of the Dominican medical institutions the US military medical mission
“took on more of the character of a charity program and less of an emergency operation,”
especially after the Dominican hospitals reopened. Many of those hospitals referred
Dominican civilians who could not afford medical service to US army hospitals. This led
the military to have issues controlling where the Dominican population sought aid.193
This relationship and form of operation emerged as the status quo for the duration of the
intervention and occupation despite the attempts of the army medical units to control the
population and shift primary responsibility onto the Dominican institutions. The status
quo provided an example of how the military’s use of humanitarianism to control the
population backfired. The Dominican population wanted the continued treatment from
the US military and pushed back on the military’s attempts to scale back aid.
Medical civil affairs programs enacted a number of operations that led to stability,
but established control of where and how Dominicans received medical treatment from
US military units while boosting confidence in the Dominican medical institutions. One
way was through medical units providing consultations for further treatment. The case of
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Ramiro Matos Gonzalez provides an example of a consultation. On September 16, 1965
the US Army Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) in the Dominican
Republic received a letter from Francisco Caminero, the commander of Dominican
military forces and the national police, that requested treatment for Lieutenant Colonel
Ramiro Matos Gonzalez, who sustained wounds in the right eye from a grenade
fragment.194 The following day, the US Embassy approved the medical treatment and
“suggested that treatment be without charge to the Dominican government,” and the case
received further endorsement from the Chief of MAAG Colonel J.F. Quilty.195 Carrying
out the orders of the Embassy, the Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Robert Linvill,
requested the “necessary action and effect coordination to have this individual [Lt. Col.
Gonzalez] evaluated under provisions of change 12, AR 40-3, paragraph 34.”196 This was
the same army regulation provided by the civil affairs officer when arguing for medical
attention and aid for Maria de Los Angeles Ogando, which was eventually denied by the
medical and JAG officers. Two weeks after the Chief of Staff’s request, Lt. Col.
Gonzalez received a medical evaluation from the 15th Field Hospital and the evaluating
doctor, Lt. Col. Donald McLeod, recommended “that this man be evaluated by an
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[ophthalmologist]. There is such a specialist at Rodriguez [Army Hospital], in Puerto
Rico. This man may travel without assistance on routine inter island flights.”197 There
appears to be no further documentation on whether the US military provided travel to
Puerto Rico for treatment. However, Lt. Col. Gonzalez did visit medical facilities in
Puerto Rico as evidenced by a medical report from Ashford Medical Center, office of K.
Ocasio Cabanas, Condado, Santurce, Puerto Rico, which stated that the prognosis was
extremely poor, and surgery was not recommended.198 There appears to be no further
documentation regarding the case of Lt. Col. Gonzalez but the case offered details
regarding US military medical aid, and the role of medical units during the intervention.
The case of Lt. Col. Gonzalez offers insight into how US medical units offered
aid in the months after the initial combat actions and humanitarian crisis and on how
those units viewed their role in the intervention. While providing humanitarian aid
medical units continued controlling where and how the Dominican population sought
treatment. For instance, while the US Embassy approved of using military transportation
and not charging the Dominican government. The military doctors with the 15th Field
Hospital believed that Lt. Col. Gonzalez maintained the ability to travel on his own to
Puerto Rico to receive further medical care. There is also the issue that Lt. Col. Gonzalez
received the required treatment due to his status as a Dominican military officer and that
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the recommendation for treatment came from Francisco Caminero, a figure whom the US
needed to cultivate a positive relationship with to control the crisis.
The continued support of Dominican military members was further illustrated in
the case of a medical evaluation regarding the six-year-old son of a Dominican Air Force
officer. The reason given for the evaluation of the child was provided through paragraph
34, Army Regulations 40-3 and it was “recommended that a ophthalmologist evaluate
this lad…such a specialist is a staff [consultant] to Rodriguez Army Hospital, Puerto
Rico.”199 Furthermore, military and embassy leadership agreed that treatment should be
provided without cost to the Dominican government and “that all charges incident to this
evaluation be waived under the provisions of Paragraph 34e, AR 40-3,” which
highlighted this incident as an unusual circumstance per wording of the Army
Regulation.200 Paragraph 34 of the Army Regulations is in regard to foreign nationals and
stated that the individual may receive medical care when the “action can be expected to
contribute to the advancement of the public interests of the United States,” and further
stated that this “care under this paragraph will be afforded only to foreign officials of
high national prominence.” 201 This regulation was used to rationalize many of the
evacuations for high ranking Dominican Republic military personnel while turning away
average Dominican citizens. Those regulations allowed US army medical units to fulfill
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the evaluation and at times evacuation request of high-ranking Dominican military
officers and government officials. There did not appear to be any debate as to whether the
officials’ families fell under that regulation. However, other than Dominican officials, the
medical units also conducted evaluations of Dominican civilians.
Two cases illustrated the US Army medical units’ ability to evaluate Dominican
civilians but not to conduct the evacuation or treatment provided to high ranking
Dominican officers or officials. The first involved seven year old Altagracia Grullon
Ventura who received an examination on March 8, 1966 regarding burns she received
five years prior to the US military intervention.202 The examining doctor concluded that
“this child has severe scarring of the thorax which could be improved by plastic
surgery…There is no current urgency of treatment” and “it is recommended that she be
evaluated by such a specialist [plastic surgeon] within the next six month. It is further
recommended that such referral be accomplished through charitable or Human Rights
channels.”203 The second case involved Estervina Cabrera, examined August 19, 1966
Cabrera was shot in the leg during the fighting in 1965. The evaluation reported that “she
underwent emergency surgery at what was then the 15th Field Hospital for a shattered
bone in the right leg” and she remained under the 15th Field Hospital’s care for a couple
of days before transferring to Dominican medical facilities.204 The evaluation described
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her condition as “she has an osteomyelitis of the right tibia (infection of the bone of the
leg) and a chronically draining wound. The treatment…is surgery to debride the bone of
infection and bone chips to replace the destroyed bone.”205 It was further concluded by
the evaluating doctor that “this type of treatment is within the scope of an orthopedic
surgeon and therefore available from local Dominican resources. Recommend no further
action be taken.”206 Those two cases, especially the latter, displayed the unwillingness of
the medical units to provide medical care offered by Dominican facilities. Those cases
are also the best illustration regarding the US military’s control of Dominican civilians by
sending them to Dominican hospitals and doctors. The military wanted to rebuild the
trust and reliance on Dominican medical facilities to demonstrate that the pro-US
government had the capability to take care of the population and to diminish support for
leftist political organizations.
The four cases outlined represented the varying kinds of treatment the US medical
units and personnel provided to Dominican civilians compared to high ranking
Dominican officials. It is important to note that evaluation of the cases occurred at
different times in the intervention with the two regarding high ranking Dominican
military officials occurring earlier in the intervention when Dominican institutions
operated at minimal capacity. Evaluations of the two Dominican children occurred later
in the occupation when the US military attempted to build up the new Dominican
government and institutions. However, the cases demonstrate discrepancies in how the
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medical units treated Dominicans as a whole. The issue was further illustrated by the
fourth case regarding Estervina Cabrera in which medical units originally operated on the
child’s leg, and then transferred responsibility to a Dominican hospital during the early
stages of the intervention. The transfer occurred at the same time medical units
administered further treatment in Puerto Rico to a high-level Dominican officer. No
records existed to aid the US medical evaluator in 1966 and there appears to be no date
offered when Cabrera originally received treatment.
The medical units’ primary mission throughout the intervention and occupation
focused on treating US military personnel, alleviating the public health crisis, and
assisting Dominican medical institutions to the best of their ability. The biased treatment
toward high ranking Dominican officials that held positions in the pro-US government
demonstrated that the US military’s humanitarianism was about stabilizing the crisis and
controlling the population to build up the Dominican government. It also illustrated the
influence of the US embassy which held close relationships with Dominican officials
who provided access to high level Dominican military officials. The access allowed the
US Embassy to influence the US military in a desired way or to perform certain duties to
support the establishment of a pro-US government. However, all medical actions initiated
by the embassy fell in accordance with US Army Regulations describing treatment of
foreign personnel, so the embassy did not ask the military to do anything illegal
according to military policy.
While evaluations took up a significant amount of time for medical personnel,
venereal disease (VD) caused a significant and lasting problem for US military soldiers
for the duration and the treatment of those diseases outside of administering medicine
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never experienced full success. The problem took an immense toll on US military
personnel and accounted for more medical issues than battle and non-battle casualties.207
Attempting to aid in the reporting and treatment of VD the medical command released
orders that reminded commanders “that men were not to be punished for having venereal
disease, and unit surgeons were reminded that personnel treated for venereal disease were
not to be reported” to maintain privacy in the hopes that soldiers kept reporting their
conditions.208 During the initial stages of the intervention testing equipment did not
accompany the medical units to the Dominican Republic, so many soldiers received
treatment presumptively if they exhibited any symptoms of disease.209 While treating
soldiers for the disease medical personnel also attempted to treat the disease within the
Dominican population as a way of stemming the amount of cases.
The medical personnel attempted a number of tactics to both warn US personnel
and to stop the number of cases of venereal disease. One of the first attempts occurred in
a medical bulletin regarding health hazards in the Dominican Republic, which read “VD
is prevalent in the Dominican Republic…We cannot legislate morals and nonfraternization and continence are almost impossible to enforce, but troops should be
informed of the fantastically high risk they are taking with sexual contacts here.”210
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Following the issue that there was no prevention of mingling between US military
personnel and Dominican civilians the commanders of the US Forces medical units and
the IAPF medical unit worked together in attempting to track the origins of the infections.
Officers worked alongside health services in North Carolina, the location of Fort Bragg,
the home base of the 82nd Airborne Division, and the Dominican health services to track
down women who encountered infected US military personnel. While able to track some
women through the process the overall program did not lead to a decrease in VD reports.
Instead beginning in 1966 cases of VD actually went up.211 The rates of VD across US
military personnel remained at high levels throughout the intervention with the only
decreases attributed to the withdrawal of US troops from the Dominican Republic until
the full withdrawal in September 1966.
Decreasing the exposure to VD led to the medical personnel confronting several
challenges related to the relationship between Dominican women and US military
personnel. US military commanders attempted to control the personnel through educating
US troops. Soldiers did not always distinguish the difference between regular Dominican
women and prostitutes and treated any woman as the latter.212 The primary problem was
how to approach Dominican women still living with their families about sexual health.
The issue existed due to the Dominican Republic representing a strong conservative
catholic country at the time of the intervention. The military hesitated to create issues
regarding accusation of a middle class, catholic Dominican teenager of sexual relations
with a US soldier, which inevitably would have led to further problems for the US
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military. Instead, medical command monitored US troops and created screening units
including check-ups for soldiers that transferred out of the Dominican Republic,
especially if they received treatment for VD while in the country.213
While the treatment and programs to limit VD among US personnel may have
included Dominican citizens it did not seek to aid Dominicans in general. The plans’
primary goal, especially the plan to track the origin of the VD, revolved around
protecting US military personnel and if the medical units aided Dominican citizens then
all the better. The attempts to limit the cases of VD added an extra dimension to the
Dominican intervention in that more casualties occurred due to VD compared to combat
actions that occurred during the initial months of the intervention. The US military
accepted that banning sexual interactions between military personnel and Dominicans
was unenforceable. The military believed the best strategy remained education about the
susceptibility to diseases and constant testing.
While the medical units in the Dominican Republic served both military
personnel and Dominican civilians discussions existed as to whether or not US Army
medical personnel had the responsibility to treat military and government dependents
inside the Dominican Republic. The conversation started on May 10, 1966 when Lt. Col.
Donald McLeod, commanding officer of the 42nd Field Hospital, sent a communication
letter that detailed how the daily bulletins sent out by the US Forces “restricted medical
support to ‘Tourist Type’ dependents of military or [Department of the Army] civilian
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personnel.”214 “Tourist Type” dependents referred to dependents that did not have to be
in the Dominican Republic, but were visiting family or living alongside a spouse. Lt. Col.
McLeod referenced army regulations that stated “the eligibility of these individuals for
treatment” is required and defined the parameters for treatment.215 Seven days after Lt.
Col. McLeod’s initial communication, on May 17, 1966 Lt. Col. Edwin F. Pegelow,
Assistant Chief of Staff J1 (Personnel), sent a Disposition Form to the J4 (Logistics) and
the US Forces Chief of Staff. The form summarized Lt. Col. McLeod’s position and
stated that his “inference is that the hospital is capable of supporting the needs of
dependents notwithstanding the operational posture of USFORDOMREP” and that the
regulation “states in part that support to dependents will not be permitted to interfere with
the primary mission.”216 Lt. Col. Pegelow concluded by mentioning that once the policy
regarding the treatment of dependents was set it may have increased dependents arriving
in the Dominican Republic, which carried the possibility of raising problems regarding
the treatment administered by medical units.217
After Lt. Col. Pegelow’s form reached the Chief of Staff and Lt. Col. McLeod,
the conversation reverted to Lt. Col. McLeod who on May 20, 1966 created a Disposition
Form sent to the Chief of Staff of the US Forces. In the form Lt. Col. McLeod stated that
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“Dependents of active duty military are authorized medical care by law” and that if they
did not receive treatment at military facilities then the military covered their treatment at
civilian facilities.218 Lt. Col. McLeod also expressed a worry regarding the image of the
US military both within the Dominican Republic and in the United States when he stated
that “local civilian medical care as judged by our standards is less than ideal. A most
embarrassing situation would arise if a dependent was denied care at our medical facility
and expired in a local civilian hospital,” and that he did not want to “encourage an
additional workload but to preclude the possibility of an embarrassing situation
arising.”219 That statement illustrated the US military’s desire to maintain a positive
image of their presence in the Dominican Republic by treating dependents of US military
or civilian personnel. The military also wanted to demonstrate publicly that Dominican
healthcare facilities under the pro-US government operated in a capacity to handle
Dominican casualties or any medical issues that arose. The Chief of Staff received Lt.
Col. McLeod’s Disposition Form and signed a handwritten note on it for the J-1
(Pegelow) and the J-4 (Walsh) to “see me please.”220 While it is unknown what was said
during the meeting, the Chief of Staff agreed with Lt. Col. McLeod’s position. Lt. Col.
Owen Walsh (J-4) sent a communication to the surgeon section, commanded by Lt. Col.
McLeod, confirming “the C/S [Chief of Staff] agrees in principle with the position
stated…however, he does not want to advertise or ‘unadvertise’ the dependent eligibility
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and medical service. The matter will remain at statusquo.”221 The Chief of Staff not
wanting to advertise the ability of the medical units to treat dependents attempted to keep
the number of dependents in the Dominican Republic at a negligible level, a concern
expressed by the J-1 (Pegelow), but expressed that if issues developed then dependents
remained available for treatment at US Army medical facilities.
The discussion regarding the treatment of US military dependents in US Army
medical facilities illustrated the US military’s perception of the Dominican medical
facilities and the military’s desire to control not only Dominican civilians but also
military dependents. Controlling the Dominican population and the image of the
intervention remained a primary importance throughout the intervention and occupation
of the Dominican Republic, and the treatment or non-treatment of dependents allowed for
embarrassing situations to arise in multiple settings. The first, was the situation Lt. Col.
McLeod mentioned, where if a dependent died in a Dominican hospital after US medical
facilities turned them away. That issue, other than not great publicity for the military, also
brought other issues to the forefront. Lt. Col. McLeod commented on the superiority of
US medical facilities compared to the Dominican Republic’s medical facilities. It is
unclear if the comment was about US facilities in general, such as inside the United
States or at Puerto Rico, or if the comments regarded US military medical facilities in the
Dominican Republic. What is clear is that the facilities Lt. Col. McLeod expressed may
cause embarrassment to the US military are the same facilities the US military sent

221

Walsh communication, May 23, 1966; 901-02 United States Forces,
Dominican Republic, Surgeon Section, Medical Care Instruction, 1966 [3 of 3]; Unit
Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record
Group 546; Box 14; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.
122

Dominican citizens for treatment to demonstrate the ability of the pro-US government to
support the population while denying Dominicans the “superior” treatment available at
US medical facilities.
The case of Maria de los Angeles Ogando, discussed in a previous chapter, or
Altagracia Ventura and Estervina Cabrera mentioned earlier, are examples where the
military had the opportunity to use US medical facilities. Instead the military deemed
Dominican facilities capable of administering the treatment required. The US military’s
humanitarianism through civic action projects and civil affairs operations created an
environment for the formation of a pro-US government to support the populations needs
and to turn Dominicans away from leftist political groups. The conversation regarding the
control of dependents also illustrated how the US military attempted to avoid
embarrassing situations, and bad press. Humanitarian aid provided by the US military
controlled the Dominican population throughout the occupation and eliminated the threat
of leftist political groups to the pro-US government through the appearance to take care
of the Dominican people.
From the beginning of the intervention medical units gained top priority from the
US government much to the chagrin of the combat troops and commanders deployed to
the country. While the civilian casualties were not as high as initially believed, the
humanitarian crisis remained high on the list of US government concerns and the US
military used the crisis to successfully control the population. Overall, the US military
medical units that served in the Dominican Republic treated over 60,000 people during
the intervention and subsequent occupation and performed civic action programs all over
the country. The units’ role in the intervention took center stage ahead of combat actions
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and remained an important factor by serving in an emergency and advising capacity to
the Dominican Republic’s health services. It is unknown how the civil affairs operations
impacted Dominican medical facilities long term. The primary role of civil affairs was to
restart the institutions and to assist with the bureaucracy not to improve the facilities.
However, judging by military comments on the state of Dominican medical institutions
the hospitals improved only marginally from before the crisis.
US military medical units that operated in the Dominican Republic successfully
turned the Dominican population away from radical political groups and completed the
US military’s goal of stabilizing the Dominican crisis in support of a pro-US government.
Those intervention and occupation displayed how medical units treated high ranking
Dominican military and government officials compared to average Dominican citizens to
control where and how Dominicans sought medical treatment. The former had the ability
to receive treatment at US facilities outside of the Dominican Republic while the latter
remained in the Dominican Republic. Dominican military officers and government
officials aided the overall mission of forming a pro-US government whereas the military
wanted the average Dominican to support the government. The medical units operated in
an assisting capacity further represented their control of the Dominican population. The
US military maintained that US facilities offered better treatment but forced Dominicans
to seek help from Dominican hospitals in order to reserve US facilities for US troops and
diplomatic personnel.
The medical and humanitarian issues impacted the US military intervention from
the very beginning as the US military held the dual role of acting as peacekeepers and
serving as a humanitarian force. Some of the first US medical providers in the Dominican
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Republic before the US military arrived were Peace Corps nurses who operated within
Santo Domingo when the fighting broke out. Those volunteers continued working
through the violence while Dominican doctors fled the capital city, or to the safe havens
of foreign embassies. The Peace Corps nurses kept returning to the hospitals, many
existed behind Constitutionalist lines, to offer aid to Dominican citizens wounded in the
fighting. The journey to those hospitals routinely went against US military orders to
remain within the safe zones, or behind the Line of Communication. When the US
military started to focus heavily on aid the Peace Corps nurses provided liaison duties
between the military, and the Dominican hospitals and civilians to provide better care for
those involved. Peace Corps operations and the relationship with the US military
throughout the intervention remained a key component of all US civil affairs activities.
The US military medical mission aided the overall US military mission of stabilizing the
Dominican Republic, thereby furthering US government policy initiatives in the region.
Using humanitarianism, the US military controlled the Dominican population and aided
the build-up of Dominican health institutions.
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CHAPTER V – BASEBALL AND MUSIC
In the summer of 1966, the US military started conducting band concerts around
the Dominican Republic. Those concerts provided the opportunity for US forces to build
relationships with the Dominican people, and to improve the image of the US as the
intervention dragged on. Alongside the concerts, US forces conducted carnivals and
festivals to entertain the local population. At one band concert in the town of Constanza
information trickled up the chain of command that candy was not going to be distributed.
The Chief of Staff of the US Forces produced a handwritten note asking why and the civil
affairs officer explained “all coordination at the local community level was effect by SF
[Special Forces] Detachments in the area, plans were not made by this office for
loudspeaker support or candy distribution.”222 Clearly incensed at the explanation, the
Chief of Staff wrote back in big bold letters “WHY NOT CANDY?”223 Unable to provide
a satisfactory answer the civil affairs officer responded saying “I will make arrangements
for and see that candy distribution is made in Constanza” followed by a handwritten note
expressing “candy will be issued in connection with all band concerts.”224 Those
suggestions provided by upper level commanders demonstrated the importance of the
band concerts to the US military effort. The US military continued conducting band
concerts through the final phase of withdrawal from the Dominican Republic in
September 1966. The entertainment and recreational activities provided by the US
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military throughout the intervention played a large role in the military’s mission of
stability to ensure a Dominican government friendly to US interests in turning the
Dominican population away from radical political organizations.
This chapter argues that the US military successfully used recreation and
entertainment as humanitarian aid to diminish the populations interest in leftist political
activism. That decreased interest in the leftist political message allowed for the creation
of a stable pro-US government. Using sports, such as baseball, and entertainment, such as
concerts, was not only about improving relationships. The events provided activities for
people to attend that kept their focus away from the political violence carried out by left
and right-wing political groups and US and IAPF military operations. Events such as the
concert in Constanza acted as a key tactic for civil affairs as it provided entertainment to
the population and allowed the military to paint a picture of celebration and cohesiveness,
rather than that of violence and oppression. Military action usually involved violence,
guns, bombs, and subterfuge. Instead with band concerts and other recreational activities
the military provided a different perception of military action. Baseball kept youth away
from the radical political groups conducting political violence throughout the intervention
and occupation. By keeping young people out of political activism, US military
sponsored baseball leagues provided a stable environment for political negotiations and
elections to occur and bring to power leaders favorable to the US.
The Dominican Republic was not the first or the only time the US government or
military used the entertainment of military bands as a diplomatic vehicle. During the
1950s through the 1960s the US State Department ran a musical diplomacy program.
Performers such as Dizzy Gillespie, Louis Armstrong, and Dave Brubeck travelled
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throughout the world promoting US music culture, particularly jazz. For US diplomats
and performers jazz was the equivalent of democracy. Dave Brubeck before his European
tour in 1958 said to a reporter “Jazz represents America in so many ways. Take freedom
for example. In jazz you have freedom of expression within the structure of the musical
form. In the United States we have individual freedom within the structure of the
Constitution.”225 How the State Department used jazz and jazz performers around the
world provided a blueprint for how US Army bands performing in the Dominican
Republic performed during their concerts to showcase and promote the United States’
image.
It was not only independent professional musicians that toured the world
promoting US democracy and freedom during the 1950s and 1960s. During this period,
the United States Air Force Band (USAF Band) performed a number of concerts around
the world to promote the United States’ cultural differences and heritage.226 Military
bands made an important contribution during the Cold War as ambassadors of the United
States through their performances in foreign nations. Their musical ability may have led
to the increase or decrease in reputation of not just the US military but the US
government. When performing, a military band carried a heavy burden whether playing a
national anthem, culturally appropriate music, or ignoring the musical history of the
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target nation. The military band is always an ambassador when it travels within or outside
US borders.227 This status as a diplomatic ambassador is further displayed in the musical
concerts performed in the Dominican Republic during the intervention.
A variety of recreation and entertainment programs for Dominican citizens and
US military forces provided activities for both, but for very different purposes. For the
US and IAPF forces, entertainment and recreation offered distraction from the periods of
boredom that reigned after primary combat activities ended with the establishment of the
Provisional Government. The forces also received a diminished role after the Dominican
military and re-established police force moved back into the city making the IAPF
primarily an on-call force. The US and IAPF troops had access to sporting leagues
consisting of volleyball and softball tournaments which saw US units and Latin American
Units squaring off against each other for friendly competition.228 Parties also never
decreased as troops sought to entertain themselves with shows and cookouts. General
Palmer, deputy commander of the IAPF and commander of the US Forces, remembered
fondly how Latin American troops loved to dance and admire the ocean, and that US
personnel “found Latin American amateur troops shows remarkable and their huge pit
barbecues irresistible.”229 US military personnel also had access to USO shows visiting
the Dominican Republic in July 1965.230 Bob Hope started shows by yelling “Hello,
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Saigon east” and led the cast of characters, which also included Joey Heatherton, an
actress, dancer, and singer.231 When in the Dominican Republic the USO performed for
82nd Airborne personnel, but Latin American units attended the shows alongside their US
counterparts. While IAPF personnel had access to parties, sport leagues, and USO shows,
the US military provided the primary entertainment and recreation for Dominican citizens
which allowed the US to maintain control over the situation. Civil affairs units used a
variety of programs throughout the intervention and two of the primary events consisted
of band concerts, and baseball.
Musical concerts comprised one of the primary forms of recreation and
entertainment the US military used to distract the Dominican population from political
events occurring in Santo Domingo. Military bands have a long history of performing for
deployed troops and the civilian populations where US troops are present. Musicians
performed during the Spanish-American War in Cuba during official ceremonies and for
the civilian population as part of relationship building.232 During World War Two, music
was used for propaganda purposes with recordings performed at Abbey Road Studios and
hospitals used music and the formation of bands to help rehabilitate soldiers preparing to
re-enter civilian life.233 The use of music to entertain troops and civilian populations
continued into the Vietnam era and continues into the present. During Independence Day
celebrations, all military branches respective bands perform concerts at locations around
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the Washington D.C. area before the city’s firework display. The US military has long
understood that music “provides the break that everyone must have from time to time in
order to keep on with his job. And it is significant that music universally provides by far
the largest portion of pure entertainment.”234 Music provides the opportunity for people
to dance or raises their spirits and pride for their nation. For example, one does not need
to listen to John Philip Sousa’s “Stars and Stripes Forever” very long before they find
themselves tapping their feet along with the rhythm, or to the jazz music of Charlie
Parker or Dizzy Gillespie before they are carried away by the variety of complex beats
and rhythms. Captain James Conely understood the influence of music and wrote “music
reflects the lives and thoughts of people so much that if one studies their music he can
better understand the people themselves.”235 This is the environment and philosophy
military band concerts brought to the Dominican Republic in 1965 until the end of the
occupation in September of 1966.
The US military used music to turn people away from leftist political activism
within the first week of US troops conducting military operations in Santo Domingo. In
the afternoon of May 10, 1965, a few days after the 82nd Airborne created the Line of
Communication, the 82nd Airborne band marched down the line playing their instruments
with their rifles slung on their backs. The scene did not escape American journalists at the
time with one asking “are they playing ‘We Shall Overcome,’ or ‘Marching through
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Georgia’?”236 After the stabilization of military activities individual musicians and groups
from the band played in cafés and restaurants hoping to provide an atmosphere of
normalcy. After the creation of the IAPF music continued to play an essential role within
the military civil affairs entertainment programs with concerts held daily in front of US
and Latin American troops, as well as Dominican citizens. The US military commanders
in the Dominican Republic seemed to understand what Captain Conely discussed seven
years later that “music may never be God’s Holy Authorized Answer to the military” but
“it is entirely possible that music can be used both directly and indirectly to help the
military do its job better.”237 The military performs a variety of jobs, and while their
primary job is warfighting and enforcing US foreign policy, the military does engage
with civilian populations outside of combat. For many of those interactions military
personnel are either the first American or the only American a person will see. Music and
band concerts aided the military in representing the United States on missions and at
locations where the military is deployed. In the case of the use of music in the Dominican
Republic it helped the military to stabilize the situation and turn the Dominican
population away from leftist political organizations through the combination with other
events such as festivals, or carnivals.
US Army bands performed a number of concerts around the country outside of
Santo Domingo to promote general good will between the Dominican population and the
US military, but also to turn the population away from the leftist organizational activities
that occurred in the capital city. During the early stages of the intervention a number of
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Constitutionalists journeyed to the countryside in an attempt to start a rural insurgency
along the lines of what Castro accomplished in Cuba. While achieving minor success in
the beginning those attempts eventually fell apart. The US military recognized that rural
communities needed to be controlled and separated from the events occurring in Santo
Domingo. One strategy involved the band concerts, which occurred in a variety of small
towns throughout the rural regions of the country. This strategy also saw use in Vietnam
with a different twist, “while another unit screened people in a village for Viet Cong
soldiers, the band presented concerts and variety entertainment to keep noncombatant
populace away from the screening unit. The people enjoyed the concerts and screening
was completed without disturbance.”238 This tactic does not appear in any of the afteraction reports regarding band concerts in the Dominican Republic. However, the Vietnam
case illustrated that the army recognized and used musical concerts as a tactic for a native
population to draw attention away from other events.
To illustrate the tactics used within the band concerts after action reports for three
concerts provided a description of events, comments from the local population, and areas
where the concerts needed improvement for future events. The first concert described by
the reports was the June 19, 1966 concert in the northern city of Nagua. The day of the
scheduled concert a Special Forces unit organized a field day and provided a sort of
festival atmosphere that consisted of games found at US carnivals.239 After the band

238

A History of US Army Bands, Edition D, US Army Element, School of Music,
Sub-Course overview, October 2005. https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/armybands.pdf,
Accessed July 14, 2019.
239
After Action Report of Band Concert in Nagua, June 27 1966; 201-46 J-5,
United States Forces, Dominican Republic, Operating Procedures, Band Concerts, 1966;
133

arrived citizens threw a picnic on the beach followed by the band concert in the city
plaza. Playing in front of a crowd of 2,000 people the band impressed the audience with
their choice of music and “the band’s obvious proficiency deeply impressed the citizens
of Nagua, especially the playing of the Dominican National Anthem.”240 The playing of a
national anthem was mentioned as a key point earlier in the chapter as part of the bands
responsibility and the critical consequences if the band bungled the playing of the
anthem. The primary objective of the concert mentioned in the report “was to improve
the image of US Forces and to establish better relations with the Dominican people”
which the report concluded was done successfully.241 The primary recommendation made
regarded holding a festival before the concert to draw the local population to the site with
the concert as the main event for entertainment.
Combining a field day or festival type event along with the band concert appeared
to have been a big take away from the Nagua concert, but it did not appear to have been
taken into account according to the other two after action reports regarding concerts in El
Seibo and Hato Mayor. The only mention of a carnival was in the after-action report for
the Hato Mayor concert that involved “around 1000 persons” in attendance “most of
whom had gathered in the park before the arrival of the band. In this audience there were
many teenagers as there was some type of carnival in the town which they were
attending.”242 The carnival appeared not to have been a product of US civil affairs or
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Special Forces personnel. After both concerts in El Seibo and Hato Mayor the band
attended a reception at the local government building where city officials praised the
bands efforts and musical ability. In Hato Mayor, the local band leader “praised the band
for its quality and the US Forces for presenting the concert and remarked ‘that the
residents of Hato Mayor will long remember that when the Inter-American Peace Force
was in the Dominican Republic, its band came to Hato Mayor’.”243 It is unknown whether
or not this is a direct quote from the town band leader or if the writer of the report
paraphrased the speech. However, it is telling that the Dominican band leader said “InterAmerican Peace Force” when referencing the band, even though the band was the 81st US
Army Band. A similar phrase occurred after the concert in El Seibo, where the report
stated “the Governess thanked the band and the US Forces for the concert and presented
the Bandleader with a bouquet of flowers.”244 This report contained the comments from
the Governor who stated “Distinguished artists who are members of this Musical Band.
We are very thankful for your visit to this town of El Seibo. Believe us that we will know
how to keep this concert in our hearts sprayed with beautiful tones as these perfumed
flowers which I give you.”245 The comments from the Governor, while showing
appreciation towards the band and band members did not mention the US Forces. Neither
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comments from the band leader in Hato Mayor or the Governor in El Seibo mention the
band as part of the US Forces. There may be a number of reasons for the not mentioning
of the US military directly, one example is that the Dominican citizens of both towns
differentiated the US band from the US military forces as two separate entities. The
possibility also existed that Dominicans refused to acknowledge the US Forces in a
positive view while acknowledging the talent and skill of the band members. In all three
after action reports regarding the band concerts the primary mission of the band was to
improve the image and relations of the US Forces. The non-mentioning of US Forces in
comments from the community leaders illustrated this mission may not have been as
successful as described in the reports.
US Army bands played an essential role in the Dominican Republic during the
intervention and occupation providing entertainment for US and IAPF forces, and for
Dominican citizens. While US forces used band concerts to improve relations and the US
military’s image the primary mission remained turning Dominican audiences away from
the leftist political activities. The political divide of the civil war followed by the political
terrorism that occurred after the establishment of the Provisional Government saw the US
Forces prioritize making sure the violence and turmoil did not spill over into the rural
population. Band concerts provided the Dominican population entertainment during the
ongoing violence in the capital city, and during the political negotiations conducted by
the OAS and the two opposing political factions. Outside of the rural band concerts, US
Army bands participated in ceremonies within the Dominican government and the IAPF
in Santo Domingo. There was even a case where army bands played for a local school
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dance and experienced widespread use in civil affairs operations involving Dominican
youth.
US military civil affairs in the Dominican Republic adopted baseball as a form of
entertainment to turn people away from the leftist political activities. From the early
stages of the intervention baseball played an important role in the civil affairs operations
aimed toward the Dominican population. In propaganda pamphlets distributed throughout
the city by US psychological operations units a listing of baseball scores from Major
League Baseball (MLB) appeared on over 25,000 leaflets dropped over Santo Domingo
in the opening months of the intervention.246 The use of baseball games and leagues
continued throughout the occupation as Special Forces units in towns around the rural
and urban portions of the country sponsored baseball teams and leagues to provide
entertainment and recreation for all demographics of the population.247 Those civil affairs
baseball operations consisted of setting up a small league within a town, or suburb of a
city. The teams were then sponsored by a US military unit, usually the unit operating in
proximity whose personnel donated money and equipment. The name of the unit
appeared on the back of the player’s jersey, so instead of displaying a local business as
seen on US little league jerseys, the Dominican players’ jerseys read “105th Trans. Co” or
“Co. C 4/68th Armor.”248 The use of baseball as a civil affairs operation provided a dual

246

Department of the Army, Stability operations: Dominican Republic,
Psychological Operations, Vol. II.
247
Civil affairs operations chart; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican
Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, Civil Affairs Project, 1966; Unit Records Created
During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8;
National Archives at College Park, Maryland.
248

Dominican Youth Sports Program Final Team Standings, August 4, 1966; 20146 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, Civil Affairs
137

opportunity. It first provided entertainment, similar to the band concerts, for the local
population. Secondly, it provided a way to keep Dominican youth away from the leftist
political organizations that caused problems for the US military through protests and
other more violent forms of political activities.
Baseball has a long history in the Dominican Republic and for the civil affairs
units participating in the intervention provided an ideal event to aid in the success of the
mission. First introduced to the Dominican Republic by US Marines during the first
occupation of the nation, from 1916 to 1924, as a form of entertainment and recreation.
The Dominican population adopted the sport as their own by expressing nationalistic
sentiment through the various teams, especially when Dominican teams played teams
comprised of the occupying marines.249 Participation of the sport grew under the dictator
Rafael Trujillo, who along with US owned sugar refineries organized and built “baseball
facilities as partial outlet for cane cutters [idle] during the half of the year that they
weren’t working.”250 The 1930s saw US corporations use baseball to keep cane cutters
from organizing or speaking out against the working conditions of the US companies, and
the Trujillo government.251 Those teams went on to form the Dominican baseball league
which included the participation of not only highly skilled Dominican players, but also
MLB players. The players participated during the offseason or because of their exclusion
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from the MLB due to racial segregation. Rob Ruck described a multitude of reasons
African American baseball players traveled to the Dominican Republic among them was
not only continuous playing, but also for the pay and that African Americans did not
experience the racial animosity experienced within the United States.252 At this point the
relationship between US and Dominican baseball existed strictly through the Dominican
league as Trujillo did not allow MLB teams to sign any Dominican players. Instead
Trujillo preferred to keep them on his team, “Escogido,” which won the league
championship every year.253 The US sugar industry’s use of baseball to control the
population mirrored Trujillo’s tactics within the Dominican league. However, those
tactics do not appear to have influenced the US military civil affairs program rather the
military used an already a popular sporting event to their advantage. Baseballs use in
Dominican politics continued after the overthrow of the Bosch administration in 1963
when Reid Cabral’s triumvirate attempted to calm the population, and reasoned that “a
few hours at the ballpark would divert the minds of the Dominican people from thoughts
of revolution, riot and mayhem.”254 The US military built on baseball’s history of turning
the Dominican population away from radical political activities and groups.
The civil affairs office created multiple sporting teams, baseball included,
consisting of US military personnel that played Dominican teams. The signing of the Act
of Reconciliation ceased hostilities between the Constitutionalist and Loyalist forces on

252

Ruck, Tropic of Baseball, 60.
Klein, American Hegemony, 116.
254
Quoted in Rob Ruck, Raceball: How the Major Leagues Colonized the Black
and Latin Game (Boston: Beacon Press, 2011), 166, Nook edition. From Felipe Alou
with Herm Weiskopf, Felipe Alou: My Life and Baseball ([Waco, TX?]: Word Books,
1967) 119-120.
139
253

August 30, 1965 and created a Provisional Government. This led to a decrease in combat
activities for the US and IAPF and the two resorted to general peacekeeping and
constabulary operations. The ceasing of combat activities allowed civil affairs units to
conduct more recreational and entertainment-oriented programs as the US forces
remained in the Dominican Republic to support the Provisional Government and ensure a
peaceful transition to a permanent government after elections. One project consisted of
establishing a US Forces, Dominican Republic (USFORDOMREP) baseball team “to
represent US military forces in the Dominican Republic for competition against local
civilian and Dominican military teams” mirroring the teams organized by marines during
the previous occupation.255 The circular announced the date for tryouts and encouraged
all qualified US military personnel to attend with the season expected to last from
October to March.256 The fielding of a baseball team comprised of US military personnel
to play against Dominican teams offered entertainment for the Dominican population, but
also acted as a unifier for the Dominican people to rally around the Dominican team
playing an occupying military force. The games between US military personnel and
Dominican teams carried political meaning as occupiers played the occupied. The US
military wanted to turn Dominicans away from the radical political activities and in doing
so ensured stability for the completion of the mission. The games allowed people to unify
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around a common cause and distracted them from political players seeking to use the
military operations to inflame the violence.
Civil affairs units also included softball in the programs for recreation and
entertainment. The civil affairs office within the USFORDOMREP created a command
intramural softball tournament “to afford all US military personnel assigned to
Dominican Republic the opportunity to participate in organized competitive sports
activities.”257 The tournament occurred in October and consisted of eight teams from the
six major commands making up the USFORDOMREP.258 Around this same time the
USFORDOMREP Civil Affairs office created an intramural volleyball tournament.259
Those programs primarily targeted US military personnel as the military stance shifted to
peacekeeping and constabulary operations and boredom remained the number one issue
facing a number of military personnel. However, while it is not explicitly mentioned in
either of the circulars announcing the formation of the tournaments those games in all
likelihood were open to the Dominican population to provide entertainment. Continuing
with the unifying the population theme the US Air Force donated fuel to the Dominican
Air Force, in 1965, to fly the Dominican Republic National Softball team to the First
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World Championship of Male Softball in Mexico.260 That year the Dominican team
finished ranked ninth out of eleven teams finishing with three wins and seven losses. The
team played the US national team and the Nicaraguan national team, while both nations
had military personnel in the Dominican Republic as part of the IAPF. The US national
team won the tournament with a defeat over Mexico.261 The US military civil affairs
office sought not only to turn the population away from leftist political groups but to also
unify the nation using baseball and softball. Those attempts continued into 1966 when the
USFORDOMREP sponsored a Dominican youth baseball tournament in the final months
of the occupation.
A primary target of the US military civil affairs programs remained the youth of
Santo Domingo as they made up the majority that participated in the political protests
against the intervention. Youth also made up a majority of the multiple left-wing political
groups concentrated within the universities and schools. The “international language of
dissent” that ignited in the early 1960s spread to the Dominican Republic after the
overthrow of the Bosch administration in 1963 and grew stronger during the Reid Cabral
triumvirate and US intervention.262 The civil affairs officers fixated on baseball as a
distraction and control tactic and a major project began in March 1966 when civil affairs
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units “organized and furnished coaching and equipment for youth baseball league in
cooperation with USAID.”263 The start of this program coincided with the beginning of
the presidential campaign season on March 1, 1966 to choose a new president, who
created a government to replace the Provisional Government. The season ran through the
months of May, June, and July, which corresponded to the June 1 presidential election
that saw Joaquin Balaguer defeat Juan Bosch, and the July 1 swearing in of Balaguer as
president. There was little chance of the dates coinciding coincidentally as baseball
season in the Dominican Republic runs from October through March. Youth also made
up the majority of people that threatened instigating protests against the US occupation
and the elections. A program that kept young people off the streets and out of the
influence of political, especially left leaning, leaders and provided entertainment for the
Dominican population seemed like a win-win situation for US military personnel. The
added benefit also existed that US soldiers had plenty of opportunity throughout the
baseball season to increase public good will and opinion of US military presence.
Running from March through the end of July the Dominican youth baseball
season provided a good example of a long running civil affairs program that turned the
Dominican population away leftist political activities. The six teams from suburbs
surrounding Santo Domingo made up the league included Villa Francisca, Haina,
Ensanche La Fe, Cristo Rey, Arroyo Hondo, and Villa Faro. Additionally, each team had
a corresponding US military unit sponsor that provided coaches and a representative from
the Dominican government to promote relationships. The following sponsors are:
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Table 1 Baseball Teams and Sponsoring Units
Arroyo Hondo
Haina
Cristo Rey
Villa Faro
Ensanche La Fe
Villa Francisca

42nd Field Hospital
105th Transportation Company
Higher Headquarters, 2nd Battalion,
504th Inf.
B Battery, 1st Battalion, 320th Artillery
Company A and B, 2nd Battalion, 508th
Inf.
Company C, 4th Battalion, 68th Armor

All six teams originated from almost every section of the city to provide for a complete
covering of the youth population of Santo Domingo and the sponsoring unit was located
in close proximity to the team they were sponsoring.264 US military units varied in the
participation with units providing one to three individuals to coach or assist with running
the team. However, the number of coaches provided does not seem to correspond with
commitment to the team as the 2nd Battalion, 504th Infantry contributed one coach, but in
June 1966 “raised funds to provide…a complete set of uniforms to include shoes, socks,
T-shirts, caps, and 2/504th lettering on back of uniform.”265 The season ended with Villa
Francisca as the season champion and the rankings based on season long records
corresponded to seeding in the Dominican Junior Baseball Tournament held at the end of
August.266
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Organized at the end of July through early August the USFORDOMREP
sponsored Dominican Junior Baseball Tournament provided one of the last opportunities
for the US military civil affairs programs to impact the Dominican youth and turn them
away from radical political organizations. In the planning of the event the Adjutant
General described it as “a Civic Action activity at Quisqueya Stadium involving six (6)
junior baseball teams which have been sponsored by various military organizations of
USFORDOMREP.”267 The primary planning of the tournament fell to the J5 Chief of
Staff with almost all sections of USFORDOMREP on hand to participate including J4,
Joint Information Office (JIO), Provost Marshal, Comptroller, and the sponsoring
military units. Just like in the regular season the USFORDOMREP coordinated with
USAID “on procurement of equipment and uniforms to the extent possible,” and set a
budget for the equipment and trophies at five-hundred dollars.268 The procurement of
equipment came in at one-hundred dollars done through Clark’s Sporting Goods in
Fayetteville, North Carolina located nearby Fort Bragg, the home base of the 82nd
Airborne Division and 18th Airborne Corps, both of which made up the primary
command personnel for the USFORDOMREP.269 To officially follow through with the
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tournament the proposal was placed to the USFORDOMREP command staff for concur
or non-concur. As often was the case with civil affairs programs the medical section
caused an issue with planning.
Every level of the USFORDOMREP command staff concurred with the planning
for the Dominican Junior Baseball Tournament except for the Surgeon of the US Forces,
who described a couple of topics regarding the safety of the players, the Dominican
population, and US military personnel. The first point the surgeon made was that
“medical facilities at the present time are primary mission oriented only, and medical care
is of the ‘routine’ and ‘extreme emergency’ variety.”270 Part of the reason for this status
among the medical facilities was that the withdrawal of US military personnel started at
the end of July and beginning of August, so the personnel working in those facilities was
limited. The surgeon went on to describe “injuries commonly encountered in baseball
games are of the head injury or broken bone variety” and that field x-ray equipment was
not available, nor any ambulances available if a serious injury occurred.271 The final
comment provided by the surgeon was that “without a backup hospital, responsibility for
medical care of local Dominican Nationals involved in sports injuries should not be
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undertaken.”272 Those details and comments are discussed not to provide a poor
representation of the medical section within the USFORDOMREP, but to illustrate the
issues between the different levels of command, as to the responsibilities and abilities of
military personnel. The medical section pointed those issues out to the other levels of
command to provide a scenario of a serious injury occurring. There is no evidence that a
serious injury occurred but this program originated to provide a positive image of the US
military. If a Dominican youth received a serious injury at a USFORDOMREP sponsored
event with a heavy US military presence and did not receive adequate or quick medical
care the impact of the event may have proven disastrous for the US military. The upper
levels of command took the Surgeon’s comments into consideration and opted to follow
through with the event as scheduled.
With approval of the tournament the US Civil Affairs Chief of Staff created a
series of events celebratory in nature and included a heavy presence of US military
leaders and military personnel. The first day of the tournament contained the most pomp
and circumstance with the opening ceremony taking up most of the morning’s events
before the first game. The two key events from the schedule were the band playing the
National Anthem, and General Linvill, commander of USFORDOMREP throwing out
the first pitch.273 The first event, playing the National Anthem was conducted by
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elements of the USFORDOMREP band, however, the schedule does not make clear
which National Anthem was played, the United States or the Dominican Republic. In
fact, within the comments on the schedule the bullet point “Band will play the National
Anthem” is underlined with a question mark.274 There appeared no detailed description in
the documents regarding which anthem was played during the ceremony. Common sense
points to the Dominican Republic’s anthem due to “playing the anthem…is a ceremony
proclaiming that the strife on the field takes place under the overarching protection and
harmony of the nation, to which players on both teams belong.”275 The awkwardness and
protest that would have occurred at the playing of the US National Anthem would have
painted the tournament in an unfriendly light, and created more friction between the
Dominican population and US Forces at the height of US military withdrawal. For
comparison, imagine the protest and anger if the Dominican Republic national anthem
instead of the “Star Spangled Banner” was played before a Major League Baseball game.
The other major part of the ceremony was General Linvill throwing out the first pitch. In
the schedule the event is listed as “General Linvill will throw the first ball to the
Dominican Sports Director or his representative to open the tournament.”276 The imagery
of the US Forces commander throwing a ball to a representative of the Dominican
government acted as an analogy for the US military withdrawal and the turning over of
power and control to the Dominican government. The practice in the US is that “the

274

Attachment to Memorandum, Schedule of Events, August 12, 1966; NACP.
Roberto Gonzalez Echevarria, “The Magic of Baseball,” Indiana Journal of
Global Legal Studies 8, no. 1, Symposium in the Global Era: Economic, Legal, and
Cultural Perspectives (Fall, 2000): 151.
275

276

Attachment to Memorandum, Schedule of Events, August 12, 1966; NACP.
148

leader himself, not his proxy, the manager, or the pitcher, hurls the first ball,” which is
why at most opening day baseball games the governor or community leader from
whichever city the team is from throws out the first pitch.277 While not surprising that the
US military commander threw out the first pitch as the US military planned and
sponsored the event, it would have brought attention to the US military’s role in the
intervention and occupation and further attention on the US withdrawal.
The US military using baseball as a part of civil affairs operations provided
inroads for Major League Baseball (MLB) to invest in the Dominican population and use
the history of the sport within the nation. For example, with the fall of Trujillo and the
stabilization provided by the US military the MLB started moving into the country to sign
and produce big league talent. With the blockade of Cuba in 1961 and the opening of the
Dominican Republic in 1966 major league teams started sending scouts to the area
looking for players.278 Almost ten years after the US withdrawal of military forces from
the Dominican Republic MLB teams organized baseball academies in the country. Those
academies operated in a similar way to sugar refineries “in which nearby sugar refineries
operate in that raw materials are obtained cheaply, locally refined (at reduced cost), and
shipped abroad,” the difference being that the baseball academies operated in obtaining
and refining baseball players.279 There appears to have been no discussion or apparent
relationship between the US military and the MLB in the conducting of baseball games
and tournaments. Although, the Dominican Junior Baseball Tournament concentrated
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talent from around Santo Domingo in the fourteen to sixteen age range, the age when
MLB teams look to sign players to one of their academies. That leads one to wonder just
how many MLB scouts attended the tournament to survey the talent. What started during
with the military intervention in 1966 with the forming of a youth baseball league
blossomed into “hundreds of amateur leagues with thousands of teams in the country.”280
While the US military used baseball as a tactic to control and distract the Dominican
population it unintentionally opened the door for a level of investment and control that
still impacts the Dominican Republic into the present.
The use of the military band and baseball represented the use of recreation and
entertainment to turn people away from leftist political activities and allowed for the
creation of a pro-US government. There is no doubt that the US military band sought to
build relationships between the US military and the Dominican population. However, as
expressed earlier in the chapter there existed a valid question as whether the Dominican
people recognized the band as operating under the US Army. The issue also existed
whether there was any image to improve as most military operations took place in the
capital city rather than among the rural populations. Baseball provided another interesting
case as the setup of a junior league took place in Santo Domingo and much of the youth
population of the various suburbs participated in and had the opportunity to build
relationships with US personnel. The leagues and games diminished Dominican political
interest in leftist organizations during elections, the most crucial period of the
intervention. Baseball’s role in minimizing protests furthered the chances of a smooth
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transition to a permanent government. The analysis of Army band concerts and the
organization of US military sponsored baseball leagues illustrated the multiple tactics
involved in civil affairs outside of propaganda and building infrastructure, but there is
still more to be done.
Historians have severely overlooked the use of recreation and entertainment as
tactics to control the native population of a nation under occupation. The US government
used music and concerts during the Cold War to illustrate the multitude of US culture,
and to combat the Soviet Union’s argument that the US contained racialized institutions
that treated non-white Americans as second-class citizens. Penny Von Eschen’s Satchmo
Blows Up the World analyzes the State Department’s use of jazz musicians on US foreign
policy tours to Africa and Latin America.281 The tours conducted by Louis Armstrong
displayed the United States’ cultural diversity through music and attempted to downplay
the racial tensions used throughout Soviet propaganda. Looking at the use of music by
US soldiers Doug Bradley’s We Gotta Get Out of This Place analyzes the culture of
music among US soldiers that served in the Vietnam War and how that music shaped
their experience.282 Those historians represent analysis of music in both foreign policy
and within the military, but the use of military bands in the use of foreign affairs or civil
affairs has largely been overlooked. This chapter briefly discussed the USAF Band and
the multiple foreign good will trips the unit embarked on, and on the importance of
playing music that may draw praise or may offend. To this day the US military employs
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the largest number of professional musicians than any other institution in the United
States, and the role of the military band has only continued to grow with the taking on of
new responsibilities. Historians, such as Bradley, have done an admirable job of
discussing the influence of music on military personnel, particularly in a war zone, but
that analysis must be broadened to look at military bands themselves and the soldiers that
operated within those units both in and out of combat zones. The same argument can be
made about the use of baseball. There is no question that historians have created a
number of works regarding the influence of military occupation on the spread of sports
throughout the different regions of the world, specifically how every nation in Latin
American and the Caribbean occupied by the United States developed baseball as part of
their national identity. Rob Ruck’s Tropic of Baseball and Raceball analyzed the history
of the sport in the Dominican Republic and its influence on the Dominican population.283
While Alan Klein offered detailed analysis of how baseball shaped the culture within the
Dominican Republic.284 However, there is still more work to be done regarding the
relationship between the military and the MLB. It is a convenient coincidence that in a
short time after the US military secured the Dominican Republic as a nation friendly to
US interests that the number of Dominicans participating in the MLB rose dramatically.
The number of youth baseball leagues around the Dominican Republic also exploded in
relation to the number of MLB baseball academies after the USFORDOMREP sponsored
a youth baseball league and championship tournament. There are multiple avenues for
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recreation and entertainment in the realm of occupation and intervention and once those
avenues are explored the full image of the US intervention and occupation activities can
be revealed and studied.
The US military civil affairs office successfully used entertainment and recreation
to turn people away from leftist political organizations. Whether it was creating the
Provisional Government in 1965, the start of campaign season on March 1, 1966, the
June 1 election, or the installment of the elected president on July 1 US band concerts and
baseball games provided entertainment for the population to keep them from joining
radical political organizations. Military leaders appeared to be fine having people cheer
and organize against the military as long as the overall mission to stabilize the Dominican
Republic succeeded. US military personnel at all levels and ranks used the development
of relationships and programs to keep people away from radical political activity. The
military allowed protest but wanted to keep people away from individuals seeking to
distance the Dominican Republic from the US, called for violence against the occupiers
(including both US Forces as part of the IAPF), or for political violence against the
opposing political party. The successes of those entertainment programs in the
Dominican Republic led to the creation of a stable environment and the electing of a
permanent pro-US government.
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CHAPTER VI – RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PEACE CORPS
On June 13, 1965, Sargent Shriver addressed an audience at St. John’s University
in Jamaica, New York. The audience consisted of possible recruits to the United States
Peace Corps who after enlisting traveled to developing nations as representatives of the
United States to train, work, and live among the population. At the beginning of his
speech Shriver provided a geography lesson and described how “symbolically, the rest of
[the audiences’] lives will…be spent…in coming to grips with that geography lesson…in
trying to establish a relationship between that name on your diploma and the world
around you.”285 Shriver elaborated on that relationship later in the speech while
discussing the story of a Peace Corps volunteer (PCV) in the Dominican Republic. The
PCV served in Santo Domingo during the initial stages of the US military intervention
when the fighting was strongest between the US military forces and the Constitutionalist
forces. In relating the story Shriver asked “what does it mean to be American?”286 Shriver
provided his definition through the lens of the relationship between the PCVs and the
Dominican population and described how mentioning the words “Peace Corps” opened
barriers and doors.287 When one PCV challenged a Constitutionalist soldier after the
soldier said all Americans should go home the soldier replied “We don’t mean you.
You’re different. You live with us. When we’re hungry—you’re hungry. When we walk
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through the mud—you walk through the mud.”288 For Shriver, that represented a new
meaning of American, it meant that a PCV was a citizen of the world. The volunteers
shared in the experiences of the people they lived and worked with and built different
relationships compared to the more traditional relationships developed between the US
Government and the government of another nation.
Shriver’s new definition of what it means to be American offers fascinating
comparisons between PCVs and US soldiers deployed overseas. His definition of shared
experiences with other peoples of the world indicated that PCVs were more American
than US soldiers. For Shriver, PCVs were not only in a foreign nation to create US
friendly governments but to better the peoples’ lives whereas the US soldier enforced US
foreign policy and therefore does not share the same experience as the foreign citizen.
That definition depicted the US soldier as an occupier and the PCV as a friendly neighbor
concerned about the people. The definition also offered insights into how Shriver and the
Kennedy administration wanted to move away from a military dominated foreign policy
and to a policy like the 1930s Good Neighbor Policy of President Roosevelt. The
situation further represents the perception of the military during the 1960s and set the
stage for the domestic confrontations within the US of the late sixties into the 1970s over
the Vietnam War.
Peace Corps volunteers living in the Dominican Republic believed the military
intervention tested the resolve and independent status of the Peace Corps as a separate
government organization. The intervention tested this resolve as it was the first time the
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Peace Corps and the military deployed to the same nation. During the intervention the US
military and the Peace Corps conducted parallel programs to improve relationships with
Dominican civilians. This chapter argues that the Peace Corps worked alongside the US
military to provide humanitarian aid to turn the Dominican population away from the
leftist political groups and to improve the image of the United States. This fits into the
overall argument of the dissertation by demonstrating how the US military and Peace
Corps supported a pro-US Dominican government through taking care of the
populations’ needs thereby diminishing their interest in a leftist government.
Conceived during the 1960 presidential campaign the Kennedy administration
developed the key outlines of how the Peace Corps functioned and defined the corps’
purpose within the realm of US foreign policy. The Peace Corps existed due to
“Kennedy’s belief that the United States had ‘to do better’ in competing with Moscow for
the allegiance of the newly independent countries of the Third World.”289 In the article
“Decolonization, the Cold War, and the Foreign Policy of the Peace Corps,” Elizabeth
Cobbs described how the Peace Corps “challenges historians to look through and beyond
the Cold War” and that the “Peace Corps story also reveals the importance of going
beyond the bounds of simply US policy.”290 Adding the Peace Corps to the study of US
military civil affairs and civil action projects allows for a further in depth study of the
policy surrounding the US military humanitarianism in the Dominican Republic. The
Peace Corps adds an additional US government entity that conducted similar programs as
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the US military throughout the nation. The United States military organized and
performed civil action projects in the Dominican Republic in order to further US foreign
policy goals. The Peace Corps conducted parallel programs in order to accomplish the
similar goals of bettering the lives of Dominican citizens, improving the image of the US,
and eliminating Dominican interest in leftist organizations. Peace Corps volunteers lived
alongside of the Dominican population and experienced the same restrictions imposed by
the military occupation.
Many historians have offered their analysis on the Peace Corps with the majority
focusing on the development of operations within the organization, the Peace Corps’ role
in foreign policy, and the spirit of the organization and its programs, rather than how the
Peace Corps operated alongside other organizations of the US government, especially the
US military.291 These historians discuss how President John F. Kennedy’s Peace Corps
“initiative inspired, and continues to inspire, hope and understanding among Americans
and the rest of the world.”292 However, historians have also asked questions regarding the
overall role of the Peace Corps in US foreign policy. Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman’s All You
Need is Love uses the Peace Corps to analyze the “function of humanitarianism in US
foreign policy” and asks the question “is humanitarianism real or is it a smoke screen for
the most basic intent of policy, which is to fulfill the will to power? If it is a smoke
screen, whom does it fool, Americans or the rest of the world or both?”293 This question
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works alongside of Wilensky’s question about the use of military medical aid in Vietnam
and whether the military used medical aid to reach a specific foreign policy goal. The
Johnson administration use of the Peace Corps in humanitarian operations carried
significant impacts on the lives of Dominican citizens and blunted US military
operations. The US government used the Peace Corps along with its humanitarian
activities and programs to function as a “smoke screen” for the military and foreign
policy goals and initiatives.294 The Peace Corps’ favorable view around the world was
used in the Dominican Republic to obscure the heavy handed military action.
The Peace Corps struggled against other US government institutions to maintain
its independence as the Cold War atmosphere prompted US government officials to seek
an advantage in developing nations wherever available. Gerard T. Rice’s The Bold
Experiment analyzed the initial years of the Peace Corps in the early 1960s and goes into
in depth analysis regarding the Peace Corps’ role within foreign affairs.295 During one of
the Peace Corps’ first meetings the head of the organization, Sargent Shriver, determined
a number of principles and objectives in which the Peace Corps operated. Those
principles centered on what Shriver believed allowed the Peace Corps to reach the three
main objectives put in place by Congress. The objectives included “provide a needed skill
to an interested country; to increase the understanding of Americans by other peoples;
and to increase American understanding of other peoples.”296 The main objectives offer
further context on the Peace Corps’ role in the Dominican Republic during the military
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intervention and determined to what extent the relationship between the Peace Corps and
the US military impacted those objectives. The three objectives also fit into the question
asked earlier by Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman regarding the function of humanitarianism as a
smokescreen to achieve desirable foreign policy objectives. Analyzing information
regarding how the different objectives complimented or contradicted each other further
complicates the Peace Corps’ role in US foreign policy during the Cold War. This is true
especially in the Dominican Republic, where the US military and the Peace Corps
functioned side by side with the same goals and interests of improving the US image and
turning Dominicans away from leftist political organizations.
The Peace Corps navigated around the perception of working to further US
foreign policy interests by primarily operating in nations that offered an invitation and
only conducted programs authorized by the host government. One of the greater projects
the Peace Corps participated in during the 1960s revolved around community
development in which Frank Mankiewicz, the Chief of Latin American Programs, was
the staunchest advocate. Mankiewicz viewed community development as the path to
changing the way a nation operated and the way the people of a nation participated in
their government. However, community development projects “ran the risk of becoming
involved in internal politics” as those programs “were aimed at social reorganization; that
is, encouraging people to take the action necessary to secure their community welfare and
democratic rights.”297 The Peace Corps volunteers operating in the Dominican Republic’s
community development projects had the most encounters with US military personnel.
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Those volunteers promoted democratic principles of political participation to meet the
needs of the Dominican population rather than revolutionary or insurrectionist ideology.
Those efforts were realized on June 1, 1966 when Dominicans elected a permanent
government. In the election, goals of both the US military and the Peace Corps were
realized with the election of Joaquin Balaguer, who was elected through democratic
means and headed a US friendly government.
The Peace Corps continued to struggle with separating itself from US foreign
policy throughout the initial stages of its existence. One of the primary points Sargent
Shriver maintained during his stint as Director of the Peace Corps was “insisting that the
Peace Corps would never go to a country where the United States was actively waging
war.”298 However, while the military operation in the Dominican Republic represented an
act of limited warfare the Peace Corps remained in the nation throughout the military’s
occupation of the capital city. Peace Corps volunteers “were strictly forbidden to engage
in any kind of political propagandizing or subversive activity overseas” while also
working hard to maintain the Corps’ separation from political or military affairs.299 This
grew increasingly difficult during the Dominican intervention due to the fact that Peace
Corps volunteers created relationships with Dominican citizens who fought on the side of
the Constitutionalists when the civil war broke out. This led the Johnson administration to
restrict Peace Corps volunteers from speaking out against US policies and the US
military operations. Peace Corps volunteers during the intervention participated in an
immense psychological, social, and cultural event that few have had the ability to
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experience. The actions of the 1965 US military intervention represented those significant
experiences of the Peace Corps volunteers in the Dominican Republic.
When conflict broke out in the Dominican Republic in 1965 the Peace Corps had
thirty-three volunteers in the country, most located in the capital of Santo Domingo. Tad
Szulc built a number of relationships with Peace Corps volunteers to share their accounts
and experiences, and he dedicated his book “to the Peace Corps volunteers in Santo
Domingo.”300 Stanley Meisler’s When the World Calls also discussed the Peace Corps in
the Dominican Republic and provided narrative aspects of the Peace Corps’ mission.301
Meisler also illustrated the fragility of the Peace Corps’ independence by describing how
“throughout the crisis, President Lyndon Johnson made it clear that he regarded the Peace
Corps as an instrument of his policies.”302 The early days of the intervention were
especially difficult for the Peace Corps volunteers located in the capital city as many of
them remained in the Constitutionalist occupied area. There the volunteers experienced
aerial attacks and gunfights while working as ambulance drivers or in the hospitals in any
capacity that helped the wounded and suffering. Szulc called the Peace Corps nurses “the
real heroines of the civil war” and further described hospitals without lights or medicine
as part of the conditions where the nurses operated.303 The Peace Corps made their name
through their neutrality in the Dominican Republic during the first few days of the civil
war and that reputation continued throughout the US military intervention.
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Peace Corps volunteers saw their role in the Dominican Republic after the landing
of US Marines as aiding the Dominican civilians caught in the crossfire. One of the main
tasks of that role included distributing medical supplies, especially painkillers, brought by
the Marines. Naval ships emptied their own medical stores to aid the stricken hospitals
and “the supplies were handed by the Marines at the Haina beach to Peace Corps
representatives, who arranged for their delivery to the Dominican Red Cross and the
hospitals downtown.”304 This military-Peace Corps relationship continued during the
initial stages of the intervention as Peace Corps volunteers in Santo Domingo operated as
intermediaries between US forces and civilians in the Constitutionalist sections. The
volunteers also participated in a variety of actions from the distribution of medical
supplies to arranging meetings between Constitutionalist leaders and US government
officials. Bob Satin, the Peace Corps Director in the Dominican Republic, conducted the
latter duties and at times remained the only US official in constant contact with
Constitutionalist leaders. During one of these liaison duties Satin discovered two marines
captured by the Constitutionalist forces after getting lost on the streets of downtown
Santo Domingo. After discussing their situation with the Constitutionalist leaders, Satin
negotiated the release of the marines and escorted them back into the US occupied
area.305 While Satin acted as an intermediary between US officials and Constitutionalist
leaders the perception of his services had a divisive effect on the Peace Corps volunteers.

304

Szulc, Dominican Diary, 45.

305

Szulc, Dominican Diary, 147-148.
162

Despite the services provided by Bob Satin some Peace Corps workers perceived
that Satin did not act in their best interests or represented the Peace Corps positively
during the opening stages of the intervention. Those criticisms of Satin offer a glimpse
into the relationship between the Peace Corps, the US military, and the US government
during the intervention and how the three institutions interpreted their role in the ongoing
crisis. One of the first criticisms of Satin described how he saw himself as a big US
government official and “instead of concerning himself with the Volunteers” concerned
himself with acting as an official representative of the US government.306 Peace Corps
volunteers questioned this role and asked whether “acting as the intermediary between
Caamano [the Constitutionalist leader] and the US Embassy [was] a proper Peace Corps
role.”307 Those questions stemmed from the Peace Corps’ desire to remain neutral in
events and as mentioned earlier in the chapter Sargent Shriver vowed to never send the
Peace Corps to places where the US military was engaged in combat operations and
especially to participate in diplomatic missions.
The Peace Corps were already present in the Dominican Republic at the start of
the intervention, so the options were either remain operating in the nation or withdraw the
volunteers. Almost all the volunteers elected to stay. While Peace Corps volunteers
criticized Satin for his role in the intervention Stanley Meisler defended Satin against the
criticisms. Meisler explained how Satin “felt that he could perform useful and peaceful
service as one of the few US officials trusted by the rebels” and since “so many American
diplomats were away from the embassy…he surely knew more about the rebels than any

306
307

Meisler, When the World Calls, 87.
Meisler, When the World Calls, 87.
163

other American in the embassy.”308 Regardless of how Satin saw his role, Peace Corps
volunteers continued with their criticisms and one volunteer even filed an official
complaint relating to Satin’s actions during the intervention.
The Peace Corps volunteer’s complaint against Satin offers insight into how the
Peace Corps operated at the start of the intervention regarding the safety of Peace Corps
volunteers and illustrates the possible relationship between Peace Corps volunteers and
US military personnel. The complaint originated with Peace Corps volunteers Peter and
Esther Podolsky, who sought to file four charges against Robert Satin. The charges
included “gross negligence with regard to the safety of Peace Corps Volunteers in the
Dominican Republic” during the outbreak of the civil war, “gross negligence with respect
to the personal property” of the two Peace Corps volunteers filing the charges, and
“abuse of authority…and conduct unbecoming a Peace Corps staff member.”309 The
charge that pertains to this subject and chapter was the conduct unbecoming of a Peace
Corps staff member. The charge directly mentioned relations with the US military and
Satin’s work with the Constitutionalist leaders. The first detail of the charge discussed
“that Satin antagonized a Captain Sentori, of the United States Military Engineers Unit in
Santo Domingo, by blaming him for an article which had appeared in a local newspaper
about the Army Engineers trucking grain from Santo Domingo to La Vega for Peace
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Corps purposes.”310 There is no mention of the name of the newspaper and there does not
appear to be any mention of the contact in US Army records. The report described that
“Captain Sentori…refused to do anything more for the Peace Corps” due to the
confrontation with Satin and that Podolsky had to work on fixing the situation. The other
accusation under this charge was that “Satin had acted in a disloyal manner during the
revolution” by providing information to US reporters in the Dominican Republic and that
“Satin openly backed the rebels, thereby creating a serious conflict with the 82nd Airborne
Division.”311 While there appears to have been no follow up investigation of the charges
the description of providing information to reporters appeared to have some fact. One of
the primary contacts of Tad Szulc in reporting the experiences of Peace Corps volunteers
was Robert Satin. Satin provided Szulc with information regarding the relationships
between Constitutionalists and Peace Corps workers and described the work of Peace
Corps volunteers working in hospitals inside Constitutionalist occupied sections of Santo
Domingo.312
This filing of charges and the details of the charges provide a look into how two
Peace Corps volunteers viewed Satin’s work and the issues created between the Peace
Corps and the US military during the intervention. Detailed earlier in the chapter, US
Marines provided medical aid to Peace Corps volunteers who in turn distributed the aid in
areas held by the Constitutionalists. According to the Podolsky’s charges, Satin took
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exception to the fact that the US military aided the Peace Corps in its role and damaged
relationships between the Peace Corps and the US military by antagonizing the US
military personnel that provided aid supplies to Peace Corps volunteers. At the same
time, Satin maintained good relations with the Constitutionalists who the US military
perceived as the primary threat throughout the intervention. Peace Corps members
actively tried to stay out of controversial political situations but “sometimes Volunteers
had no choice but to play active parts in political imbroglios.”313 Those active roles
applied to the situation in the Dominican Republic when Peace Corps volunteers worked
in hospitals tending to Constitutionalist soldiers wounded fighting Loyalist soldiers, and
later US military personnel.
That Satin engaged in openly talking about the relations between Peace Corps and
Constitutionalist soldiers more than likely influenced US military perceptions at the
beginning of the intervention. However, the average soldier and marine remained just as
confused about the overall situation. Tad Szulc described an encounter where a Marine
sat down with him and a couple of Peace Corps nurses and expressed confusion with the
entire situation.314 There are many perceptions of the actions of Robert Satin. From the
two marines who he helped release from Constitutionalist hands to the intermediary
duties between the US government and the Constitutionalist leaders, and finally to the
different perceptions of the multiple Peace Corps volunteers. The role of Peace Corps
members, especially Robert Satin, and their overall objective in the Dominican Republic
complicated the Dominican intervention. The volunteers perceptions of the intervention
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and the Peace Corps’ role also reveal their internal struggle to remain an independent
entity, and neutral in the volunteer’s view, while conducting programs as a representative
of a US government organization.
As the fighting ceased the overall question for the Johnson administration
regarding the Peace Corps remained whether the volunteers had a role inside of the
Dominican Republic that benefitted the administration’s policy goals and the goals of the
US military. The goals of the administration stood at preventing a second Cuba and
installing a government friendly to the United States. The goals of the US military
remained to use humanitarianism to fulfill the needs of the Dominican population to
support the pro-US government. Due to the popularity of the Peace Corps in the
Dominican Republic the Johnson administration believed that “if it behaves with proper
discipline, it can be a very useful balance to more hardheaded activities which clearly
will be necessary as we go ahead.”315 The military carried out those “hardheaded
activities” which brought the military into direct contention with the Peace Corps’ policy
of remaining independent.316 A memorandum from McGeorge Bundy, the President’s
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, to President Johnson described a plan to
use Peace Corps volunteers alongside US military personnel in order to diminish the
perspective of overwhelming military force. That plan illustrated that the United States
had harkened back to the military intervention tactics of the early twentieth century.
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Those tactics included covering aggressive military action with humanitarian and civil
action that benefitted the foreign nation.
The Johnson administration did not intend to flood the Dominican Republic with
Peace Corps volunteers, rather, the administration highlighted specific programs in areas
where the Peace Corps offered the best support to the US military’s mission. The
programs involving Peace Corps volunteers included elementary school teachers, public
health volunteers, community development organizers, and town administration
technicians. In total the Johnson administration requested about two hundred and ten
volunteers for the Dominican Republic.317 The vast majority of the volunteers provided
for the operations were community development organizers. Numbering eighty
volunteers, community development organizers worked in much the same way that
military civil affairs personnel operated but wore civilian clothing rather than a military
uniform. As mentioned earlier in the chapter community development remained one of
the main programs of the Peace Corps and involved volunteers working in a community
to diagnose a number of issues. Once identified, the volunteers mobilized the local
population to either fix the issues themselves or to take their complaints to the local
government.
US military and Peace Corps volunteers even used some of the same tactics
although with different expected outcomes. In one of these projects, Peace Corps
volunteers organized eight and nine-year-old kids into baseball teams in a similar way
that the military organized baseball leagues discussed in a previous chapter. As the games
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started they “soon attracted older brothers who formed teenage and youth teams, and the
teams turned into social clubs” which in turn provided the Peace Corps workers an
opportunity to attract the parents and other adults to attend the meetings.318 After a few
months the volunteers “could boast that their baseball teams had evolved into a
community association.”319 Those tactics mirrored tactics used by the US military,
although the goal of the military was not to create community associations but to keep
Dominican youth away from the radical political factions that operated in Santo
Domingo. The military and the Peace Corps conducted the same operations to better
relationships with the Dominican people. While the military sought to keep people away
from radical political groups those baseball leagues acted as an unintentional community
gathering. Those gatherings may have provided an avenue of good will for the US
military from Dominicans. On the other hand, the Peace Corps formed leagues to form
community associations and to control political activities by turning them away from
leftist policies while furthering Dominicans’ positive perceptions of the United States.
However, while the Johnson administration looked into sending more Peace Corps
members to the Dominican Republic the administration made sure the volunteers
understood “the sensitive nature of their work” and the ramifications “if they start
criticizing US policy down there, [the administration] will simply shut down the Peace
Corps in the Dominican Republic and give the whole operation a bad black eye.”320 The
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administration showed a willingness to work with the Peace Corps as long as the Peace
Corps fell into line and followed the administration’s policy goals.
Throughout the Dominican intervention the Johnson administration and the US
military attempted to use the Peace Corps in order to provide cover for military actions.
The Johnson administration viewed the Peace Corps as a possible alternative to military
force or at least a counterweight to the military actions that occurred in the Dominican
Republic. At the start of the intervention the US military deployed civilian clothed
Special Forces operators into sections of Santo Domingo in intelligence gathering
missions and to determine the level of communist activity within the Constitutionalist
forces. The military expanded those missions into the rural cities and towns in the
Dominican countryside to determine whether the Constitutionalists had spread to other
parts of the country and if there existed any danger of a communist insurgency.321 Those
Special Forces operations, called “Operation Green Chopper,” included personnel from
the US embassy and US Agency of International Development (USAID) to “lend
credibility to cover stories about conducting economic, agricultural, or medical
surveys.”322 When those missions existed in the planning stages military and State
Department officials asked if Peace Corps volunteers could be used on the missions as a
show of good will and as a means to provide cover to the Special Forces personnel. The
response to the proposal “personally authorized by Peace Corps Director Sargent Shriver
was ‘Not only no, but hell no.’”323 The Peace Corps worked throughout the intervention
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to remain independent from US military operations. While the corps refused to work
alongside the Special Forces during Operation Green Chopper volunteers worked with
and parallel to US military personnel in regard to community development and health
care projects.
The Johnson administration along with the US military further sought to use the
Peace Corps through the organizations participation in the Interagency Youth Committee
(IAYC) which identified potential leadership within a nation or at least teenagers who
demonstrated the ability to provide future leadership. The IAYC included members from
the US Embassies around the world, US Information Service (USIS), US Agency for
International Development (USAID), the Peace Corps and the US military, and possible
participation by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The IAYC existed “as a result of
a judgment by President Kennedy that official United States Government personnel were
not adequately reaching the likely foreign leaders of tomorrow with a true picture of our
ideals and our aims.”324 The members of the committee included personnel that had direct
access to the youth of a nation through the operation of country wide programs. The
conflict of interest regarding the Peace Corps’ independence and role in foreign policy
came to light in a letter from Warren Wiggins to William Josephson, the General Counsel
of the Peace Corps. The letter described how “programs sponsored by the Interagency
Youth Committee are tending to involve Peace Corps volunteers overseas in exactly what
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Peace Corps volunteers are not supposed to do.”325 The Peace Corps saw itself as a tool
of US foreign policy but did not participate in US foreign policy directly as they
considered themselves neutral in events that occurred between the United States and
possible host nations. While detailed information on the IAYC in the Dominican
Republic appears not to be available in the archive a letter to the Department of State
from the US Embassy in Ecuador illustrated how the IAYC operated. In order for the
IAYC to have success and to obtain the committee’s objectives “all existing US agencies
which have programs relating to youth” were “coordinated and monitored through the
Youth Committee.”326 This meant that US military personnel possibly monitored all
Peace Corps programs and that Peace Corps volunteers worked in an intelligence
collecting capacity for the US military and other US foreign policy and defense
institutions.
The topic reached Sargent Shriver’s desk on July 17, 1965 in a letter from Adam
Yarmolinsky, an aid to the Secretary of Defense, and described the good working
relationship between the Peace Corps and the IAYC. The letter further described how the
relationship between Peace Corps operations and those conducted by the IAYC provided
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the opportunity to work together in individual nations.327 For an example, Yarmolinsky
used the ongoing military and Peace Corps operations in the Dominican Republic stating:
As I reported to you on my return from Santo Domingo last month, I found the
Peace Corps staff the best source of information on what was going on in the
Dominican Republic. I don’t believe they saw any impropriety in responding to
the questions that I put to them, although I can imagine all kinds of situations in
which they would not feel it appropriate to provide information. One can always
invent a parade of horribles, and the fallacy of the entering wedge is one that the
Peace Corps must have had to overcome in many other contexts.328
Yarmolinsky discussing the Dominican Republic illustrates that the IAYC conducted
operations in that nation and since the US military operated within the IAYC chances are
the US military approached the Peace Corps in the Dominican Republic for information
on youth in the country. After all, the military, as described earlier, attempted to use
Peace Corps volunteers as a cover when conducting surveillance and intelligence
gathering missions in rural Dominican towns and cities during Operation Green Chopper.
After receiving the letter, on July 26, 1965 Shriver passed the letter on to Wiggins asking
for a comment on the matter.
Those working within the Peace Corps, including Shriver, were not happy that the
IAYC sought to use Peace Corps volunteers in the committee’s activities and responded
to Yarmolinsky’s original letter indicating that the Peace Corps refused to participate any
further. To start, Wiggins responded to Yarmolinsky’s July 17 letter to Shriver by
commenting that “we are all in agreement that we should not be involved in this
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operation [and] the Youth Committee.”329 That comment, and sentiment by the Peace
Corps’ senior officials, preceded Shriver’s August 4, 1965 letter to Yarmolinsky that
started by emphasizing “Secretary Rusk’s often quoted but nonetheless fundamental
statement that the Peace Corps is not an instrument of foreign policy because to make it
so would rob it of its contribution to foreign policy.”330 The letter continued by detailing
how the Peace Corps received constant attacks from the Soviet Union and its allies
describing the Peace Corps as a CIA covert operation and that the Peace Corps already
contributed to IAYC programs by continuing original Peace Corps operations.331 Shriver
also responded to Yarmolinsky’s example of the Dominican Republic by providing
another example from the Dominican Republic, in which he stated:
Let me give you just one example of why we have such great concern in this area.
Just a few weeks ago “Newsweek” published an article about the Dominican
Republic. In but one brief phrase it referred to Peace Corps Volunteers providing
information to the Ambassador. So far as we have been able to determine, there
was no truth to this statement, except as the Ambassador might have had casual
contact with individual Volunteers. But a few weeks later this phrase in this
article was cited by a responsible official of the Government of Pakistan as one of
the reasons why Pakistan was reducing its request for Peace Corps Volunteers.332
The example provided by Shriver demonstrated the Peace Corps’ unwillingness to work
with other organizations of the US government so that the Peace Corps maintained a
reasonable level of independence to continue proclaiming neutrality in US foreign policy.
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Yarmolinsky responded the next day again wishing to maintain a working relationship
with the Peace Corps adding that the Department of Defense “would be most unhappy at
the thought of separation.”333 In its early years, the Peace Corps worked to maintain
independence and in the Dominican Republic with a high level of Peace Corps volunteers
working alongside US military personnel that independence appeared threatened at every
turn. The struggle increased when Peace Corps independence meant the possibility of
working against US foreign policy goals.
In September 1965, the Peace Corps broke off relations with IAYC programs in
order to maintain the independence deemed essential to work within host nations. A
memorandum for the director dated September 30, 1965 “recommended that [the Peace
Corps] change [their] position in the Committee to observer status, that [the Peace Corps]
not participate in Committee ‘survey teams,’ and that [the Peace Corps] limit [their]
participation abroad to routine cooperation” through providing funding for foreign
citizens to visit the US in an education capacity.334 The senior officials of the Peace
Corps believed that if the organization participated in IAYC operations then the Peace
Corps would exist as an intelligence gathering organization. That perception inside of a
host nation carried the possibility of hurting the Peace Corps’ projects throughout the
world especially in places where the US military operated, such as the Dominican
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Republic. Sargent Shriver described the dangers of working with the IAYC, which
included the US military, by saying:
we weaken ourselves by not emphasizing and re-emphasizing that we are the
original emphasis on youth program and still are the most effective because we do
it our way, the honest, no-ulterior motive way. To force us to gather information,
etc. is a perfect means of wrecking the most effective program the USA possesses
for reaching youth overseas…I expressed these identical sentiments 3 years ago
when [Robert Kennedy] had this idea. It’s the wrong way to use the Peace
Corps.335
No documentation appeared within the archives that the Peace Corps split from the IAYC
impacted the relationship with the military as both continued to operate in the Dominican
Republic in order to accomplish their own goals. The Peace Corps did work with the US
military during the Dominican intervention. The co-operation occurred on its own terms
and required the Peace Corps to maintain their independence as a government
organization. The operations alongside US military personnel led Peace Corps volunteers
to grow concerned about the Dominican populations’ perceptions of the Peace Corps
working alongside the military.
The relationship between the US military and the Peace Corps lasted for the
duration of the military intervention and benefitted Dominican citizens. The US military
and the Peace Corps conducted civil action projects and civil affairs duties throughout the
Dominican Republic to better the live of Dominicans while eliminating their interest in a
leftist government. While upper level Peace Corps officials hesitated to work with US
military personnel, volunteers in the Dominican Republic showed a willingness to work
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alongside the military on a variety of projects. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the
Johnson administration considered sending two hundred and ten Peace Corps volunteers
to the Dominican Republic to offset the US military presence in the nation. This action
occurred in November 1965 and in 1966 some of those programs started to bear fruit as
Peace Corps volunteers worked alongside Special Forces operators in towns and cities
throughout the Dominican Republic not just in Santo Domingo. One example occurred in
the town of Monte Cristi, a Peace Corps volunteer along with a Special Forces soldier
and a regular US Army soldier “organized an English class three nights a week lasting
two hours each” and estimates indicated that one hundred Dominican civilians attended
the classes.336 English classes carried high importance as the Peace Corps considered
English language classes the bread and butter of the education projects in host nations.
Many of those nations’ governments believed the English language as an opening into
building relationships around the world.337
While it appears that US military and Peace Corps documents do not discuss
cooperation or the relationship between volunteers and military personnel it seems
suspect that there existed no military-Peace Corps interaction. In a civic action project
report dated April 15, 1965, the same report that describes the one instance of Special
Forces and US Army soldiers working with a Peace Corps volunteer to conduct English
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classes, many of the projects paralleled and possibly influenced Peace Corps activities.338
Other than the English classes taught in Monte Cristi, in the town of Nagua Special
Forces personnel constructed schools with playgrounds while offering English classes
and donated baseball equipment to the local teams.339 The example of Nagua showcased
that projects conducted by the military more than likely crossed over with Peace Corps
operations, especially when those operations involved construction of schools. Peace
Corps volunteers possibly taught English courses and formed local baseball teams in
those areas if not taught classes in military-built schools. However, while Peace Corps
volunteers and US military personnel worked together and appeared to have at least a
working relationship some Peace Corps volunteers grew concerned about this
relationship. In When the World Calls, Meisler discussed how one Peace Corps volunteer
showed concern when “thirsty PCV boys [crossed] the street for a…American beer at the
army base or of lonely PCV girls dating GIs” and that those actions created “confusion in
the Dominican mind about the autonomy and separate identity of the Peace Corps.”340
The main concern of Peace Corps officials and a number of volunteers remained showing
neutrality from US military actions and US foreign policy even though the actions of the
Peace Corps existed to influence peoples’ perceptions of the United States. However,
Peace Corps volunteers did not want to be seen in the same image as the US soldiers, the
occupiers. The volunteers wanted to maintain the good neighbor status. The military
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wanted the good neighbor status which led to both organizations seeking the same
objective of stability and a good image of the US. However, having Dominican civilians
identify the Peace Corps with the US military, many volunteers believed, endangered
Peace Corps operations during and after the intervention not only in the Dominican
Republic but around the world.
At the start of the military intervention Peace Corps personnel maintained a
positive reputation with the Dominican population as their works contributed to bettering
the Dominican peoples’ livelihood and participation in the Dominican government. When
the military arrived, US soldiers participated in programs that aided and contributed to
the Peace Corps’ work but joint programs or operations remained extremely rare. The
example regarding the Peace Corps volunteer working alongside a US Special Forces
soldier teaching English classes is one of the few examples apparent in military
documents, while Peace Corps documents are full of attempts to differentiate themselves
from military services and programs. Before the intervention the Peace Corps volunteers
were “liked as a person, not manipulated as a door-knob to other American aid.
Particularly in the urban barrios, the Volunteers are protected and cared for by their
neighbors.”341 That perception of the Peace Corps volunteers stemmed from the works
completed and started before the intervention. Those works and programs included rural
community development that involved developing Dominican water sources through
drilling wells, and reforestation and conservation. Other programs included community
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action involving self-help school construction guidance, providing nurses to improve the
standards of Dominican health care institutions, and providing secondary school teachers
and training teachers.342 Many of those programs operated before the military
intervention in April 1965 and some continued through the end of the intervention and
occupation in September 1966 therefore operating in a parallel fashion to military civil
action programs.
The US military did not intend to work alongside the Peace Corps during the
intervention and outside of the Johnson administration’s attempts to co-opt the Peace
Corps no documentation revealed that the military aspired to work with the Peace Corps.
However, many of the military programs interconnected and crossed paths with the Peace
Corps goals or aided other Peace Corps programs. From April 28, 1965 to June 21, 1966
the US military divided up civic action projects into two categories: military civic action
and community relations.343 Many of those projects received focus in an earlier chapter,
but some of them crossover with, or potentially impacted, projects conducted by the
Peace Corps.. A large part of the US military civic action involved community relations
projects designed to work with community members and leaders in order to better
community involvement or the community infrastructure.
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The US military’s civic action programs carried the potential to crossover with
three realms of Peace Corps activities: water access and distribution, community
organizing through recreational activities, and providing or teaching medical care and
first aid. The act of providing potable water to Dominican civilians took the primary
concern for US military personnel throughout the intervention. A number of missions
involved repairing water lines and drains, installing water pumps and tanks, and
deepening and improving water reservoirs in towns throughout the country.344 For its
part, the Peace Corps sent thirty volunteers between March 1963 and October 1964 to
construct wells to provide water access to Dominican communities.345 Peace Corps
operations for digging wells in those communities ended in 1964 seven months before the
US military intervention. The focus by Peace Corps members on supplying water to
communities illustrated that personnel in both organizations, the military and the Peace
Corps, recognized the importance of fixing water issues throughout the nation. Also, as
mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the Peace Corps only sent volunteers on a
specific program if the host nation asked for the volunteers. The Peace Corps volunteers
working on the water supply also demonstrated that the Dominican government
recognized the importance of supplying water to civilians in the hopes of managing
possible crises and maintaining stability throughout the nation.
While supplying water remained important throughout the intervention, both the
US military and the Peace Corps invested a lot of time, personnel, and material into
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medical treatment and programs to educate the civilian population. The medical civil
action projects discussed in a previous chapter carry over into this aspect, but the military
and Peace Corps personnel worked together and within each other’s programs at a variety
of points throughout the intervention. One of the primary roles fulfilled by the Peace
Corps during the opening stages of the intervention involved working in Dominican
hospitals located in Constitutionalist occupied sections of Santo Domingo. Those
volunteers continued to provide medical assistance after the initial fighting calmed down
and more than likely encountered US military personnel. Adding to this connection,
during the opening month of the intervention navy corpsmen worked in hospitals across
Santo Domingo, including a children’s hospital, assisting in multiple duties to provide
added personnel.346 After the initial stages, the US military sought to return civilian trust
in the Dominican medical institutions through providing supplies and support to
Dominican hospitals and clinics. The military also ran a number of clinics across Santo
Domingo that provided healthcare to Dominican civilians. The Peace Corps nurses’
primary goals in the Dominican Republic were to improve the care and practices of the
Dominican institutions a role which they continued to play after the end of their
enlistment in June 1965 when many of the nurses decided to re-enlist.347 Those Peace
Corps goals crossed over with the military as both sought to better Dominican health
institutions to provide better healthcare to turn the population away from leftist political
groups and to that the pro-US government could meet Dominicans’ needs.

346

Military Civic Action and Community Relations Projects, April 28,1965-June
1966; NACP.
347
Peace Corps Programs in Education and Training in Latin America, 1962,
1963, 1964; NACP.
182

Medical assistance and training also spread to other regions of the Dominican
Republic and into other professions. Starting in 1963, the Dominican government, at the
time led by Juan Bosch, asked the Peace Corps and the US Embassy to send Peace Corps
volunteers to work with Dominican fisherman in an attempt to create another export
industry outside of sugar production.348 In September 1963, the Peace Corps sent
fisherman, along with other agricultural teachers, to the Dominican Republic for the
“expansion and modernization of [the] fishing industry” with the volunteers’ tour ending
in June 1965, the military intervention started at the end of April 1965.349 It is unknown
whether or not those Peace Corps volunteers re-enlisted, or if the program continued after
June 1965. However, in November 1965, four months after the end of the Peace Corps
program, US Army Special Forces in the town of Monte Cristi “provided instruction in
first aid to local fireman and fisherman” until December 1965.350 While it is unknown if
Peace Corps volunteers attended the Special Forces instruction, the question does arise as
to whether or not the work of the Peace Corps volunteer with the local population made
the fishermen more willing to work with the Special Forces members. A second issue
arises regarding whether the members of the community drew a distinction between the
Peace Corps volunteers and military personnel and their reasons for operating the two
programs. So, while the Peace Corps sought to maintain their independence and
neutrality, and to differentiate themselves from the military the two organizations worked
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parallel to each other or benefitted from each other, intentionally or not, in a multitude of
ways.
Community organizing through recreational activities had a plethora of support
and involvement from both Peace Corps and US military personnel but for very different
reasons. Mentioned earlier in the chapter, Peace Corps volunteers organized a baseball
league with the hopes of creating a community organized event that had the potential to
draw a majority of members from the community. Thereby offering the opportunity for
Peace Corps volunteers to promote political participation to fix standing issues within the
community. A previous chapter discussed the military’s use of baseball leagues to keep
Dominican youth away from the radical political factions that existed in the Dominican
Republic after the conclusion of fighting. It does not appear that the US military or the
Peace Corps used each other’s leagues. Outside of baseball, both the Peace Corps and the
US military invested in music as another tactic to promote their goals for the nation.
From October 1963 to July 1965 the Peace Corps sent thirty-five teachers and teacher
trainers to the Dominican Republic “to aid in the training of local teachers” and those
volunteers included music teachers.351 At the same time those teachers educated young
Dominicans about the world of music the 82nd Airborne Division’s band marched down
the line of communication and conducted public concerts throughout Santo Domingo.
The US 81st Army Band followed those concerts by conducting concerts throughout the
Dominican Republic in 1966 until the military withdrawal in September. Unfortunately,
it does not appear that the military or the Peace Corps mentioned or discussed the others
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programs but music remained a key player throughout the intervention for the military as
a means of distraction and control while the Peace Corps used music to further
educational opportunities.
Very little mention appears in Peace Corps and US military records regarding the
programs operated by the other government organization. However, the Dominican
Republic is one of the few places and times where the Peace Corps and the US military
conducted programs and operations at the same time and in the same country. The Peace
Corps pushed to appear independent and neutral in order to maintain the perception that it
was not acting as an arm of US foreign policy, and Sargent Shriver pushed to keep the
Peace Corps out of any nations where the US military operated. The Dominican Republic
represented a special case as Peace Corps volunteers ran programs in the nation at the
outbreak of hostilities and did not seek evacuation when the US military intervened in the
conflict. This provided the Johnson administration and the Peace Corps with a choice,
keep the volunteers in the nation or have them withdraw. Both President Johnson and the
Peace Corps opted to have the organization remain in the Dominican Republic and
operate alongside of the US military actions. As discussed earlier in the chapter, Peace
Corps administrators believed this choice and the subsequent actions removed any
semblance of independence the Peace Corps had and threatened the Peace Corps’
relations not only in the Dominican Republic but with nations around the world.
The military held a complex relationship with the Peace Corps throughout the
intervention in the Dominican Republic. On the one hand, the military wanted to use the
Peace Corps at the beginning of the intervention to cover Special Forces members around
the Dominican Republic. The Peace Corps provided cover stories while those soldiers
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gathered intelligence on whether the Constitutionalist cause had spread outside of Santo
Domingo and if there was any danger of a communist insurgency starting in the
countryside. The military also remained a member of the Interagency Youth Committee
seeking to discover talented youths in at risk nations to train and develop into future
leaders. Members of the IAYC saw the Dominican Republic as a good testing ground for
Peace Corps volunteers to provide useful information on the nation’s youth population.
The Peace Corps for its part withdrew itself from participation on the IAYC preferring to
operate its own youth programs and vehemently refused to work with Special Forces on
their intelligence gathering missions. On the other hand, the Peace Corps and the US
military appeared to have had a working relationship with each other throughout the
intervention as long as the Peace Corps controlled its volunteers talking to the press. The
military worked with the Peace Corps to distribute food, water, and medical supplies to
Dominican civilians and the programs of both organizations crossed over at a number of
occasions. At some intersections Special Forces members worked in conjunction with
Peace Corps volunteers. Those relationships add to the complexity of the overarching
relationship between the Peace Corps and the military and offers further insight into how
the two organizations can work together even with separate goals and intentions.
During the initial stages of the intervention the US military alongside the Peace
Corps and attempted to use volunteers’ relationships with the Dominican civilians.
However, as the intervention progressed, and the fighting slowly ended the military left
the Peace Corps to conduct its own programs The Peace Corps at present is operating in
sixty-five nations around the world and none of them have a heavy US military presence
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acting in a combat or occupier stance.352 The Peace Corps relationship with the military
today is based on those early interactions with the military during the formative years of
its development after the organization’s creation in 1961. The Peace Corps managed to
stay out of the conflict in Vietnam even though many within the organization and the
Johnson administration believed there was a role for volunteers in handling refugees. The
Dominican Republic remains the one theater where Peace Corps volunteers operated in a
situation where US military personnel engaged in full combat operations and involved
Peace Corps nurses providing medical treatment to those who minutes before fought
against US troops.
The relationship developed between the military and the Peace Corp during the
1965 Dominican intervention offers insight into whether the two can ever work together
in a nation while allowing the Peace Corps to maintain its independence as a separate
government organization. The Dominican situation revealed how the US military and the
Peace Corps conducted parallel programs to improve the image of the US and to support
a pro-US government. The US government’s use of humanitarian aid involving both the
US military and the Peace Corps demonstrated that the two organizations can work
together in joint operations. However, the Dominican intervention shows that the Peace
Corps has, and always will, push back against those types of endeavors.
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CHAPTER VII – CONCLUSION
Throughout August 1966 all elements of the Inter-American Peacekeeping Force
(IAPF) finished operations and withdrew from the Dominican Republic. The Paraguayan
contingent departed the country at the end of July, the Honduran contingent left on
August 12 with the Costa Rican contingent the following day, and the Nicaraguan
contingent left on August 22.353 Brazil and the United States, the two nations that had the
largest representation in the IAPF, made up the last foreign units to leave. The election of
Joaquin Balaguer on June 1 and his swearing in on July 1, 1966 provided the Dominican
Republic a stable and US friendly government. The final elements of the US military
forces withdrew on September 21, 1966. This dissertation argued that the US military
deployed to the Dominican Republic in 1965 to create the conditions to establish a proUS government. The military relied on civic action programs and civil affairs operations
to create the conditions due to humanitarian aid, from entertainment to medical care,
made the population less likely to support a leftist government. Those humanitarian
operations alleviated the hardships felt by Dominican citizens, improved the US image,
and furthered the US mission to establish a pro-US government.
The civil affairs and civil action projects provided the by US military sought to
turn the Dominican population away from radical political organizations. The military
designed many programs to keep Dominican youth away from the radical left- and right-

353

Quarterly Historical Report, July 1-September 20, 1966, Office of the C3,
Plans and Operations; 206-6 Unified Command Inter-American Peace Force,
Organizational History, 1 July-20 September 1966; Unit Records Created During the
Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 1; National
Archives at College Park, Maryland.
188

wing political groups that gained popularity after the cease fire in September 1965. The
formation of baseball leagues sponsored by US military units provided a form of
recreation for Dominican youth to keep them away from those groups and provided
interaction with US military personnel. Those leagues allowed the military to control and
observe youths that demonstrated leadership capabilities, a role which benefitted the
Inter-Agency Youth Committee’s job in the Dominican Republic. The military baseball
leagues also worked alongside leagues developed by Peace Corps volunteers. Those
leagues aided the creation of community societies for community action and political
activism not part of the leftist political activities.
The medical aid and claims services provided humanitarian services throughout
intervention and remained an important fixture in the civil affairs and civil action
operations around the Dominican Republic. Those programs demonstrated how the
military aided the population, when the military helped, and how the military helped. The
case of Maria de Los Angeles Ogando illustrated the limits of military humanitarian aid
but also revealed the international and legal aspects of the intervention and occupation.
The OAS grew immediately suspicious of the US actions and were widely critical of the
US during the initial stages of the intervention. However, the OAS criticism abated as
their role in the intervention increased through the creation of the IAPF. The US military
passed Maria de los Angeles Ogando’s claim along with other claims filed against the US
military to the OAS for settlement. The medical aspect of Ogando’s claim also reveals
the military’s medical humanitarian mission in the Dominican Republic. The military
deemed Dominican military personnel and Dominican government officials essential to
the mission and provided access to US medical facilities under army regulations.
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However, the average member of the Dominican population did not experience this
treatment and instead received referrals to Dominican medical facilities. Those actions
illuminate the military’s attempt to demonstrate that the pro-US government had the
capabilities to meet the needs of the Dominican people and turned the Dominican
population away from the leftist political organizations policies.
Civic action programs and civil affairs operations used in the Dominican Republic
remain an example of the US military using humanitarian operations to promote and
support US foreign policy goals. Through the claims services and medical aid provided in
the Dominican intervention US medical units and claims teams controlled the Dominican
population seeking assistance. The civil affairs and civil action programs carried out by
the US military during the Dominican intervention acted as an instrument of US
government policy. Those programs carried out the official military mission of providing
an atmosphere of stability to allow US negotiators to form a permanent Dominican
government friendly to the United States.
Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman’s question about the use of the Peace Corps also
provides insight into how the government organization operated alongside US military
civil affairs and civil action programs. Seeking insight into the true use of humanitarian
activities, Hoffman asks questions revolving around the intent of humanitarianism and
whether humanitarianism is a means to power.354 While meant to analyze Peace Corps
programs within the realm of foreign policy Hoffman’s analysis can apply to the
programs conducted by the US military in the Dominican Republic. The US military
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provided humanitarian aid but chose who received aid and the humanitarian operations
created a favorable environment for the US government’s negotiations to resolve the
conflict favorable to the US. Humanitarianism also acted as a cover for the unilateral
military action taken by the US during the initial stages of the intervention by providing
an in road for the US to push the OAS to create the IAPF and for the US to legitimize the
intervention on an international stage.
The US military’s use of humanitarianism within civil affairs and civil action
programs leads to the question of can the military forces of any nation be used in a purely
humanitarian capacity? In the present, the military often engages in humanitarian actions
as seen in the US response to humanitarian aid efforts after natural disasters such as the
Indonesian tsunami disaster in 2004, and Japan’s tsunami disaster in 2011 when the US
sent an aircraft carrier to assist in the recovery. The military also deployed on
humanitarian missions within the United States after Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina
when the 82nd Airborne Division deployed to Miami and New Orleans respectively to
provide security and humanitarian assistance. The question is not to ask whether the
military should be used in humanitarian disasters but to analyze whether the military can
be a humanitarian organization. The military’s primary goal is to support and carry out
the US government’s policies in foreign relations and at times within the United States
itself. With the advent of technology and the ever-growing capabilities of militaries
around the world, particularly the US military, nations respond to humanitarian crises
whether through conflict or natural disasters by sending military personnel as the leading
representatives. The primary reason for the military moving to the frontline of
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humanitarian crises is that militaries tend to be well organized, supplied, and available in
a short period of time.
Issues arise with the military’s use as a humanitarian organization due to the
military maintaining its own regulations on top of the laws created by the US legislative
body. Those regulations determine the way the US military reacts to a given crisis or to a
situation that arises in a nation where they are deployed. This is illustrated fully in
situations regarding claims services and medical aid situations. The military, at the time
of the Dominican intervention, had to operate along the lines of its own regulations, and
so while a humanitarian situation may require one action regulations force the military to
complete another action. The Dominican intervention has a number of these situations,
some of which are discussed in the preceding chapters, but they all lead to the question of
the military acting in humanitarian endeavors. This topic requires further study in order to
provide a firm conclusion and even then, that conclusion will change as the military is
constantly changing and updating regulations. Studies specifically analyzing military
actions, regulations, and policies in a humanitarian mission can provide further
understanding of the methods and uses of the military as well as provide a lens through
which to view not only US foreign relations, but also domestic relations in times of crisis.
The military is first and foremost an organization that specializes in war. How the
military responds to humanitarian actions and the civilian perception whether inside or
outside of the US toward the mobilization of military forces can provide further insight
into the function and actions of governments and militaries, and their relationships with
civilian populations and organizations.
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It has been fifty-five years since the beginning of the US military intervention in
the Dominican Republic and there is a variety of material awaiting analysis. This
dissertation seeks to restart the conversation regarding the Dominican intervention and
US military interventions and occupations during the Cold War outside of Vietnam.
There is no question that the Vietnam War represents a vital point in US history and
military history. However, aside from Vietnam overt US military actions during the Cold
War remained small, limited conflict interventions. In fact, the US did not fight in a high
conflict military engagement after World War II, other than Korea and Vietnam, until the
Gulf War in 1991 followed by Afghanistan in 2002 and Iraq in 2003 both of which are
ongoing and turned into counterinsurgency after a couple weeks.355 Studying conflicts
such as the Dominican intervention also provides a larger world perspective during the
Cold War outside of Vietnam, and highlights US military action as a whole during the
1960s and into the 1970s. For example, the US occupation of Santo Domingo contains
similarities with the occupation of Berlin after World War Two. This dissertation seeks to
start the conversation by providing the context and motivations of the US military
engaging in civil affairs and civil action programs throughout the Dominican Republic.
The humanitarian operations carried greater value than combat actions regarding the
success of the overall mission. The intervention in the Dominican Republic reignited
overt and prolonged US military interventions during the Cold War and provides further
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analysis and context for how the US military operates alongside civil society,
governments, and humanitarian organizations to accomplish the mission.
The 1965 Dominican intervention provides a variety of research opportunities that
span across a wide variety of historical fields. In the field of war and society and military
history for example, work in soldier experiences during the intervention remains
undiscussed. Soldiers serving within the Marine Expeditionary Brigade and the 82nd
Airborne division experienced a combat environment outside the Vietnam War and many
of those Marines and soldiers did not deploy to Vietnam during the conflict but remained
in the US or Caribbean theatres. Members of the 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne experienced
the highest amount of deployments as they deployed to the Dominican Republic for the
duration of the intervention, to Detroit during the race riots in 1968, and to Vietnam in
1969. Analyzing how those Marines and soldiers viewed their service in the Dominican
Republic and how their experiences impacted their perceptions of the Vietnam War,
particularly how Vietnam has been memorialized while the Dominican intervention has
been forgotten, is beneficial to understanding the impact of the Vietnam War on military
experiences during the Cold War. A discussion of soldier experience during the
Dominican intervention also allows for a more complete comparison of the Dominican
intervention alongside other Cold War interventions and military interventions that
occurred toward the end of the 20th century. The military interventions in Granada,
Panama, and Haiti provided illuminating insight into the similarities and differences
between the engagements, and to what extent the military actions influenced each other.
All four occurred in the Caribbean region, and two of the four occurred during the Cold
War while the Haitian intervention remains one of the vital military operations in the
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region after the Cold War, and it too turned into an international intervention headed by
the United Nations.
Further building on the military aspect of the Dominican intervention, there is a
ripe opportunity to analyze the US military operating within a military coalition made up
of solely western hemisphere nations, and US military combat units serving under a Latin
American military general. The Inter-American Peacekeeping Force (IAPF) made up of
military units from the United States, Brazil, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Honduras, and
Paraguay remains the only strictly western hemisphere military coalition to have existed.
A Brazilian general, Hugo Panasco Alvim, commanded the IAPF, continuing Alvim’s
and Brazil’s relationship with the United States military dating back to the Italian
campaign during World War II where Alvim served as an artillery commander.
Relationships within the force go deeper as Nicaragua and Honduras have their own
bloody history with the United States stemming from the interventions and occupations at
the beginning of the 20th century. Paraguay and Brazil also have a heated rivalry dating
back to the War of the Triple Alliance. An in-depth analysis of the coalition and why a
coalition has not been created since will further the overall historical analysis of US and
Latin American relations throughout the Cold War and into the present.
The Dominican intervention can also provide insight into the history of
international relations and foreign policy of the US working with the OAS while trying to
keep the UN out of the Dominican military operation. The US working within the OAS to
provide the appearance of multilateralism within the international community while also
working deliberately to keep the UN out of the Dominican Republic stained the
reputation of the OAS. The UN maintained official diplomatic and military
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representatives within the Dominican Republic during the intervention, the diplomatic
representative came from Canada and the military representative came from India, but the
two officials held no authority. The OAS claimed authority due to a clause within the UN
charter that provided hemispheric organizations sole authority over any crises. The
Dominican intervention and the IAPF also provides a unique comparison with the 1994
Haitian intervention in which President Bill Clinton formed an international coalition
with the United Nations, rather than the OAS, that contained military units outside of the
western hemisphere, including France which as a long and bloody history with Haiti. An
analysis comparing the motivations of the two coalitions and the impact on the
Dominican Republic and Haiti which occupy the same island will add to the analysis of
foreign policy and international relations history of military interventions.
The economic aspect of the Dominican intervention is an avenue of research with
great importance due to the Johnson administration’s work to rebuild the Dominican
economy in order to create an atmosphere of stability. Rebuilding the Dominican
economy required financial aid from the US government and massive loans from the
World Bank and US banks who turned to the US government for promises to back up the
loans if the Dominican government defaulted. The economic aspect saw the US
government throw money into Dominican banks in order to spur Dominican businesses
and provided money to the Dominican government to provide pay to government
workers. On one instance during the intervention the US threatened to withhold
Dominican government salaries if the Dominican government did not complete a series
of reforms the US wanted completed. An economic study of the Dominican intervention
will further illuminate the US government’s involvement in the Dominican economy,
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particularly in the sugar and tobacco industries. Both industries are carried over from the
US economic involvement of the early 20th century that led to the military intervention
from 1916-1924 and offer an intriguing connection between the two interventions, and
the economic and foreign policy of the United States.
The Dominican intervention offers insight into the US military’s use of
humanitarian civil affairs and civil action projects to diminish interest in a leftist
government and to support a pro-US government. Humanitarian civil affairs and civil
action projects, not traditional military strategy and tactics, allowed for the US military
and government to view the Dominican operation as a success before proceeding to the
conflict with Vietnam. President Johnson saw the Dominican operation as vital to the US
national interest not only in the prevention of a second Cuba in the Caribbean but also
within the international community as the ability to protect US interests. That interest
reflects the US governments stance during the Berlin Airlift when the US government
refused to abandon Berlin during the Soviet Union’s embargo. The Dominican
intervention and the soldiers that participated in the intervention have been largely
overshadowed by Vietnam and US domestic events of the 1960s. However, lessons
learned during the Dominican intervention and the actions by US civil affairs and civil
action officers and the US military in general operating alongside multiple humanitarian
and governmental organizations remains influential on military actions undertaken
throughout the world.
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